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 The association between attentional bias for threat (ABT) and anxiety has 
conventionally been studied from the information-processing approach, via research 
traditions adapted from the field of cognitive psychology. While ABT is thought to play a 
causal role in anxiety, the tendency to orient more quickly to negative compared to neutral 
stimuli can also represent an adaptive habit which facilitates survival by preparing the 
organism to respond swiftly to danger. The latter notion bears implications for the design of 
research on the ABT-anxiety link which are not well reflected within the information-
processing approach. Specifically, given the adaptive aspects of ABT, the pathway between 
ABT is not likely to be direct, nor does the expression of ABT unmask underlying anxiety in 
all instances. However, led by the dominant information-processing approach, a significant 
proportion of studies on the ABT-anxiety link has focused on characterizing ABT in anxiety 
via methodologically rigorous experimental paradigms, where ABT is investigated as an 
isolated process involved in anxiety. The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link 
in the context of a research program extending from that of the information-processing 
approach, specifically one where the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study 
design by considering ABT as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety. The end goal 
was to identify theoretically-relevant mediators and/or moderators of the ABT-anxiety link 
which may ultimately serve to refine the design of attentional bias modification programs, in 
which significant effort has been invested in the search for novel ways to treat and prevent 
anxiety.  
 Two preliminary studies (Chapters 2 and 3) were conducted to inform and support the 
three empirical studies (Chapters 4 to 6) addressing the main aims of the present thesis: a 
scoping review to identify priorities in research on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety as 
conceptualized within a relevant framework, and a protocol study to support the development 
 
 
of the main behavioural measure of ABT used across the main studies of the present thesis. 
Informed by outcomes of the scoping review, the following third variables were examined for 
their potential role in the ABT-anxiety link: positive attentional bias, loneliness, and 
neurocognitive functioning across multiple domains. Positive attentional bias moderated the 
association between ABT and anxiety (Chapter 4). In Chapter 5, findings supported a proxy 
model of the role of loneliness in the ABT-anxiety link. Mediation analyses to examine the 
role of cognitive functioning in the ABT-anxiety link were targeted in Chapter 6, but could 
not be pursued in the absence of correlations between cognitive performance and self-
reported anxiety. An incidental finding across the main studies of the present thesis was that 
ABT was preferentially associated with anxiety when indexed based on sadness- relative to 
fear-related stimuli. This finding was partially replicated when probed in a follow-up study 
(Chapter 7). Collective findings point to individual differences as a source of variance in the 
ABT-anxiety link, and highlight the utility of an extended research program towards 
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 This thesis is presented as a collection of manuscripts prepared for publication, with 
the exception of the introductory and concluding chapters (Chapters 1 and 8), as well as 
Chapter 7 which sits within the present thesis as a post-hoc study. The remaining chapters are 
based on manuscripts which have either been published/accepted for publication, or 
submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. Manuscripts presented in chapters are 
identical to articles published or submitted for peer-review except for table numbers and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“… the problems and the method pass each other by.”  
– Wittgenstein (1953), Philosophical Investigations, p.231. 
 
1.1. Anxiety 
Anxiety is a cognitive, affective, physiological, and behavioural response that is 
activated when an individual encounters an event or object that could pose a threat to their 
safety (Steimer, 2002). While anxiety is ubiquitous to the human experience, some 
individuals experience anxiety with a greater intensity, frequency, and duration than others, 
even in the absence of triggers or actual danger (Craig, Brown, & Baum, 1995; Barlow, 
2000).  
Individuals who experience excessive and debilitating reactions to normative 
experiences (i.e. pathological anxiety) present commonly in clinical practice (World Health 
Organization, 2017). Besides experiencing a compromised quality of day-to-day life (Barrera 
& Norton, 2009), these individuals are at higher risk for a range of serious mental and 
physical health issues, including depression (Stein, Fuetsch, Müller, Höfler, Lieb, & 
Wittchen, 2001), suicidal ideations and/or attempts (Sareen et al., 2005), heart conditions 
(Celano, Daunis, Lokko, Campbell, & Huffman, 2016; Bowen, Senthilselvan, & Barale, 
2000), and respiratory problems (Bowen et al., 2000). 
1.1.1. Transdiagnostic or Nondiagnosis-Specific Conceptualizations of Anxiety  
Widely-accepted formal classification systems for mental disorders [e.g. Diagnostic 





2013); International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems/ICD-
10 (World Health Organization, 1992)] put forward distinct diagnostic categories to organise 
different clusters of anxiety-related symptoms based on specific feared stimuli (e.g. bodily 
symptoms in panic disorder, and social situations in social anxiety). In a complementary 
manner, drawing from various lines of evidence including genetics, comorbidity, and 
treatment response, transdiagnostic or nondiagnosis-specific conceptualizations of anxiety 
have also been developed to recognise and focus on the overlap between structurally 
delineated anxiety diagnoses. To elaborate, twin studies have consistently pointed to a 
common genetic vulnerability across anxiety disorders (Purves et al., 2019; Shimada-
Sugimoto, Otowa, & Hettema, 2015; Kendler, Health, Martin & Eaves, 1987), and anxiety 
disorders frequently co-occur (Goldstein-Piekarski, Williams, & Humphreys, 2016; Noyes, 
2001). These findings suggest that formally-recognised anxiety disorders may not necessarily 
represent independent conditions (Norton, 2008). In a third line of evidence, meta-analyses 
have demonstrated that highly similar cognitive-behavioural and pharmacological treatments 
are comparably effective across the anxiety disorders (i.e. regardless of the specific feared 
stimuli associated with the disorder; Fedoroff & Taylor, 2001; Norton & Price, 2007; Gould, 
Otto, & Pollack, 1995; van Etten & Taylor, 1998), suggesting that there are core features 
underlying different anxiety diagnoses upon which treatment mechanisms act (Norton, 2008). 
Collectively, these findings inform and support models which emphasize a common anxious 
pathology (e.g. Norton, 2006; Brown & Barlow, 2009; Goldberg, 1996; Barlow, Allen, & 
Choate, 2004; Sharp, Miller, & Heller, 2019; Vigne et al., 2019).    
The presence of transdiagnotisc models of anxiety can be identified in several areas of 
anxiety-related research. While more commonly explicitly articulated where the treatment of 
anxiety is being studied (i.e. to justify a unified treatment approach), such models can and 





a given mechanism against anxious pathology quantified by valid, global measures. 
Examples include the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) and Anxiety 
subscale of the Depression, Stress and Anxiety Scales 21 (DASS-21; S. Lovibond & P. 
Lovibond, 1995a), on which scores have been shown to be elevated among anxious 
individuals regardless of their specific anxiety diagnosis (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & 
Swinson, 1998; Vigne et al., 2019; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997).  
1.2. Attentional Bias for Threat and Anxiety 
1.2.1. The information-processing approach   
Attentional bias for threat (ABT), or the tendency to orient more quickly to negative 
compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016), is a 
construct that features prominently in research on the etiology and maintenance of anxious 
pathology from a transdiagnostic perspective (although disorder-specific lines of work have 
also been developed). The conceptual origins of the ABT-anxiety link can be traced back to 
early cognitive theories of anxiety (Beck, 1976; 1986). Based on introspective and self-report 
sources of data, it was deduced that anxious individuals appear to be characterised by an 
overactive alarm system, and hypothesised that this tendency to be over-alert to unsafe 
features in the environment may play a role in the development and maintenance of anxious 
pathology (Beck, 1986). However, set in motion by increasing demands for methodological 
rigorousness in psychological research (including the study of psychopathology), discourse-
based methods of investigating ABT in anxiety were soon phased out in favour of the 
information-processing approach to allow for ABT to be quantified based on publicly 
observable indices (e.g. reaction times; MacLeod, 1993; McNally, 2001). While sometimes 
referred to as “the” cognitive approach to the study of anxious pathology, the information-





and research practices adapted from the field of cognitive psychology, in addition to the 
theoretical position that cognitive processes play a causal role in the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety (McNally & Reese, 2008). Such an approach has also been taken to 
the study of other cognitive processes associated with anxious pathology, including biases in 
interpretation and memory (McNally & Reese, 2008).   
Examining findings from laboratory observations across 172 studies (i.e. studies 
conducted within the information-processing approach), an early meta-analytic review (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007) concluded that ABT is indeed prevalent across all presentations of anxious 
pathology (i.e. the full range of formally-recognised anxiety disorders), among children, 
adults, and older adults, and is displayed by anxious individuals in both the clinical and sub-
clinical range. In turn, this prompted further research enthusiasm for the ABT-anxiety link, 
with the number of articles published on the topic increasing steadily from 74 to 170 per year 
over the past decade1. Beyond simply establishing an association between ABT and anxiety, 
the focus of research shifted further towards developing more methodologically rigorous 
experiments to determine the conditions under which ABT can be observed among anxious 
individuals, and describing more specific models of ABT in anxiety. Common areas of study 
and debate include whether ABT in anxiety unmasks facilitated attention for, difficulty 
disengaging from, or attentional avoidance of negative stimuli; whether ABT is an automatic 
or strategic process; and, the best experimental paradigms (and/or the experimental settings 
which should be manipulated) to address these questions (see Cisler & Koster, 2010 for a 
review).  
 
1 Estimates given for the span of 2009 and 2019 based on the search terms “attentional bias” AND “anxiety” on 





1.2.1.1. Caveats associated with the information-processing approach 
Despite the initial promise of ABT as a clinically relevant construct and research 
avenue for understanding anxious pathology, the field has also been dampened by a 
cumulative body of mixed, contradictory, and/or null findings.  For example, group-
comparison studies have not always documented differences between anxious and non-
anxious individuals in the attentional processing of negative stimuli (e.g. Staugaard, 2009; 
Wirth & Wentura, 2017; see Kruijt, Parsons, & Fox, 2019 for a meta-analysis and van 
Bockstaele, Verschuere, Tibboel, Houwer, Crombez, & Koster, 2014 for a review). Further, 
although the notion that ABT may play a causal role in the etiology and maintenance of 
anxiety largely underlies the impetus for research in the area, studies have demonstrated that 
changes in anxiety do not necessarily correspond to changes in ABT (e.g. de Voogd et al., 
2016; Boettcher et al., 2013; Chau, Tse, So, & Chan, 2019).  The accumulation and 
persistence of such findings over decades of research and increasingly sophisticated 
laboratory methods for measuring ABT (e.g. eyetracking, neuroimaging, and 
electroencephalography techniques; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, & Hyatt, 2013; Harrewjin et 
al., 2020; Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014) caution against purely 
methodological accounts for observed inconsistencies in the association between ABT and 
anxiety. 
Inconsistent findings on the association between ABT and anxiety, and the prolonged 
time they have remained unresolved, can in part be understood by identifying trade-offs in 
the course of theory and research development on the ABT-anxiety link within the dominant 
information-processing approach. As earlier mentioned, the ABT-anxiety link has conceptual 
origins in early cognitive approaches to anxiety (Beck, 1976; 1986), although discourse-
based methods of investigating ABT in anxiety were eventually phased out in favour of the 





observable indices. This initial theorizing on the ABT-anxiety link began from a position 
which acknowledges the evolutionary function of ABT. That is, being quicker to attend to 
negative stimuli in the environment can also represent a functionally adaptive habit which 
facilitates survival by preparing the organism to respond swiftly to danger (Beck, 1986), a 
sentiment echoed by researchers seeking to understand basic human emotional attention (e.g. 
Öhman, 2005; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Öhman, Soares, Juth, Lindström, & Esteves, 
2012). When the adaptive aspects of ABT are considered, two key notions bearing 
implications for the design of studies on the ABT-anxiety link arise. First, the pathway 
between ABT and anxiety is not likely to be direct, given that ABT represents a 
fundamentally adaptive function (see Burris, Buss, LoBue, Perez-Edgar, & Field, 2019 for 
similar sentiments). Second, and for the same reason, the expression of ABT need not 
necessarily confer underlying anxiety or produce anxiogenic consequences in all instances 
(van Bockstaele et al., 2014). Thus, precise models of the ABT-anxiety link will require a 
research program where ABT is treated as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety, as 
much as they rely on the development of experimental paradigms to capture and specify the 
observable characteristics of ABT in anxiety.   
While the evolutionary function of ABT is sometimes given mention within the body 
of research led by the information-processing approach, the position appears to be 
ideologically accepted (rather than empirically practiced) at best. As discourse-based 
methods of investigating ABT in anxiety were phased out in favour of the information-
processing approach, this movement entailed the adaption of not only terminologies and 
experimental paradigms from the field of cognitive psychology, but also the research practice 
of investigating a given cognitive process in isolation, under carefully controlled laboratory 
conditions (McNally, 2001; McNally, 2019). While this allowed for targeted and highly 





information-processing approach widely reflects only one of at least two necessary 
components of the research program required to develop precise models of the ABT-anxiety 
link. The leverage of the information-processing approach (and persistent tradition of 
investigating ABT as an isolated process involved in anxiety) has largely left only 
methodological accounts available to make sense of inconsistent findings on the ABT-anxiety 
link (see McNally, 2019 for similar sentiments), despite cumulative evidence suggesting that 
these observations cannot entirely be attributed to the lack of sensitivity of measures of ABT 
to anxiety. Borrowing from the Wittgensteinian quote laid out at the outset, problem and 
method pass each other by. 
1.2.2.  Extending the information-processing approach 
A call for action for the information-processing approach to be extended to include 
mediator and moderator variables where the ABT-anxiety link is being studied (i.e. to 
consider ABT as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety) appears excessive where the 
defined end goal is merely descriptive. Further, no model of the ABT-anxiety link within the 
information-processing approach explicitly denies the adaptive aspects of ABT, or claims that 
ABT in isolation explains anxiety; rather, parsimony in research design is favoured towards 
descriptive goals. Yet, current directions in the treatment of anxiety point to a need for the 
adaptive aspects of ABT to be considered empirically (rather than merely ideologically) in 
research. As mentioned earlier, studies demonstrating that changes in anxiety do not 
necessarily correspond to changes in ABT (e.g. de Voogd et al., 2016; Boettcher et al., 2013; 
Chau, Tse, So, & Chan, 2019) represent one line of work which has dampened the initial 
promise of ABT as a clinically relevant construct and research avenue for understanding 
anxious pathology. These studies are situated within a fast-expanding, larger body of work 
reflecting the latest efforts to develop novel and improved interventions for anxiety in the 





to reduce ABT in the hope that this will produce reductions in anxiety, and have been 
developed and delivered on various digital platforms including mobile, tablets, and 
computers. Using modified versions of experimental paradigms initially designed to assess 
ABT, attentional bias modification programs (in their most common form) are centred around 
multiple training sessions which repeatedly redirect participants’ attention away from 
negative stimuli towards neutral or more positive stimuli (Bar-Haim, 2010; Mogg, Waters, & 
Bradley, 2017).  
Given that ABT represents an indirect or component predictor of anxiety, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that reductions in ABT produce modest reductions in anxiety at best (see Mogg 
et al., 2017 for a meta-analytic review). In light of these findings, several groups of authors 
have recommended targeting ABT as an adjunctive rather than standalone measure in the 
treatment of anxious pathology (e.g. Bechor et al., 2014; Linke et al., 2019; Kuckertz et al., 
2014), concurrently highlighting that the effects of attentional bias modification programs 
could be strengthened by adjacently targeting clinically meaningfully variables.  It is also 
worth bringing to the fore cases where reductions in anxiety are not observed even after 
individuals undergo procedures to discourage attentional orientation towards negative stimuli 
(Maoz, Abend, Fox, Pine & Bar-Haim, 2013; Bunnell, Beidel, & Mesa, 2013).  While 
possible negative effects of attentional bias modification training have not yet been 
examined, questions have been raised on whether discouraging attentional orientation 
towards negative stimuli might alter an otherwise adaptive function (van Bockstaele et al., 
2014), and highlight the need to develop ways of identifying candidates less likely to benefit 
at the treatment selection phase. As attentional bias modification programs continue to gain 
traction, incorporating mediators and moderators into the design of studies on the ABT-





development, but also for the thoughtful design of treatment protocols towards maximised 
therapeutic outcomes. 
1.2.2.1. The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework  
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a research framework put forward by the 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and in part reflects the NIMH’s efforts to 
encourage communication and integration between bodies of research on categorically-
defined psychiatric disorders (Cuthbert, 2014). According to the RDoC framework, a 
common set of functional systems underlie a wide range of psychological conditions (i.e. 
psychiatric disorders can be characterised by a profile with common descriptors).  Based on 
well-developed bodies of evidence for underlying neural circuitry (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013), 
the RDoC specifies five basic classes of functional systems (or functional domains) which act 
synergistically or additively to determine psychological health: Negative Valence Systems, 
modulating responses to aversive situations or contexts; Positive Valence Systems, 
modulating responses to positive/rewarding situations or contexts; Cognitive Systems, 
modulating neurocognitive functions; Systems for Social Processes, modulating interpersonal 
functioning and behaviour; Arousal and Regulatory Systems, responsible for contextual and 
homeostatic regulation of neural systems2. Within this framework, ABT has been linked to, 
and can be understood as an indicator of, functioning within the Negative Valence Systems 
(Gibb, McGeary, & Beavers, 2016; Paulus et al., 2017; Wieser & Keil, 2020).  
 
2 A simplified version of the RDoC framework is presented here and adopted in the present thesis. The RDoC 
framework additionally parses each major functional domain into subsidiary functional systems termed 
“constructs” (e.g. cognitive control and working memory within the Cognitive Systems). However, these 
constructs are and have been subject to continual revision (whether replaced or updated) on the basis of 
developments in research (Cuthbert, 2014). Thus, each major functional domain is presently considered 
holistically, in accord with their broad definitions. Additionally, at time of writing, a sixth major functional 
domain (Sensorimotor Systems) has been proposed. However, the domain is still under evaluation for distinct 
neurocircuitry from that of other major RDoC domains (see workshop proceedings on NIMH website), and 
research on how functioning in the domain may be assessed is still in stages of infancy. Thus, the initial five-






A key challenge to extending the information-processing approach to the ABT-
anxiety link is the lack of literature from which theoretically relevant third variables can be 
drawn, given few studies have been conducted with an approach where ABT is treated as an 
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. Selecting anxiety-relevant variables with 
conceptual ties to other functional systems in the RDoC framework (i.e. besides the Negative 
Valence Systems) represents a useful heuristic to this end, for reasons laid out as follows. 
First, the functional nature of the RDoC domains inherently limits conceptually compatible 
variables to those which contribute to a mechanistic understanding of a given 
psychopathological outcome (anxiety in this case), and thus encompass greater potential to be 
modifiable targets in clinical practice relative to those which do not (e.g. sociodemographics). 
Second, the fundamental nature of the RDoC domains to human psychological functioning 
would favour the selection of third variables which also have independent, meaningful 
relevance for understanding anxious pathology, even if interactive effects with ABT are not 
observed. Both aspects are of important service to current priorities in research on the ABT-
anxiety link, as highlighted in treatment outcomes of attentional bias modification programs: 
namely (and respectively), the need for attentional bias modification programs to be 
supplemented by adjacently targeting other clinically relevant variables, and the need for a 
treatment protocol for anxious individuals who may not be suitable candidates for attentional 
bias modification programs.  
1.3. Aims of the Present Thesis and Outline of Chapters  
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research 
program extending from that of the information-processing approach, specifically one where 
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an 
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. A key novel element in the approach to the study 





modulated by stable individual differences, and not only by transient psychological states 
and/or procedural moderators (i.e. variations in experimental manipulations). The end goal is 
to identify theoretically-relevant moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link which 
may ultimately be clinically useful (precisely, serve to refine the design of attentional bias 
modification programs)3, and the RDoC framework was used as the basis for selecting third 
variables to be studied to facilitate this goal.  
There are two preliminary studies in the present thesis spanning Chapters 2 and 3, 
conducted to inform and support the empirical studies across Chapters 4 to 6 addressing the 
main aims of the present thesis. In Chapter 2, a scoping review was conducted to characterise 
existing research on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety according to the RDoC domain 
to which studied processes could be conceptually linked. This procedure was undertaken in 
keeping with preparatory customs prior to conducting research on a given psychological 
condition within the RDoC framework. Specifically, the extent and nature of RDoC-relevant 
research on the given psychological condition is commonly first examined to identify any 
disparities in research focus, and ultimately highlight the RDoC domains which should be 
prioritised in future research (Glenn, Cha, Kleiman, & Nock, 2017; Rabasco, Ambrosino, & 
McKay, 2019; Koudys, Traynor, Rodrigo, Carcone, & Ruocco, 2019; Wildes & Marcus, 
2015; Schreiner, Klimes-Dougan, Begnel, & Cullen, 2015). The present scoping review 
served to the same end by informing the selection of third variables which were studied in 
relation to the ABT-anxiety link in subsequent empirical studies. Chapter 3 presents a 
protocol study conducted to support the development of the main behavioural measure of 
ABT (a visual dot probe task) used across the main studies of the present thesis (Chapters 4 
to 6). Using a modified version of this dot probe task, a follow-up study on the nature of the 
 
3 While this thesis may produce findings relevant to a broader range of interventions for anxiety, the current 
thesis will focus on the relevance of findings to the design of attentional bias modification programs in light of 





anxiety-related attentional bias was conducted and is presented in Chapter 74. Chapter 8 
concludes with a general discussion that summarises key findings, limitations, and 
implications of the current thesis.
 
4 It should be noted that the focus of the present thesis was not on the procedural moderators of ABT in anxiety 
(i.e. the experimental conditions under which the anxiety-linked attentional bias can be observed). However, this 
study (Chapter 7) was conducted in light of the pattern of association between indices of attentional bias and 
self-reported anxiety incidentally observed across the empirical studies in Chapters 4 to 6, owing to 





Chapter 2: A Scoping Review on the Extent and Nature of Anxiety-Related Research 
within the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Framework* 
  
 
* The manuscript presented in this chapter (Section 2.1) is currently being reviewed for 
publication (under the same title) at New Ideas in Psychology: 
 
Wei, M., & Roodenrys, S. (2020). A Scoping Review on the Extent and Nature of Anxiety-
Related Research within the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Framework. New 








Background: The need for research on modifiable risk factors in anxiety has been 
highlighted in previous reviews synthesizing existing literature on the etiology and 
maintenance of anxiety. The National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) provides a useful framework to lead this body of work.  
Methods: A scoping review was conducted to examine the extent and nature of research 
evidence on each RDoC functional domain as they have been investigated in anxiety via 
relevant correlates, with the end goal of informing priorities in future anxiety-related research 
within the RDoC framework.  The selection criteria for this scoping review resulted in 171 
cases (across 95 studies) where RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety were studied.  
Results and Conclusions: Results highlight disparate research focus across domains (limited 
research on processes within the Positive Valence Systems, Systems for Social Processes, and 
Arousal/Regulatory Systems), inconsistent findings within domains (Cognitive Systems), and 
a lack of research on cross-domain interactions. These findings provide a starting point for 









Anxiety-related conditions represent one of the most commonly encountered forms of 
psychopathology in mental health practice, whether in trait-like or clinical form (Douglas & 
James, 2013). While formal classification systems for mental disorders [e.g. Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders/DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013); 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems/ICD-10 
(World Health Organization, 1992)] put forward distinct diagnostic categories for different 
clusters of anxiety-related symptoms, there also exist core features and hence shared 
mechanistic underpinnings across the range of formally recognized anxiety-spectrum 
disorders (Bystritsky et al., 2013; Lang & McTeague, 2009).  The most recent systematic 
review of research on the etiology and maintenance of anxious pathology (Zimmermann et 
al., 2020) concluded with the need for more research on modifiable risk factors in anxiety on 
the whole, a sentiment supported by the volume of studies on sociodemographic and familial 
risk factors identified in previous anxiety-related reviews (Mirza & Jenkins, 2004; Moreno-
Peral et al., 2014).  
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) is a research framework put forward by the 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and in part reflects the NIMH’s efforts to 
circumvent stalled progress in the treatment of major psychiatric disorders by improving the 
applied value of research findings (Elmer, Brown, & Shepard, 2016; Cuthbert, 2014; Vilar et 
al, 2019). To this end, the RDoC framework proposes that there are five1 major functional 
domains which act synergistically to determine psychological health, and encourages 
research to be structured around these domains: Negative Valence Systems, driving responses 
 
1 A sixth domain (Sensorimotor Systems) has been proposed at time of writing. However, there is overlap 
between processes operating within the Sensorimotor Systems and other domains (see workshop proceedings on 
NIMH website), and research on mapping distinct psychological constructs onto this new domain is still in 






to aversive stimuli; Positive Valence Systems, driving responses to positive stimuli; 
Cognitive Systems, responsible for various (neuro)cognitive processes; Systems for Social 
Processes, driving interpersonal functions; and Arousal/Regulatory Systems, responsible for 
the context-appropriate activation of neural systems and provision of homeostatic regulation. 
Each major functional domain can be examined across seven units of analysis (genes, 
molecules, cells, neural circuits, physiology, behaviour, self-report), and subsumes several 
sub-dimensions (termed “constructs”) which specify subsidiary processes operating in each 
domain (e.g. “working memory” within the Cognitive Systems). The focus of the RDoC 
framework on mechanistic processes which underpin mental health conditions is particularly 
well-aligned with current priorities in anxiety-related research, namely the need for a better 
understanding of modifiable risk factors which may be targeted in psychological practice.  
Scoping reviews are carried out to develop an understanding of the research landscape 
on a given area by examining the extent, range and nature of associated research evidence 
(Arksey & O’Malley, 2005; Grant & Booth, 2009). The current scoping review sought to 
examine the extent and nature of research evidence on each RDoC domain as they have been 
investigated in anxiety via relevant correlates (i.e. relevant indices of functioning), with the 
end goal of informing priorities in future anxiety-related research within the RDoC 
framework. Integrating the RDoC’s purpose of maximising the generalisability and applied 
value of research findings (Cuthbert, 2014; Vilar et al., 2019), this scoping review examined 
existing research on the RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety with a focus on correlates which 
have predictive value in non-disorder-specific anxious pathology (i.e. correlates which may 
be relevant across the full range of formally recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders). Previous 
anxiety-related studies approached using the RDoC framework have focused on 
characterising anxiety in terms of constructs or subsidiary processes operating within a single 






Shankman, 2017). The present review is distinct from these studies in that 1) all major 
functional domains put forward in the RDoC framework are considered for their contribution 
to anxious pathology, and 2) given the status of constructs as concepts subject to continual 
revision on the basis of developments in research (Cuthbert, 2015), each major functional 
domain is considered holistically, without further breaking down the subsidiary processes 
operating in each domain. 
  
Methods 
Literature Search Strategy 
The first search to identify relevant studies was conducted by the first author using the 
following databases: SCOPUS, PubMed, and PsycINFO. Articles published from database 
inception to October 2019 containing the following terms within their title, abstract, or 
keywords were located: 
1. [Title] Anxiety 
2. [Title, Abstract, Keywords] At least one of the following terms: risk factor*, 
contributing factor*, predisposing factor*, predict*, correlat*, associat* 
To limit the scope of located studies to those with interests in non-disorder-specific 
anxious pathology, the “NOT” Boolean operator was applied to the following terms (and 
their abbreviations/variants) across title, abstract, and keywords: obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, social anxiety, phobia, panic disorder, depression. 
The exact string of search terms entered in each database can be found in Appendix A. 
Study Selection 






1. Published in English in a peer-reviewed journal.  
2. Examined the relationship between one or more correlates of anxious pathology (as 
narrowed down by the “NOT” Boolean operator described above) which have a 
causal or bidirectional relationship with anxiety. The selection of RDoC-relevant 
correlates was delineated in a secondary procedure; see sub-section below. 
3. Anxiety is studied as a syndrome or a collection/constellation of symptoms (i.e. study 
interests are not limited to a specific symptom of anxiety). 
4. Anxiety is quantified directly via self-report or diagnostic status, and not inferred 
indirectly via physiological or behavioural indices.  
Articles were excluded if they satisfied one of the follow criteria: 
1.  Correlates of transient or experimentally induced anxiety were studied (e.g. elevated 
plasma inflammatory markers, heightened pain perception, increase in heart rate and 
skin conductance from baseline). 
2. Findings on anxiety only apply to a specific sub-population (i.e. anxiety was studied 
in a specific medical, psychiatric, or sociodemographic population).  
3. Anxiety being examined is situation-specific (e.g. pain, health, math, dental, death, 
preoperative anxiety).  
4. Predictors of change in anxiety are being studied (e.g. intervention outcomes). 
5. Group-comparison studies where anxiety was not represented as an independent 
grouping variable, and thus could not be modelled as a continuous outcome variable.   






Articles which met the eligibility criterion listed above were reviewed for RDoC-
relevant cases. Eligible correlates had to be variables which could be linked to at least one of 
the five major RDoC domains: Negative Valence Systems (NVS), Positive Valence Systems 
(PVS), Cognitive Systems (CS, Systems for Social Processes (SS, and Arousal/Regulatory 
Systems (ARS). RDoC guidelines (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013) specify that variables need to be 
continuous, transdiagnostic, and granular enough to be tied to an RDoC domain. In accord 
with these guidelines (Cuthbert & Kozak, 2013) and previously used procedures (Glenn et al., 
2018), the following categories of variables were not included in the current review:  
Sociodemographics (40 cases), health-risk behaviours or lifestyle factors (19 cases), family 
history of psychopathology (15 cases), negative life events or life stressors (18 cases), other 
mental health disorders or chronic physical health conditions (26 cases), parenting factors (27 
cases), physical environmental factors (2 cases) and variables too broad to be tied to an 
RDoC domain (12 cases). A full list of excluded cases (and their studies of origin) is 
available in Appendix B. Figure 1 presents an adapted PRISMA flow diagram 
(http://www.prisma-statement.org/Extensions/ScopingReviews) to illustrate the steps 
involved in the initial selection of studies and subsequent selection of RDoC-relevant 
correlates. 
Figure 2.1. Adapted PRISMA flow diagram for the initial selection of studies and subsequent 
selection of RDoC-relevant correlates. References for the 154 articles assessed for eligible 







Data Extraction and Coding Procedures 
For each included correlate, the following information was extracted and is presented 
in Table 2.1: (1) its best-fitting major RDoC domain, (2) its level of measurement (unit of 
analysis), according to descriptors given in the RDoC framework (self-report, behaviour, 
physiology, neural ciruits, cells/molecules or genes), and (3) its associated anxiety outcome, 
in terms of whether anxiety was studied in a paediatric or adult population, and whether 






age ranges are provided for cases examined in association with paediatric anxiety (< 18 years 
old). Where age ranges were not provided, mean ages are given instead.  
The aim of the current scoping review was to examine  the extent and nature of 
research evidence on each RDoC domain as they have been investigated in anxiety via 
relevant correlates, with the end goal of informing research priorities in future research on 
anxiety within the RDoC framework. A key challenge to this end was to categorise a range of 
variables into RDoC domains where they have (for the most part) not been previously linked, 
in a way which presents the landscape of the existing RDoC-relevant literature on anxiety as 
objectively as possible. To this end, the NIMH guidelines were used as the main point of 
reference. Additionally, besides resolution via discussion, relevant literature was probed 
where there was ambiguity or disagreement between present authors in placing a given 
correlate2. This latter process identified several cases where correlates were linked to two 
different RDoC domains by different groups of scholars in existing literature. The RDoC 
domain for such cases is specified in the format [A/B], where A and B represent the two 
disputed domains. Further, there were several cases where an affective load was added to 
measures of cognition (CS) or arousal/regulation (ARS), so that the measured construct likely 
also taps one of the Valence Systems. RDoC domains for such cases are also specified in the 
format [A/B], where A is either CS or ARS, and B is either PVS or NVS3.  
In some cases, the association between a given primary variable of interest and 
anxiety was examined in the context of a third moderating variable. Such moderating effects 
 
2 Authors agreed on the placement of correlates 82.5% of the time.   
3 Decisions to classify psychological constructs into singular or hybrid [A/B] RDoC domains were based on the 
original designated purpose of measures developed to capture the psychological constructs. For example, the 
attentional blink task was originally developed to capture the phenomenon reflecting temporal limitations in the 
ability to deploy visual attention (a Cognitive Systems construct); it was later adapted for assessing temporal 
limitations in the ability to deploy visual attention to emotional/threatening stimuli, so that the captured 






are specified where applicable. Where these moderating effects represent a cross-domain 
interaction between two major RDoC domains, the RDoC domain for the given case is 
specified in the format [A x B], where A represents the RDoC domain of the primary variable 
of interest, and B the domain of the moderating variable. 
Finally, similar to a previous, analogous study (Glenn et al., 2018), a separate multi-
domain category was created to accommodate correlates which likely operate across the full 
range of RDoC domains.  
 
Results 
The selection criteria for this scoping review resulted in 171 cases (across 95 studies) 
where RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety were studied (see Table 2.1 for a list of cases and 
their studies of origin). Table 2.2 provides a summarised count of the total cases, non-
significant cases, and cases where cross-domain interactions were examined for each RDoC 
domain. Figure 2.2 presents a bubble chart illustrating the extent and nature of research 
evidence on each RDoC domain based on these case counts. The narrative that follows 
presents a breakdown of information in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2 (see Appendix D for 
additional details). Studies on paediatric and adult anxiety are not considered separately as 
the landscape of RDoC-relevant research was similar in both lines of work. 
Table 2.1. Included RDoC-relevant correlates and their studies of origin. The “NS” 
superscript marks cases where a correlate yielded a non-significant association with an 
outcome measure of anxiety. Asterisks mark cases where an affective load was added to 
measures of cognition (CS) or arousal/regulation (ARS), so that the measured construct likely 




































































Behaviour CS Paediatric 
anxiety 
(mean age = 
13.66) 
3 














Behaviour NVS    





Self-report NVS Paediatric 
anxiety 
(12 to 17 
years old) 
1 
4 6 Banks et 
al., 2018 
Greater increase 
in heart rate in 
the context of 
ambiguous threat 
[only for those 

























 8  Estimated 
intelligenceNS 
Behaviour CS   
 9  Psychomotor 
processing 
speedNS  
Behaviour CS   
 10  Cognitive 
flexibilityNS 
Behaviour CS   
 11  Working 
memoryNS 








al., 2012  
Avoidant coping 
strategies 
Self-report  NVS Presence/abs




st et al., 
2018 
Attachment 
insecurity   









social support  
Self-report  SS Adult 
anxiety  
1 










threat [Age 8-17 







disorder    
2 










NVS   


















































SS   
 21  Low social skills  Self-report 
(parent) 
SS   
13 22 Buss, 
2011 
Early expression 










































Behaviour ARS Adult 
anxiety   
1 

































NVS   




Physiology  ARS Presence/abs
ence of adult 
GAD  
2 




(rs4680) of the 
Catechol-O-
Methyltransferas
e (COMT) gene 
Genes  Multi   
19 30 Chapma
n et al., 
2013 
Sleep deficiency   Self-report ARS Presence/abs






















(dmPFC) and left 
hippocampus 
21 32 Chiu et 
al., 2019 
Lower capacity 


























 34  Facilitated 
learning of 
conditioned 
safety cues   
Physiology  PVS   





Self-report SS  Paediatric/a
dult anxiety 
(16-19 
years)   
1 




Self-report NVS Adult 
anxiety  
1 













 38  Lower 
experiential 
avoidance 
Behaviour NVS   
 39  Lower 
mindfulness 
Self-report PVS   







and low mental 
effort only] 












and low mental 
effort only]  










[at high cognitive 
load only]  
Behaviour CS Adult 
anxiety  
2 




Behaviour  CS    












30 45 Ewing et 














 46  Negative 
interpretation 
biasNS 
Behaviour  NVS   
 47  Emotion 
recognition bias 
for happy facesNS  
Behaviour PVS   























 50  Neuroticism Self-report NVS   





 52  OpennessNS  Self-report  CS   
 53  Low 
Agreeableness  






Physiology  ARS Paediatric 
anxiety 
(mean age = 
14)  
1 
34 55 Fox et 











a Conscientiousness was described as a CS-related construct in Glenn et al. (2018) and PVS-related construct in 
Widiger (2017). 
b Extraversion was described as an SS-related construct in Glenn et al. (2018); described as both SS- and PVS-
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Table 2.2.  Descriptive summary of cases (Total cases = 171) in each RDoC domain. 






Negative Valence Systems 56 7 2 
Positive Valence Systems 15 5 3 
PVS/CS 2 0 0 
PVS/SS 2 1 0 
Cognitive Systems 46 23 3 
CS/NVS 1 0 0 






Systems for Social 
Processes 
19 1 0 
Arousal and Regulatory 
Systems  
13 1 1 
ARS/NVS 1 1 0 
ARS/PVS 1 1 0 
Multi-Domain 14 0 0 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Visualization of extent and nature of research evidence on each RDoC domain as 
they have been investigated in anxiety, based on case counts in Table 2.2. Larger bubbles 






bubbles indicate a higher proportion of cases where correlates were significantly associated 
with anxiety. The area of overlap between bubbles correspond to the number of cases where 
correlates from two domains were examined for interactive effects on anxiety, although not 
all these interactive effects were significant (see Table 2.2). 
For each sub-section below, variables are presented in descending order of counts of cases 
where they have been examined in association with anxiety, along with counts of cases where 
non-significant associations were documented with anxiety (where applicable).  
Negative Valence Systems 
 Negative Valence Systems drive responses to aversive stimuli. The following NVS-
variables or classes of NVS-related variables (56 cases in total) have been examined in 
association with anxiety: Abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening 
stimuli (16 cases; non-significant in 1 case)4, higher behavioural inhibition (11 cases; non-
significant in 1 case), facilitated learning of conditioned threat cues (5 cases; non-significant 
association in 3 cases), abnormalities in relation to interoceptive processing (5 cases), early 
temperamental factors (4 cases; non-significant in 1 case), higher tendencies for avoidant-
related behaviours (4 cases; see Case #37 and #38 for discrepant results across different 
levels of measurement/units of analysis), higher Neuroticism (3 cases), Behavioural 
Inhibition System (BIS) sensitivity (2 cases), greater negative interpretation bias (2 cases; 
non-significant in 1 case), higher levels of worry (2 cases), decreased lateral prefrontal brain 
 
4 Drawing back to the focus of this thesis on attentional bias for threat and anxiety, it should be noted that cases 
in this class of variables were mostly related but not identical to the attentional bias for threat construct (e.g. in 
eight cases, abnormal neural activity during the visual processing of threatening stimuli was examined; see 
Appendix D for a full breakdown of variable classes). For this reason, the relative consistency of the association 
between “abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening stimuli” and anxiety documented in 
the studies captured in the current review should not be understood as contradictory to literature reviewed in 
Chapter 1, specifically where inconsistent associations between attentional bias for threat and anxiety are 






responses during negative feedback (1 case), and higher perceived stress (1 case). Cross-
domain interactions were examined in 2 cases.   
Positive Valence Systems 
 Positive Valence Systems drive responses to positive stimuli. The following PVS-
related variables (15 cases in total) have been examined in association with anxiety: 
Facilitated learning of conditioned safety cues (3 cases), lower spiritual well-being (1 case), 
lower mindfulness (1 case), increased lateral prefrontal brain responses during reward 
anticipation (1 case), decreased attention for positive stimuli (1 case), lower capacity to 
engage in positive emotions (1 case), lower self-directedness (1 case), and higher Behavioural 
Activation System (BAS) sensitivity (1 case). Cross-domain interactions were examined in 3 
cases. The following variables occurred in single cases and yielded non-significant 
associations with anxiety:  Emotion recognition bias for happy faces, persistence, novelty 
seeking, reward dependence, and self-transcendence.  
PVS-related Variables with Disputed Domains  
 Low Conscientiousness (2 cases) and Extraversion (2 cases; non-significant in 1 case) 
have been examined in association with anxiety. Disputed domains of classification for these 
variables were CS and SS respectively (see Table 2.1, Footnote a and b).   
Systems for Social Processes 
 Systems for Social Processes drive interpersonal functions. The following SS-related 
variables (19 cases in total) have been examined in association with anxiety: Attachment 
insecurity (8 cases), lower Agreeableness (2 cases), lower social skills/higher social problems 
(3 cases), oxytocin levels (2 cases; direction of association varies by population of study – see 






social support (1 case). Only one case/variable (Cooperativeness) yielded a non-significant 
association with anxiety. Cross-domain interactions were not examined in any of the 19 
cases.  
Cognitive Systems 
 Cognitive Systems are responsible for various (neuro)cognitive processes. The 
following CS-related variables (46 cases in total) have been examined in association with 
anxiety: Impaired inhibitory control (5 cases; see Case #114 for opposite pattern of findings), 
impaired working memory (5 cases; non-significant in 4 cases), impaired attentional control 
(4 cases; see Case #128 and #129 for discrepant results across different units of analysis), low 
processing efficiency (3 cases), better cognitive flexibility (3 cases, non-significant in 2 
cases), higher error monitoring (2 cases), lower estimated intelligence (2 cases; non-
significant in 1 case), lower Openness (2 cases; non-significant in 1 case), memory (2 cases; 
non-significant in both), math ability (2 cases; non-significant in both), attention/vigilance (2 
cases; non-significant in both), overestimation of time (1 case), sub-optimal brain-wide 
neural connectivity (1 case), increased planning time (1 case), more frequent cognitive 
failures (1 case). The following variables occurred in single cases and yielded non-significant 
associations with anxiety: psychomotor processing speed, abstract reasoning, orientation, 
visual perception, language, hand-eye coordination, praxis, and verbal learning. Cross-
domain interaction effects were examined in 3 cases.  
CS-Related Constructs Assessed Via Affectively Modified Tasks 
 In one study (spanning 2 cases), reduced attentional blink for threatening stimuli 
(CS/NVS) and positive stimuli (CS/PVS) were examined in association with anxiety. The 







Arousal/Regulatory Systems are responsible for the context-appropriate activation of 
neural systems and provision of homeostatic regulation. The following ARS-related variables 
or classes of ARS-related variables (13 cases in total) have been examined in association with 
anxiety: Irregularities in resting autonomic nervous system activity (8 cases; non-significant 
in 1 case), impaired contextual regulation of defensive responses (2 cases; non-significant in 
2 cases), higher susceptibility to behavioural conditioning (1 case), symptoms of sensory 
processing disorder in childhood (1 case), and sleep deficiency (1 case).  
ARS-Related Constructs Assessed Via Affectively Modified Tasks 
In one study (spanning 2 cases), startle reactivity during the viewing of unpleasant 
images (ARS/NVS) and startle reactivity during the viewing of pleasant images (ARS/PVS) 
were examined in association with anxiety. Both associations were non-significant.  
Multi-Domain  
A separate multi-domain classification was created to accommodate correlates which 
likely operate across the full range of RDoC domains. On account of heterogenous (but not 
mutually exclusive) views on the psychological constructs emergent from different brain 
states in the existing literature, the majority of variables categorised as multi-domain were 
indices of neural activity/connectivity. The following multi-domain variables (14 cases in 
total) have been examined in association with anxiety: Abnormal baseline connectivity 
between the amygdala and other brain regions (8 cases), reductions in amygdala volume (2 
cases), baseline functional dominance of amygdala and midline cortices (1 case), higher 






Met allele of BDNF Vall66Met polymorphism (1 case), and presence of functional Val¹⁵⁸Met 
polymorphism (rs4680) of the COMT gene (1 case).  
Discussion 
The current scoping review examined the extent and nature of research evidence on 
each RDoC domain as they have been investigated in anxiety via relevant correlates (i.e. 
relevant indices of functioning), with the end goal of informing research priorities in future 
anxiety-related research within the RDoC framework. There are several notable findings. 
First, the number of cases where interactive effects between RDoC functional domains on 
anxious pathology (i.e. cross-domain interactions) were examined is small across-the-board. 
This is the case even though abnormal mental functioning, including the expression of 
anxious pathology, is likely to reflect the synergistic effects of at least two functional 
domains (Elmer et al., 2016). 
Second and relatedly, the frequency of cases was not equal across the five major 
RDoC domains and sixth multi-domain category, with a disproportionately high number of 
cases occurring in the NVS category (56 of 171 cases). This landscape of research is neither 
surprising nor unique to anxiety-related research, given the fundamental relevance of the 
NVS to affective conditions in general (Carcone & Ruocco, 2017), and anxious pathology 
specifically (Lebowitz, Gee, Pine, & Silverman, 2018). However, despite NVS-related 
processes appearing to be a leading focus in research on the etiology and maintenance of 
anxiety (as conceptualised within the RDoC framework), explicit investigations on how these 
processes might interact with those from other functional domains is lacking (observed only 
in 2 cases). As a point worth noting, factors related to the attentional bias for threat construct 
(i.e. abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening stimuli) were dominant 
among cases in the NVS identified through the current search strategy. In ventures to develop 






behavioural training programs localised in the modification of threat-related attentional 
processes. The moderate success of the field in effecting and sustaining therapeutic benefits 
(see Mogg & Bradley, 2018; Mogg, Waters, & Bradley, 2017; Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 
2014 for meta-analytic reviews) point to the limitations of single-domain risk models for 
anxiety, and further highlight the need for cross-domain interactions to be examined where 
NVS-related processes are studied in anxiety, including but not limited to attentional bias for 
threat. 
Third, although the count of cases was smallest for the ARS and Multi-Domain 
categories (13 and 14 cases respectively), many of the factors in these categories tend to be 
biologically-driven. In the search for modifiable risk factors for anxiety, these factors may 
have utility in elucidating mechanisms of change but may not necessarily be directly targeted 
in psychological practice. Examples include irregularities in resting autonomic nervous 
system activity (ARS) and abnormal baseline neural activity/connectivity (Multi-domain). 
Fourth, there is limited research on the PVS- and SS-related correlates of anxiety (15 
and 19 cases, respectively), despite these functional domains encompassing a range of 
psychological processes which offer promise in clinical utility (e.g. reward learning, 
affiliation and attachment; Glenn et al., 2018). Of note, among the 19 cases where SS-related 
variables were examined in association with anxiety, a non-significant association was 
observed only in one case (5.3%). However, five of the 15 PVS-related cases (33.3%) yielded 
non-significant associations. These findings suggest there may be more heterogeneity in the 
PVS domain of the anxious profile relative to the SS domain, a tentative notion which may 
nonetheless be useful to keep in view when tailoring future investigations to extend research 
on anxiety within the RDoC framework. 
Finally, although the count of cases for the CS category (46 cases) was second in 






(23 of 46 cases; 50%). It has been highlighted that there is heterogeneity in measures used to 
assess the same neurocognitive constructs within the anxiety-related literature (Leonard & 
Abramovitch, 2019). Further research is needed to verify whether there is indeed 
heterogeneity in the CS domain of the anxious profile, or whether these mixed findings are 
better explained by methodological factors.   
Limitations 
 The current scoping review had several limitations. First, the “NOT” Boolean 
operator was applied to terms related to a range of psychological conditions in the present 
search strategy, including formally recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders and depression. 
While the goal was to limit the scope of located studies to those with interests in non-
disorder-specific anxious pathology (i.e. to identify targeted correlates which may be relevant 
across the full range of formally recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders), this search strategy 
may not have identified all eligible studies. Second, finer-grained details on anxiety outcome 
measures were not extracted beyond the population of study (paediatric/adult) and whether 
anxiety was quantified continuously or dichotomously (i.e. diagnostic status). Third, it is 
possible that the overall number of cases where RDoC-relevant correlates of anxiety were 
studied may have been underrepresented due to the exclusion of studies which were not titled 
according to the variants of “correlate” used in the current search strategy (listed in the 
Methods section). Nonetheless, presently identified disparities in the count of cases across 
RDoC domains are unlikely to reflect an artefact of the current search strategy (given no 
RDoC-specific terms were used), so that the landscape of the larger RDoC-relevant literature 
pertaining to anxiety is likely to be similar to that reported here based on the sample of 
included studies. Fourth, as mentioned in the Methods section (Data Coding and Procedures), 
a key challenge of this study was to categorise a range of variables into their best-fitting 






end, the categorisation process relied only on the judgement and consensus of a research team 
of two. As highlighted in the Results section, there have been a handful of cases where 
variables have been categorised into different RDoC domains by different researchers (see 
also Footnote a and b in Table 2.1), and the classification of variables in the current study is 
likewise susceptible to alternative opinions. Finally, although it is not the purpose of a 
scoping review to undertake any quality assessment procedures (Arksey & O'Malley, 2005), 
it should nonetheless be understood that included studies were not further evaluated beyond 
the extent required for extracting data relevant to the current scoping review. Barring these 
limitations, findings from the current scoping review provide a starting point for advancing 








The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research 
program extending from that of the information-processing approach, specifically one where 
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an 
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. The end goal is to identify theoretically-relevant 
moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link which may ultimately be clinically useful 
(precisely, serve to refine the design of attentional bias modification programs), and the 
RDoC framework was used as the basis for selecting third variables to be studied to facilitate 
this goal.  
 Section 2.1. presents a scoping review conducted to characterise existing research on 
the etiology and maintenance of anxiety according to the RDoC domain to which studied 
processes could be conceptually linked. This procedure was undertaken in keeping with 
preparatory customs prior to conducting research on a given psychological condition within 
the RDoC framework. Specifically, the extent and nature of RDoC-relevant research on the 
given psychological condition is commonly first examined to identify any disparities in 
research focus, and ultimately highlight the RDoC domains which should be prioritised in 
future research (Glenn, Cha, Kleiman, & Nock, 2017; Rabasco, Ambrosino, & McKay, 2019; 
Koudys, Traynor, Rodrigo, Carcone, & Ruocco, 2019; Wildes & Marcus, 2015; Schreiner, 
Klimes-Dougan, Begnel, & Cullen, 2015). This scoping review was similarly conducted to 
inform the selection of third variables most apt to study in relation to the ABT-anxiety link. 
 In previous analogous reviews on the RDoC-relevant literature conducted in relation 
to other forms of psychopathology, prioritised RDoC domains for future research are 
typically determined as those which have received lesser attention (i.e. span fewer cases) in 
investigations on the etiology and maintenance of that given psychological condition (Glenn 






al., 2015). However, for reasons detailed as follows, this heuristic was adapted for the present 
thesis. First, with Negative Valence Systems (i.e. the domain to which ABT has been linked) 
as the reference point (56 cases), outcomes of the scoping review indicated that research on 
Cognitive Systems span a substantial number of cases in investigations on the etiology and 
maintenance of anxious pathology (46 cases, with the next-highest count of cases being 19 in 
Systems for Social Processes). However, the inconsistent predictive value of Cognitive 
Systems in anxious pathology (23 of 46 cases were non-significant) warrants further 
clarification and research in the area, with recommendations having been made to do so in the 
context of standardised, more comprehensive neurocognitive measures (Leonard & 
Abramovitch, 2019). More specifically, it is possible that neurocognitive functioning is 
weighted less in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety, but the notion warrants clarification 
by assessing the association between a wider range of neurocognitive domains and anxious 
pathology.  
Second, the RDoC domains which received relatively lesser attention in research on 
the etiology and maintenance of anxious pathology (as determined by fewer case counts) 
were not equal in the extent to which they captured anxiety-relevant processes which may be 
directly amendable to psychological intervention, and/or had measures available to be used as 
feasible screening tools. Specifically, Systems for Social Processes, Positive Valence 
Systems, and Arousal/Regulatory Systems spanned relatively fewer cases (range 13 to 19), 
among which Arousal/Regulatory Systems appear to capture biologically-modulated 
processes of anxiety to a greater extent (e.g. irregularities in resting autonomic nervous 
system activity). In a clinical context, biologically-modulated processes may be more useful 
for evaluating rather than effecting mechanisms of change (Kazdin, 2007) and tend to require 
equipment which is less readily accessible in psychological practice in order to be measured 






goal of the present thesis to contribute to the refinement of attentional bias modification 
programs, anxiety-related processes from the Arousal/Regulatory Systems may encompass 
lesser potential to serve as direct adjunctive therapeutic targets to ABT, or aid in identifying 
individuals who may not be suitable candidates for attentional bias modification programs.  
Based on the unique landscape of RDoC-relevant literature on anxious pathology 
emergent from the present scoping review, and keeping in view the end goals of the present 
thesis, Systems for Social Processes, Positive Valence Systems, and Cognitive Systems were 
presently considered as prioritised RDoC domains for research in the selection of third 
variables to study in relation to the ABT-anxiety link. The specific factors selected to be 
studied in relation to the ABT-anxiety link were chosen on the basis of 1) having conceptual 
ties to these RDoC domains at definition level, 2) being broad enough to be used as proxy 
indicators of functioning of their conceptually-linked RDoC domain, and 3) having been 
linked not only to anxiety but also to ABT (albeit independently) in previous literature, thus 
offering enhanced potential to add explanatory value to models of the ABT-anxiety link in 
the plausibility of a meaningful interrelationship. These factors were: attentional bias for 
positive information (Positive Valence Systems), loneliness (Systems for Social Processes), 
and neurocognitive functioning across a comprehensive, standardised test battery (Cognitive 
Systems). The expected interrelationship between these variables and the ABT-anxiety link, 
conceptualised based on relevant literature, is detailed in literature reviews presented in 




 The rationale for examining multiple domains of neurocognitive functioning for their potential role in the 
ABT-anxiety link draws on the claim that functioning within Cognitive Systems (by definition of the domain) is 
not likely to be captured by a single global measure (Morris & Cuthbert, 2012), but also coincides with earlier-
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 ABT, the primary independent variable of interest in the current thesis, is commonly 
measured using behavioural paradigms designed more broadly to comparatively assess 
differential patterns of attentional processing with regards to emotionally-salient and non-
emotional stimuli. One behavioural paradigm developed for this purpose is the visual dot 
probe task (described in more detail shortly). Within the anxiety-related literature, the dot 
probe task has not only been used extensively for the assessment of ABT, but also represents 
the most commonly adapted behavioural paradigm for therapeutic purposes (i.e. the 
modification of ABT through behavioural training methods; see Bar-Haim, 2010; Mogg, 
Waters, & Bradley, 2017 for reviews). Although alternative procedures are available to assess 
ABT (some with possible advantages over the dot probe task), the dot probe task was used in 
present efforts to extend research on the ABT-anxiety link to facilitate the comparability and 
translatability of findings. 
On each trial in a typical dot probe task, a pair of stimuli (one emotionally-salient and 
one non-emotional) are presented side-by-side on the computer screen. A probe (i.e. a dot) 
then quickly replaces either the emotionally-salient or non-emotional stimulus, doing so 
equally frequently across trials. Participants are tasked to indicate via keyboard press (e.g. ‘E’ 
for left and ‘I’ for right) the location of this probe as quickly as possible †. A more extreme 
attentional bias for the emotionally-salient class of stimuli is typically inferred from a more 
extreme difference score when mean reaction times on congruent trials (probe replaces 
emotionally-salient stimulus) are subtracted from mean reaction times on incongruent trials 
(probe replaces non-emotional stimulus). Applied to the assessment of ABT, negatively-
valenced stimuli are employed as representations of threat to be presented alongside non-
 
† In therapeutic variants of the task, participants are tasked to indicate the location of probes which consistently 
replace the non-emotional stimulus across trials. The end goal is to reduce facilitated orientation towards the 






emotional or neutral counterparts across trials. While earlier versions of dot probe tasks 
developed to assess ABT have used stimuli in the form of words or faces, there is growing 
acceptance that naturalistic scenes may offer a more ecologically-valid way to represent real-
world threat (Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello, Migliozzi, & D’Olimpio, 2014; Zvielli, 
Bernstein, & Koster, 2014).  
Concerning the employment of negatively-valenced scenes to measure ABT, there are 
two identifiable caveats within the anxiety-related literature. First, negatively-valenced 
scenes commonly used to represent threat are such as those which portray danger (e.g. 
predatory animals, an aimed gun) and those which portray loss (e.g. injury, grieving persons). 
While often treated as a homogenous class of “threat” stimuli, scenes which portray danger 
arguably relate more closely to the emotion of fear, while scenes which portray loss relate 
more closely to the emotion of sadness. Fear- and sadness-related scenes likely differ in the 
immediacy and likelihood of threat they convey (Kveraga et al., 2015), which may in turn 
have implications for measuring (and understanding) ABT in anxiety which have yet to be 
explored. Second, it is common practice for negatively-valenced scenes employed to assess 
ABT to be selected at discretion of the research team. However, emotional judgements of the 
same scene can vary markedly from one person to the next (Mikels et al., 2005), and more 
objective ways are needed to ensure that the experimental manipulation is successful (i.e. that 
selected images elicit their intended emotions). 
In collective light of these two caveats, a protocol study (presented as a manuscript in 
the next section) was conducted to identify scenes which elicit the discrete emotions of fear 
and sadness, as validated by a wider panel of judges (N =103) beyond the research team. 
Besides allowing for indices of attentional bias for fear- and sadness-related scenes to be 
computed separately, this protocol study was also set up towards the development of a dot 






was of interest to examine the role of positive attentional bias in the association between 
ABT and anxiety. To this end, scenes validated for the emotion of happiness were also 
targeted in this protocol study to create trials which could be used to compute indices of 
positive attentional bias. Second, the role of loneliness in the association between ABT and 
anxiety was also among present interests. In anticipation of the specificity of ABT in 
loneliness to social stimuli (Cacioppo et al., 2016), emotional categorical data on scenes 
collected in this protocol study was further organised along the dimension of social content 
(i.e. whether human subjects were present/absent) to allow for indices of attentional bias for 
social/non-social stimuli to be computed separately. The targeted end product was a dot probe 
task that would support a more parsimonious research design where behavioural data from 
trials within the same task can be selectively analysed to answer different research questions. 
The manuscript presented in the next section contains in-text references to externally 
hosted supplementary material, which can be accessed within the manuscript itself or by 








3.2. Manuscript  
Abstract 
Complex scenes from standardised stimuli databases such as the International 
Affective Pictures System (IAPS) are organised dimensionally rather than discretely. Further, 
the potentially unique function of socially-relevant scenes is often overlooked. This study 
sought to identify discrete categories of complex scenes from the IAPS, and to explore if 
there were qualitative features which make the emotional content of some social scenes 
identifiable with higher levels of agreement. 103 participants (53.4% Female, Mean Age 
24.4) judged 118 IAPS scenes as reflecting Fear, Happy, Sad, or Neutral.  A second 
judgement study was conducted with a separate group of participants (N = 117; 79.2% 
Female; Mean Age 30.41) to further characterise valid affective scenes across the full range 
of basic emotions. Sixty images received agreement on their emotional category from > 70% 
of judges, and were considered valid. IAPS identifier codes for these images are available for 
reference (along with supplementary data from the second judgement study), organised by 
emotional and social content. An incidental observation was such that compared to non-social 
scenes, lower agreement rates were observed for social scenes across the board. Qualitative 
features of social scenes which were classified into emotional categories based on higher 
levels of agreement are discussed. 
 
Introduction 
Experiments involving the elicitation of emotions have been integral to our 
understanding of complex interactions between emotional and cognitive processes. Several 
modalities have been employed to elicit emotions in the laboratory, one commonly used 
method being that involving the presentation of static visual stimuli. Two types of stimuli are 






of naturalistic complex scenes which present a visual array of contextually-embedded real-
life objects (including people).  The latter embodies a movement towards ecological validity, 
in which the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008) represents a key instrument. It offers a database of over a thousand photographs 
depicting a range of naturalistic complex scenes, from inanimate objects to persons 
embedded in various situations. Slides are tagged with standardised valence values1, so that 
experimental stimuli may then be selected based on normative indicators according to 
whether they are negative, neutral, or positive in emotional content.  
In recognition that a single valence scale (i.e. negative to positive) does not capture 
the range of emotions experienced in day-to-day life, a growing body of researchers have 
opted to study emotions from a categorical perspective (Finucane, 2011; Francesca et al., 
2015; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Pistoia et al., 2018; Pistoia et al., 2010; von 
Muhlenen, Bellaera, Singh, & Srinivasan, 2018). This position holds that emotions are better 
characterised as discrete entities (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011). For instance, fear and sadness 
may both be ‘negative’ emotions but are distinct in the unique subjective experiences and 
psychological consequences they produce (Zadra & Clore, 2011). Given complex scenes in 
the IAPS are not categorised according to the discrete emotion they elicit, these images are 
often qualitatively grouped or ascribed emotional meaning at the discretion of the research 
team. However, while facial expressions of basic emotions are more likely to be categorised 
homogeneously among healthy individuals (Wegrzyn, Vogt, Kireclioglu, Schneider, & 
Kissler, 2017), qualitative judgements of the same scene can vary markedly from one person 
to the next (Mikels et al., 2005). To ensure more precise experimental manipulation, some 
 
1 Each IAPS slide also comes with standardised ratings of arousal (how calming or alerting an image is) and 
dominance (extent of viewer’s perceived control relative to displayed stimulus). While the latter dimension has 
not been well-explored, the former is often used as a control variable in investigations (including the present) on 







investigators have highlighted the need for a panel of judges beyond the research team to 
validate the emotional content of experimental stimuli (Barke, Stahl, & Kröner-Herwig, 
2011; Moreno, Vanetza, & Antivilo, 2016; Xu et al., 2017).  
In a related line of work, research has highlighted the functional distinction between 
affective visual stimuli which portray humans and those which do not (Colden, Bruder, & 
Manstead, 2008; Peterman, Bekele, Bian, Sarkar, & Park, 2015; Silva et al., 2017). These 
studies are situated within a broader movement towards the study of emotion from an 
embodied perspective (Colden et al., 2008; Peterman et al., 2015; Rubo & Gamer, 2018; 
Rutherford, Maupin, & Mayes, 2018; Silva et al., 2017). This perspective recognises that 
images which feature people convey unique social information and hold interpersonal 
relevance (Colden et al., 2008). Such images are attended (Rubo & Gamer, 2018), perceived 
(Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009) and neurally processed (Rutherford et al., 2018) distinctly 
from those without humans present. Although affective stimuli based on faces incidentally 
limits all presented information to those which are socially relevant, complex scenes in the 
IAPS comprise a mixture of images which portray human persons and those which do not. 
Besides the discrete emotional category to which they belong, there is a need to further 
delineate these images according to social (or human) content to enable systematic 
experimental control.  
In relation to socially-relevant stimuli, inherent prototypes exist to facilitate the 
classification of facial expressions into emotional categories. For example, an open, smiling 
mouth is a key feature of a happy face, while v-shaped brows are key features which 
distinguish an angry face (Aronoff, Woike, & Hyman, 1992). In turn, faces where 
prototypical features are present are more likely to be identified consistently among healthy 
observers, with minimal dispute over their emotional categories (Wegrzyn et al., 2017). 






little is known about stimulus-specific properties which may modulate categorisation 
processes.  
The first aim of this study was to identify an agreement-based set of discretely 
categorised complex scenes from the IAPS, presenting this data in a way that will support the 
study of emotion from an embodied perspective. The following emotions were targeted in a 
judgement task: Fear, Happy, Sad, and Neutral2. Secondly, this study also sought to explore if 
there were qualitative features which make the emotional content of some social scenes 
identifiable with higher levels of agreement.  
Methods 
Judgement Study 1 
Participants 
103 (53.4% female) individuals (judges) aged between 18 and 60 (M = 24.40, SD = 
9.99) participated in the current study. The sample was dominantly an Australian 
undergraduate population (N = 85; 82.5%) recruited from the University of Wollongong 
(NSW, Australia), School of Psychology research participation scheme, and also included 
other members of public within Australia. Where applicable, participants received course 
credit points for their time. Sample size was selected to match that used in the main IAPS 
study, where N = 100 (Lang et al., 2008). 14 of the 103 participants reported the current use 
of antidepressants. Along with gender, medication status was tested for effects on the 
judgement task before data was collapsed across participants, and images were made the 
main unit of observation (described in detail below). 
 
2 Besides fear and sadness, the full range of basic negative emotions includes anger and disgust. The former was 
not presently targeted as static visual stimuli are poorly suited for eliciting anger (Mikels et al., 2005; Gerrards-
Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Gross & Levenson, 1995). Further, disgust was not targeted due to ethical 
concerns associated with the presentation of offensive or emotionally-distressing images. However, for 
comprehensiveness, a second judgement study was presently conducted to characterise valid affective scenes 








118 images were selected from the IAPS (63 Social, 55 Non-Social) with the end goal 
of reducing these images to a smaller set of discrete emotion-eliciting stimuli (based on 
agreement rates) in the categories of Fear, Happy, Sad and Neutral. Images targeting the 
emotional categories (Fear, Happy, Sad) were selected thematically based on conceptual 
items in an established affective word list with categorical norms (Affective Norms for 
English Words; Stevenson, Mikels, & James, 2007), e.g. “danger” or “assault” for Fear; 
“achievement” or “affection” for Happy; “tragedy” or “grief” for Sad by the first author. 
Images targeting the Neutral category were selected on the basis of valence ratings close to 
the midpoint of 5 as normed in the original IAPS study (Lang et al., 2008). Social images 
were defined as scenes with at least one clearly visible human form, while images were 
considered Non-Social only if they did not contain people (or body parts). Exemplars of 
targeted images for the Social subgroup depicted scenes such as: Man abducting a woman 
(Fear), medal recipients at sports events (Happy), people in mourning (Sad), and persons 
engaged in mundane activities such as clerical work (Neutral). Exemplars of targeted images 
for the Non-Social subgroup depicted scenes such as: Violently capsizing boats (Fear), 
desserts (Happy), injured animals (Sad), and buildings (Neutral).  
All data collection took place online at the time of the participants’ choosing, in self-
paced questionnaire format using Psytoolkit (http://www.psytoolkit.org). In forced-choice 
decision format, participants identified the 118 IAPS images (resized to 410px x 307px) as 
either Fear, Happy, Sad, or Neutral, in response to the question “Select the category which 
best corresponds to the image above.” Images were presented until the participant responded 
and then were replaced by the next image. They were presented in the same pseudo-random 
order, avoiding clustering of images from the same social content dimension and likely 






All analyses described as follows, including the generation of descriptives and 
comparisons of group means, were processed with SPSS (Version 25). In total, 12154 votes 
were received across 118 images and 103 participants. Before collapsing the dataset across 
participants to probe emotional categorical data for the 118 images, preliminary checks were 
performed to ensure that gender and medication status did not influence the proportion of 
votes across the four labels in the judgement task. To this end, a MANOVA was conducted 
with gender and medication status as predictors of vote frequency in each of the four labels. 
Neither gender (Wilk's Λ = 0.988, p = .889), medication status (Wilk's Λ = .978, p = .705) 
nor their interactive effects (Wilk's Λ = .985, p = .830) affected the composite multivariate 
score, suggesting that the proportion of votes across the four labels did not vary as a function 
of gender or medication status. Henceforth, images were treated as the main unit of 
observation.  
Main Data Analyses 
The first aim of this study was to identify an agreement-based set of discretely 
categorised complex scenes from the IAPS (Fear, Happy, Sad, Neutral), presenting this data 
in a way that will support the study of emotion from an embodied perspective.  All 118 
images were first grouped according to majority vote, or their most frequently occurring 
label. Following previously used selection criteria to identify valid emotional stimuli (Dailey, 
Cottrell, & Padgett, 2003; Francesca et al., 2015; Pistoia et al., 2018; Pistoia et al., 2010), this 
battery of images was then reduced to those with rates of agreement exceeding 70%. It has 
been highlighted that pictures with more arousing properties produce emotions of greater 
intensity (Bernat, Patrick, Benning, & Tellegen, 2006; Xu et al., 2017), which may in turn 
favour higher agreement rates on their emotional content. To ensure that differences in 
agreement rates across the image groups (if any are observed) were not better explained by 






content) was conducted on agreement rates with arousal ratings from the original IAPS 
norming study as a covariate before the selection criterion was applied.  
The second aim of this study was to explore if there were qualitative features which 
make the emotional content of some social scenes identifiable with higher levels of 
agreement. To this end, social scenes assigned to emotional categories with rates of 
agreement exceeding 70% were visually scanned for common features. While there is limited 
literature to draw from regarding specific qualitative features that may potentially reduce 
ambiguity in the emotional content of social scenes, clarity of facial expressions was used as 
a starting point of this visual analysis. 
Judgement Study 2 
 Judgement Study 1 employs a forced-choice decision format with constrained 
response options to identify affective scenes which are assigned the same emotional label 
more consistently than other scenes (i.e. with > 70% agreement rates on their emotional 
content). However, affective scenes often elicit multiple discrete emotions (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001), and it may be useful to have this information on hand 
during stimuli selection procedures. To this end, a second judgement task was run in a 
separate follow-up study to characterise the profile of emotions (across the full range of basic 
emotions) elicited by each affective scene which met the selection criterion in Judgement 
Study 1 (i.e. images classed as Fear, Happy, or Sad with agreement rates above 70%).  
Participants  
A call for participants was placed on the sub-Reddit r/SampleSize, an online 
international platform designed to connect researchers and voluntary respondents. Responses 
from 3 participants were not analysed as they did not meet the minimum age requirement for 
adulthood (18 years). The final participant pool comprised of 117 (79.2% female) aged 






United Kingdom (N = 19), Canada (N = 15), Australia (N = 9), Germany (N = 6), Netherlands 
(N = 3), and Sweden (N =3). 
Procedures and Data Analyses 
Images which were identified as Fear, Happy, or Sad (with agreement rates above 
70%) in Judgement Study 1 were presented sequentially in a page-by-page survey format, 
with six emotional labels (Happy, Surprise, Sad, Anger, Disgust, and Fear) appearing below 
each image. Participants were tasked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 10, how intensely they felt 
each of these six emotions when viewing a given image. As per Judgement Task 1, gender 
and medication status (26 of 117 participants reported current use of antidepressants) were 
tested for effects on the judgement task before data was collapsed across participants, and 
images were made the main unit of observation. Intensity ratings across all six labels did not 
vary by gender or medication status (mixed model analyses with Country modelled as 
random effects produced the same pattern of findings). Mean intensity ratings for the six 
emotional labels were thus generated for each rated image using responses from the full 
sample.  
Results 
Judgement Study 1 
Based on their most frequently occurring labels, the initial 118 images (63 or 53.4% 
Social) were classified as follows: 15 Fear (8 Social), 21 Happy (15 Social), 14 Sad (9 
Social), and 68 Neutral (31 Social). The excess of Neutral images was as intended to 
minimise viewing fatigue. The 4 x 2 ANCOVA showed that arousal did not predict 
agreement rates, F(1, 109) = 2.13, p = .147. Unexpectedly however, Emotional content did 
not predict agreement rates [F(3, 109) = .714, p = .546], nor did the interaction term [F(3, 
109) = .757, p = .521], although there was a significant main effect of Social content [F(1, 






68.17%, SE = 3.50) compared to Non-Social scenes (M = 75.52%, SE = 3.39) across the 
board3.Figure 1 illustrates the dispersion of Social and Non-Social images across the full 
range of agreement rates for each of the four Emotional categories.  
After the selection criterion was applied (agreement rates exceeding 70%; reference 
line added in Figure 1), the initial battery was reduced to sixty images: 7 Fear (3 Social), 12 
Happy (7 Social), 9 Sad (5 Social), and 32 Neutral (8 Social). Since group differences in 
agreement rates were earlier observed, the same 4 x 2 ANCOVA was repeated to ensure that 
Social and Non-Social scenes in the reduced battery were classified with equal levels of 
agreement. None of the parameters in this analysis were significant, indicating that agreement 
rates were comparable across Emotional by Social content groups and relatively unaffected 
by arousal ratings. Table 3.1 presents the IAPS identifier codes, mean agreement rates, and 
arousal ratings for these sixty images, grouped according to Emotional and Social content. 
For comprehensiveness, mean valence ratings from the original IAPS norming study are also 
given. For IAPS identifier codes of all 118 rated scenes, their exact agreement rates, and 
arousal/valence ratings, please see supplementary material. 
Towards the second aim, social scenes assigned to emotional categories with rates of 
agreement exceeding 70% were visually scanned for common features. Within the above 
70% range, faces were clearly distinguishable in most scenes as would be expected for clarity 
of facial cues to modulate agreement rates. In addition, social scenes in the Neutral (8 
images) and Fear (3 images) categories consistently featured a single person, with one 
exception in the Neutral category (#2396 – two strangers in commute at a train station). Sad 
(4 images) and Happy (7 images) social scenes in the above 70% range consistently featured 
two or more interacting persons, with one exception in the Happy category (#8465 – man 
 
3 When Social and Non-Social scenes were compared for differences in JPEG-compressed file size (i.e. an index 






running alone on the beach). Where social scenes in the Fear, Happy, Sad and Neutral 
categories failed to meet the 70% agreement rate mark, their most commonly occurring 
competing labels were Sad, Neutral, Fear and Happy respectively (see supplementary 
material for supporting data). Possible implications for research are presented in the 
Discussion section below. 
Judgement Study 2 
 28 images were classified into an emotional category with agreement rates above 70% 
in Judgement Study 1 (7 Fear, 12 Happy, 9 Sad). These images were rated on intensity scales 
(1 to 10) on six emotional labels (Happy, Surprise, Sad, Anger, Disgust, and Fear). Mean 
intensity ratings on the six emotional labels for all 28 images individually (organised by 
emotional and social content) are made available in a second datasheet within the 
supplementary material. There were two images which had intensity ratings on other basic 
emotions (Surprise, Anger, Disgust) which exceeded intensity ratings for the emotion they 
were validated for in Judgement Study 1. These images are marked with an asterisk in the 









Figure 3.1. Dispersion of Social/Non-Social images across the full range of agreement rates 
for each of the four Emotional categories based on Judgement Study 1. 
 
 
Table 3.1. IAPS Identifier Codes and Mean Agreement Rates for Images with Agreement 
Rates > 70% based on Judgement Study 1  
























3.30 [.92] 7.06 [.57] 2.34 [.26] 5.01 [.33] 
Mean 
Arousal 
6.03 [.79] 4.86 [.46] 4.98 [.43] 3.32 [.53] 





































3.44 [.51] 7.49 [.36] 2.58 [.16] 5.18 [.22] 
Mean 
Arousal 












80.58 [8.08] 82.16 [8.61] 83.98% 
[5.95] 
81.89 [7.27] 
*Images which had intensity ratings on other basic emotions (surprise, anger, disgust) 




The first aim of this study was to identify an agreement-based set of discretely 
categorised complex scenes from the IAPS, presenting this data in a way that will support the 
study of emotion from an embodied perspective. Selected complex scenes from the IAPS 
were first grouped according to their most frequently occurring label, then reduced so that 
each emotional category is represented only by images so assigned with more than 70% 
agreement among judges. The end product is a battery of images more likely to be identified 






context, these images may be better suited to capture the effects of targeted emotions than 
images assigned to experimental conditions without empirical support. The IAPS identifier 
codes of these images are made available in the Results section as a starting point of 
reference to facilitate precise experimental manipulation and comparability across emotion-
elicitation studies. Adding to existing categorical data on the IAPS, where complex scenes 
across thematic contents are treated as homogenous (Barke et al., 2011; Mikels et al., 2005; 
Moreno et al., 2016), the current study presents emotional image groups delineated by 
whether or not they portrayed human persons.  In an experimental context, this will support 
systematic control to account for the functional distinction between stimuli which convey 
socially-relevant information and those which do not (Colden et al., 2008; Peterman et al., 
2015; Silva et al., 2017). A strength of the present study is that it used a similarly-sized panel 
of judges to that used to standardise ratings in the IAPS, with comparable gender 
distributions (NParticipants = 103 and NParticipants = 100 in the current and IAPS study 
respectively; 53.4% and 50% Female in the current and IAPS study respectively). A second 
judgement study also served to provide data on the multiple emotion-eliciting properties of 
scenes presently validated as Fear, Happy, or Sad, which may be useful supplementary 
information for researchers to have on hand during stimuli selection procedures.   
In relation to the second aim, it is worth first noting that lower agreement rates were 
obtained for social scenes compared to non-social scenes across the board. That is, prior to 
applying the 70% selection criterion to isolate images with high agreement rates, social 
scenes (relative to non-social counterparts) were rated less consistently across judges with 
regards to their emotional content4. Although this observation was incidental to the main aims 
 
4 While this finding prevailed even after controlling for the effects for arousal, it should be noted that arousal 
ratings from the original IAPS study (external norms) were used in analyses. Perceptions of stimuli properties 
can vary between individuals (Mikels et al., 2005), and by extension, samples. It is possible that the true effects 
of arousal on agreement rates were not presently captured given that sample-specific norms were not 






of the current study, this relative deficiency highlights the importance of better understanding 
the qualitative features which may make the emotional content of some social scenes less 
open to dispute. Researchers have previously cautioned that findings from experiments where 
complex scenes are assigned to emotion-eliciting conditions without procedures to validate 
their emotional content should be interpreted conservatively (Barke et al., 2011; Moreno et 
al., 2016; Xu et al., 2017). Current findings suggest this caveat may apply in particular to 
social scenes. It is also worth noting that although higher agreement rates 
As may be expected, social scenes which depicted faces of featured persons more 
clearly tended to generate higher rates of agreement. Besides clarity of facial cues, the 
number of featured persons appeared to be an additional element which modulated the level 
of agreement a given scene generated on its emotional content. Neutral and Fear social scenes 
tended to receive agreement rates above 70% if they featured a single person. For Neutral and 
Fear social scenes meeting the 70% agreement criterion, the presence of multiple persons 
most commonly produced competing responses on Happy and Sad labels respectively. In 
contrast, Sad and Happy scenes tended to receive agreement rates above 70% if they featured 
at least two interacting persons. For Sad and Happy scenes, the depiction of a single isolated 
person most commonly produced competing responses on Fear and Neutral labels 
respectively. Tentatively, these observations suggest that social scenes for Neutral and Fear 
categories may be better targeted through single embodiments of facial cues, while Sad and 
Happy categories may be better targeted through multiple embodiments of facial cues. 
Nonetheless, as the second aim was exploratory in nature, no a priori attempts to control for 
any one feature were made. Thus, it cannot be said that these patterns of clustering were not 
in part due to the nature of specific images selected for the present study until clarified in 






The phrasing of instructions given to participants may also be relevant in interpreting 
the present observations. Across social and non-social scenes, participants received 
instructions to “Select the category which best corresponds to the image above”. While less 
of a concern for non-social scenes, responses tied to social scenes may capture a mixture of 
how a given scene made the perceiver feel, and the perceiver’s judgement of the 
protagonist(s)’ feelings. Clearer instructions framed to capture the former, as well as paying 
closer attention to number of featured persons to enhance selectivity, may yield more 
balanced social/non-social subgroups across emotional categories in endeavours to extend the 








3.3. Addendum  
 This section provides further detail on the development of the protocol and 
methodology of the dot probe task used in the subsequent studies that were not included in 
the manuscripts.  In the protocol study (presented as a manuscript) in Section 3.2 above, a 
subset of images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS), a database of 
naturalistic scenes with standardized valence and arousal ratings, were assigned to their best 
fitting emotional category (Fear, Sad, Happy or Neutral) based on agreement rates among 
103 judges. The end goal was a dot probe task which could produce indices of attentional 
bias for fear-, sad-, and happiness-related stimuli, and also allow for indices of attentional 
bias for social/non-social stimuli to be computed separately, where relevant. Not all images 
which met the 70% agreement rate criterion were included in the targeted dot probe task; 
rather, parameters for the dot probe task were chosen to favour precise emotion elicitation 
(i.e. fewer unique stimuli were used). This means that target stimuli (Fear, Sad and Happy 
scenes) must be repeated in the task so as to ensure an adequate number of trials per 
emotional-neutral condition. Preventative measures against habituation to target stimuli were 
hence also taken on board in the design of the present dot probe task (interspersion of neutral-
neutral trials among emotional-neutral trials; described in further detail shortly). 
 Based on outcomes from the protocol study just presented, images which met the 70% 
agreement rate criterion were ranked in ascending order of agreement rates within their 
emotional by social categories. The top three images were then selected from each emotional 
by social category to be used as target stimuli in the designated dot probe task. Thus, there 
were 3 social and 3 non-social images across the Fear, Sad and Happy categories, altogether 






was encountered when target images in the social sub-category had to be paired with unique 
neutral counterparts of the same social content. That is, while 9 social Neutral images were 
required, only 8 social images were classified as Neutral with agreement rates above 70% 
(see Table 3.1 in 3.2. Manuscript).  
To compensate for this shortage, a follow-up study was conducted with a smaller pool 
of participants (N = 21; university undergraduates with no history of psychiatric disorder). 
This follow-up study involved a judgement task presenting ten potential candidate images for 
the social Neutral category, where participants picked between the same four labels (Neutral, 
Fear, Happy, Sad) for each image. These candidate images were naturalistic scenes sourced 
from free, online stock photo databases (e.g. www.flickr.com), and were selected based on 
having similar features to the social images which achieved the highest agreement rates on 
Neutral in the protocol study just presented (e.g non-interacting people in commute, people 
working independently, people shopping for groceries). Among these images, the highest rate 
of agreement on Neutral was 90.5%, with the next highest being 85.7% (please see Appendix 
F for actual images and their full descriptives+). As two social images classified as Neutral 
with fairly high rates of agreement were presently available to compensate for a shortage of 
only one, a decision was made to replace the social image with the lowest agreement rate on 
Neutral in the initial protocol study (IAPS #2411 – 71.43% agreement on Neutral).  
Table 3.2 below gives the IAPS identifier codes (where applicable) for images as they 
were paired and used to create test trials in the dot probe task. Images in a given pair were 
sized at 307px x 230px and placed 200px apart. In keeping with trial-level parameters 
optimized in previous anxiety-related studies using pictorial dot probe tasks (e.g. Zvielli, 
 
 The pairing of target stimuli with unique neutral stimuli is conventional for dot probe tasks, in order to retain 
as far as possible the capacity for detecting any potential stimuli-specific effects at trial-level.  
+ Clerical note: Where experimental stimuli are described within manuscripts in subsequent chapters (4 to 6), the 
following phrase recurs: “two neutral images were sourced from free online stock photo databases and are 






Bernstein, & Koster, 2014; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004), each trial on the current dot 
probe task began with a fixation cross (500ms) followed by the presentation of a stimulus 
pair (500ms). A probe (i.e. a dot) then quickly replaced either the stimulus on the left or right 
(see Figure 2 below for an illustration of a trial-level sequence). Each emotional-neutral 
stimulus pair was repeated 4 times across the current dot probe task, so that there were 24 
trials per emotional-neutral condition (12 social, 12 non-social), and 72 emotional-neutral 
trials summed across fear-neutral, sad-neutral, and happy-neutral conditions. Emotional-
neutral trials were fully counterbalanced with regards to the position of the emotional 
stimulus (left or right), and whether the probe replaced the emotional or neutral stimulus (i.e. 
equal number of congruent and incongruent trials).  
Additionally, there were 8 training trials and 40 neutral-neutral trials. The 8 training 
trials were created using pairs of non-social stimuli identified as Neutral with agreement rates 
above 70% in the protocol study presented in Section 3.2, but did not appear in the main dot 
probe task. The 40 neutral-neutral filler trials were created with ten unique stimulus pairs: 
Five of the ten stimulus pairs were cross-pairings of the 9 non-social neutral images which 
appeared in the main task, and the other five were cross-pairings of the 9 neutral social 
images which appeared in the main task (see Table 3.2; note that the “Target” heading carries 
no meaning for neutral-neutral stimulus pairs). These trials were interspersed among 
emotional-neutral trials as a means of minimizing the risk of habituation to target stimuli, as 
mentioned in the first paragraph of this section (see Klein, de Voogd, Wiers, & Salemink, 
2018; Lisk, Pile, Haller, Kumari, & Lau, 2018 for similar procedures). The four types of trials 
in the main task (24 fear-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, 24-happy-neutral, and 40 neutral-neutral 
filler trials) appeared in completely randomised order in each session. 
The dot probe task was programmed using Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org), a data 






time-based tasks) to be administered within the same web browser in a single survey.  
 
Table 3.2. IAPS identifier codes (where applicable) for images as they were paired and used 
to create dot probe trials. Each stimulus pair was repeated 4 times across the task, so there 
were 112 trials in total (72 emotional-neutral and 40 neutral-neutral).  
Stimulus Pair IAPS Identifier Code 
  Target Neutral 
Fear-Neutral Social 2770 Stock Photo 1  
  6250 Stock Photo 2 
  6370 7550 
 Non-Social 1120 7185 
  1930 7500 
  5971 7705 
Sad-Neutral Social 2141 2440 
  2205 2575 
  2900 2745.1 
 Non-Social  9184 7050 
  9340 7080 
  9561 7187 
Happy-Neutral Social 2340 2383 
  2347 2393 
  8461 2396 
 Non-Social 1463 7036 






  7492 7041 
Neutral-Neutral Social Stock Photo 1 Stock Photo 2 
  2440 2396 
  2575 2745.1 
  2383 2393 
  7550 Stock Photo 2 
 Non-social 5471 7500 
  7185 7187 
  7050 7080 
  7036 7041 
  7705 7500 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Illustration of a trial-level sequence. A congruent trial is shown here (probe 







Foreword to Empirical Chapters: Overview of Data Collection and Allocation 
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research 
program extending from that of the information-processing approach. Specifically, one where 
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an 
indirect or component predictor of anxiety. The following third variables were targeted in 
three separate studies centred around the ABT-anxiety link: attentional bias for positive 
information (Study 1, Chapter 4), loneliness (Study 2, Chapter 5), and neurocognitive 
functioning across a comprehensive, standardised test battery (Study 3, Chapter 6).  
 Data collection for the three targeted empirical studies (approved by the institution’s 
human research ethics committee) occurred in two phases, with data collected in the second 
phase intended to address research questions pertaining specifically to Study 3. The presently 
employed sampling strategy was aligned with guidelines for research specified as part of the 
RDoC initiative, namely that “sampling should be designed to ensure a broad range of scores 
in each dimension of theoretical and experimental interest” (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016). In 
keeping with these guidelines, convenience (i.e. unselective) sampling methods were applied 
in recruitment procedures across both data collection phases. The first phase was an online 
study (conducted via Psytoolkit; www.psytoolkit.org), where participants completed the dot 
probe task described in Section 3.3, the UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996), and the 
Depression, Stress, and Anxiety Scales (DASS-21; S. Lovibond, S. & P. Lovibond, 1995a). 
Thus, measures of ABT, positive attentional bias, loneliness and anxiety (i.e. the DASS-21 
Anxiety subscale)* were obtained in this online study. Beyond basic demographics, measures 
 
* The present thesis focuses on mechanisms which underpin features common across the range of formally 
recognised anxiety-spectrum disorders (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2). The DASS-21 Anxiety subscale was 
developed to capture the core symptoms of anxiety (S. Lovibond & P. Lovibond, 1995b), and scores have been 
shown to be elevated across anxiety diagnoses of all types (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; 
Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). The DASS-21 Anxiety subscale was thus reasoned to be 







which may be important to control for in investigations on the ABT-anxiety link were also 
considered in the design of this online study, so that data on participants’ psychiatric history 
(i.e. whether they had ever been diagnosed with an affective disorder) and drug use 
(prescribed and recreational) was also obtained. There were two main sites where participants 
were approached for this online study: (1) locally, via the University of Wollongong, School 
of Psychology research participant scheme, and (2) remotely, via the online platform Reddit 
using the r/SampleSize channel (or “sub-reddit”) designated to connect researchers and 
research volunteers†. In total, 647 participants (471 local university students) completed the 
online study (i.e. the first phase).  
In the second phase primarily intended to collect data for Study 3 (i.e. measures of 
neurocognitive functioning), participants who completed the first phase were invited via 
email to attend an in-person laboratory testing session at the University of Wollongong. 100 
individuals participated in this laboratory testing session, and received either course credit 
points or a $20 shopping gift card for their time. Data linked to these 100 individuals were 
removed casewise from the online dataset (N = 647) to uniquely inform Study 3. Data from 
the remaining 547 participants was then broken up as they were ordered (according to 
date/time of completion) to create the samples for Study 1 (N = 270) and Study 2 (N = 277)‡, 
where relevant study variables were extracted to address separate research questions on the 
ABT-anxiety link involving the role of positive attentional bias and loneliness respectively. 
The measures and sub-samples mentioned in this section are characterised in detail within the 
studies they inform in Chapters 4 to 6. 
 
† Based on previous research (Jamnik & Lane, 2017; Shatz, 2016) and the candidate’s own experience, 
recruitment using this platform reliably produces quality data from individuals genuinely interested in making a 
contribution to scientific progress. 
‡ Data allocation procedures for the current thesis were selected to avoid feeding the same dataset through 






Chapter 4: Positive Attentional Biases Moderate the Link between Attentional 
Bias for Threat and Anxiety* 
  
 
* The manuscript presented in this chapter (Section 4.1) is published as:  
 
Wei, M., Roodenrys, S., & Miller, L. (2020). Positive Attentional Biases Moderate the Link 
between Attentional Bias for Threat and Anxiety. Current Psychology. doi: 
10.1007/s12144-021-01448-6  
 








Attentional bias for threat (ABT) has been implicated as a central mechanism 
underpinning anxiety. However, documented inconsistencies in the link between ABT and 
anxiety do not support a purely psychopathological view of ABT. While ABT is thought to 
be concomitant with the tendency to be less attentive to positive stimuli, neuroimaging 
evidence for the functional independence of positive and negative information-processing 
systems suggests this need not be the case. This may hold important implications for 
understanding the inconsistently observed ABT-anxiety link. To this end, the current study 
examined whether qualitative differences in positive attentional biases captured on a dot 
probe task would moderate the association between ABT and anxiety (N = 232). Findings 
indicated that ABT (indexed within the same task) was associated with self-reported anxiety 
only among persons characterised by an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, but not 
those characterised by an attentional bias towards positive stimuli. However, positive 
attentional biases did not independently predict anxiety, suggesting this selective association 
occurred against a backdrop of individuals experiencing similar levels of anxiety. Present 
findings hold implications for the design of behavioural training programs which target 











Attentional bias for threat (ABT), or the tendency to orient more quickly towards cues 
which convey potential threat in preference to more benign information in the environment 
(Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016), has been implicated as a central 
mechanism involved in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety-related conditions  (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Beck & Clark, 
1997; Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). This habitual pattern of 
attentional deployment is thought to favour the encoding of negative information, resulting in 
the cascade of cognitive, affective, and physiological symptoms at the core of anxiety-related 
conditions (MacLeod et al., 1986). Research in experimental psychology has provided some 
support for this theoretical link, demonstrating across a range of behavioural measures that 
individuals with elevated levels of anxiety are indeed quicker to detect  negatively-valenced 
words (e.g. Clarke, Hart, & MacLeod, 2013), faces (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de 
Bono, 1999; Staugaard, 2009), and scenes (e.g. Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014) compared 
to neutral counterparts (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a seminal review). More recently, 
selected behavioural measures have been adapted for use in clinical practice. Attentional bias 
modification training (ABMT) programs seek to alleviate anxiety through the reduction of 
ABT over multiple computerised training sessions (Mogg & Bradley, 2016), and are 
prominent in efforts to improve the efficacy of extant interventions for anxiety (Bar-Haim et 
al., 2007; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015; Mogg, Waters, & Bradley, 2017).   
Yet, inconsistencies in the association between ABT and anxiety have also been 
highlighted in the empirical literature that do not seem readily explainable by a purely 






measures of ABT, the current study is framed in terms of the visual probe detection task 
(often used interchangeably with dot probe task).While alternative procedures are available to 
assess ABT (some with advantages over the dot probe task), ABMT relies heavily on 
therapeutic variants of this instrument (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Koster & Bernstein, 2015; 
MacLeod & Clarke, 2015; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Stout, Shackman, & Larson, 2013), and 
research conducted witihn this paradigm can help to facilitate the comparability and 
translability of findings. Each trial on the dot probe task involves the brief presentation 
(typically 500 ms) of an emotional stimulus alongside a competing neutral stimulus, where 
either the emotional or neutral stimulus is then replaced by a dot (i.e. a probe). Participants 
are tasked to indicate via keyboard press the location of this probe (left or right) as quickly as 
possible.1 Studies using the dot probe task typically find that anxious individuals are on 
average faster to indicate the location of probes which replace negatively-valenced stimuli 
than those which replace neutral stimuli (Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; Bradley et al., 
1999; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992; Staugaard, 2009; Wirth & Wentura, 2017; Zvielli 
et al., 2014), a pattern of behavioural responding thought to represent the expression of ABT. 
However, where group-comparison designs have been utilised, results indicate that anxious 
individuals do not always differ in ABT from healthy controls (Mogg et al., 1992; Staugaard, 
2009; Wirth &Wentura, 2017). Although such results are often interpreted as null findings of 
ABT in anxiety, they may just as plausibly be taken to suggest that ABT can sometimes 
manifest among healthy individuals. That is, ABT can also occur in the relative absence of 
psychopathology, and so do not always indicate the presence of underlying psychological 
conditions including anxiety. Further, correlational analyses have yielded mixed findings on 
whether indices of ABT vary dose-dependently with anxiety severity. Inconsistent 
 
1 Assessment and therapeutic variants of the dot probe task differ primarily in the frequency with which the 






associations between ABT and anxiety have been observed in subclinical samples  (Fox, 
Cahill, & Zougkou, 2010; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), and do not 
appear to be better explained by issues of range restriction with inconsistent associations 
persisting in clinical samples (Abend et al., 2018; Miloff, Savva, & Carlbring, 2015) range of 
anxiety. Thus, the psychopathological status of ABT seems to vary even among individuals 
with elevated levels of anxiety.  
The emergent notion that ABT can exist in an individual without contributing to 
anxiety makes sense from an evolutionary point of view, which acknowledges that ABT can 
also be expressed as a benign, adaptive function (Barry et al., 2015; Wirth & Wentura, 2017). 
In keeping with this line of thought, several studies have examined circumstantial or 
situational moderators of the association between ABT and anxiety, including the role of 
cognitive load (Berggren, Richards, Taylor, & Derakshan, 2013; MacNamara & Proudfit, 
2014) and controllability of experimentally-manipulated danger (Notebaert, Tilbrook, Clarke, 
& MacLeod, 2017; Notebaert et al., 2020). The association between indices of ABT and 
anxiety seems to be apparent only at high but not low cognitive load (Berggren et al., 2013; 
MacNamara & Proudfit, 2014), suggesting that the anxiogenic effects of ABT may act 
conditionally upon heightened states of arousal arising from increased task demands. In a 
series of experiments by Notebaert and co-authors (Notebaert et al., 2017; Notebaert et al., 
2020), participants performed a digit identification task accompanied by threat of unexpected 
noise bursts, under conditions where they were offered strategies they could use to offset the 
noise burst (mitigation condition) or were not (no-mitigation condition). The association 
between ABT and anxiety was attenuated in the latter condition compared to the former, 
suggesting that ABT under conditions where aversive stimuli cannot be removed may be 
adaptive more so than anxiogenic. To date however, little work has been done to understand 






or the relationship between ABT and anxiety. Relative to circumstantial or situational factors, 
a better understanding of individual-level factors which moderate the ABT-anxiety link offers 
leverage in helping to develop ways of optimising treatment protocol and screening 
procedures in ABMT. The current study represents a starting point in filling this gap in 
research.   
 A common assumption across theoretical models of the ABT-anxiety link is such that 
ABT operates within an attentional system with limited resources, and thus at the expense of 
processing more positive information in the environment (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & 
Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). 
However, findings from brain imaging studies do not seem to support such a bipolar 
conceptualisation of human emotional attention.  That is, dissociable brain regions are 
recruited during the visual processing of unpleasant compared to pleasant words (Kensinger 
& Schacter, 2006; Kuchinke et al., 2005), faces (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Tatham, 
Schmidt, Beaton, Schulkin, & Hall, 2013), or scenes (Gerdes et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2015), 
suggesting that processing capacities for negative and positive information may be distinctly 
modulated. Thus, an individual who habitually orients to negative information (i.e. expresses 
ABT) is not necessarily more likely to ignore positive stimuli which may be present in the 
environment. This notion may hold important implications for understanding inconsistencies 
documented of the ABT-anxiety link as previously described. According to the broaden-and-
build theory of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001), persons with a broader scope of visual 
attention also experience more positive emotions, which in turn serves to undo or correct the 
lingering effects of aversive emotional experiences (undoing hypothesis; Fredrickson, 
Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000). By extension, it is possible that persons who do not 
discount positive stimuli in their environment (i.e. persons with a more inclusive scope of 






support of this notion, studies have found that training individuals to attend to positive stimuli 
produces decreases in self-reported anxiety (Taylor, Bomyea, & Amir, 2011; Li, Tan, Qian, 
& Liu, 2008), although the hypothesis that positive attentional bias may moderate the 
association between ABT and anxiety has yet to be explicitly tested. Within the context of a 
probe detection task, the current study examined the role of positive attentional bias in the 
ABT-anxiety link. It was hypothesised that the association between ABT and anxiety would 
be stronger among persons characterised by diminished attention to positive stimuli 
(attentional bias away from positive stimuli), relative to those characterised by intact 
attentional processing of positive stimuli (attentional bias towards positive stimuli).  
One methodological consideration worth noting in the present study relates to the 
increasing acceptance that naturalistic scenes may offer more ecologically valid ways to 
represent threat, compared to words and disembodied faces (Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello, 
Migliozzi, & D’Olimpio, 2014; Zvielli et al., 2014), with danger- (e.g. snakes, an aimed gun) 
and loss-related pictures (e.g. injured animals, grieving persons)  emerging as commonly 
used themes in the emotion-elicitation literature. Although these negatively-valenced scenes 
are often undifferentiated in terms of threat value, the two classes of stimuli relate more 
closely to qualitatively different emotions of fear and sadness, and differ in the immediacy 
and likelihood of threat they convey (Kveraga et al., 2015). Given most theories of the ABT-
anxiety link propose that psychopathological expressions of ABT have their roots in 
exaggerated perceptions of threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 
1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988), it is possible that attentional 
biases for sadness- and fear-related scenes may not be equally apparent at higher levels of 
anxiety. Specifically, stimuli which portray mild threat (e.g. sadness-related scenes) may 
offer greater sensitivity to anxiety in measures of attentional bias, relative to stimuli which 






considerations, emotional-neutral trials presenting fear-neutral and sad-neutral stimulus pairs 




Participants were 270 individuals (207 Female; Mean Age = 22.0, SD = 6.80) 
unselected for anxiety, recruited from an undergraduate student population (65.4%) as well as 
several community forums on the online platform Reddit designated for connecting 
researchers and voluntary respondents (34.6%). Recruitment site (university vs. Reddit) did 
not alter the pattern of findings as presented in the Results section. All data collection took 
place remotely via the online platform Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org). Informed consent to 
participate was obtained using an online consent form. 
Measures 
 Anxiety 
Participants completed the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scales (DASS-21) 
(Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F., 1995a). Scores on the Anxiety subscale of the DASS-21 
were the main outcome variable of interest in the present study. This subscale was developed 
to capture the range of core symptoms of anxiety (Lovibond, S. H., & Lovibond, P. F., 
1995b), and responses have been shown to be temporally stable and suitable for capturing 
trait-like syndromes (Gomez, Summers, Summers, Wolf, & Summers, 2014; Jafari, Nozari, 
Ahrari, & Bagheri, 2017; Lovibond, 1998; Lu et al., 2018). On a scale of 0 (did not apply to 
me) to 3 (applied to me much or most of the time), participants responded to items such as “I 
was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself”. Scores on 






Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a brief 
questionnaire which asks participants to “Indicate [on a scale of 1-5] to what extent you feel 
this way right now, that is, at the present moment” for 20 emotional adjectives (10 positive 
emotions and 10 negative emotions). The PANAS contains 4 anxiety-related adjectives 
(Scared, Nervous, Jittery, Afraid); these ratings were used to examine the characteristics of 
outliers in the main analyses of the current study. Previous research has highlighted that 
mechanisms of psychopathology may differ between clinically and non-clinically anxious 
individuals (Yiend et al., 2015; Unterrainer et al., 2018). As an intended control variable to 
ensure observed findings from main analyses were generalizable across the severity 
continuum of anxiety, participants also reported on whether they had been clinically 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder.  
Attentional bias 
An extended dot probe task, presented after measures of anxiety were completed, was 
used to assess attentional biases for negative/threat-related stimuli (Fear and Sad scenes) and 
positive stimuli (Happy scenes). Each trial on the dot probe task began with a fixation cross 
(500 ms) followed by the presentation of an emotional-neutral stimulus pair on opposite sides 
of the screen (500 ms). A probe (i.e. a dot) then quickly replaced either the emotional or 
neutral scene. Participants were tasked to indicate the location of the probe as quickly as 
possible via a keyboard press (‘E’ for left, and ‘I’ for right). Trials where responses were not 
received within 2000 ms were automatically considered incorrect and excluded from further 
analyses. Figure 4.1 presents an illustration of a trial-level sequence.  
There were four types of trials, appearing in a completely randomised order for each 
participant: 24 fear-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, 24-happy-neutral, and 40 neutral-neutral filler 
trials. The current study examined the emotional-neutral trials. Emotional-neutral trials were 






and whether the probe replaced the emotional or neutral stimulus. The 24 trials for each 
emotional-neutral condition were created using six unique image pairs repeated four times 
across the experiment. Images used (resized to approx. 307 x 230 px) were predominantly 
drawn from the International Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008) and pre-validated for their emotional content in a pilot study (Wei, Roodenrys, Miller, 
& Barkus, 2020)2. Content featured in exemplars from each image category was as follows: 
Fear – predatory animals, person holding an aimed gun; Sad – injured animals, grieving 
persons; Happy – enticing desserts, celebratory events; Neutral – furniture, buildings. For 
each emotional-neutral stimulus pairing, both images either consistently featured human 
persons or did not. Standardised valence ratings from the IAPS norming study for emotional 
images (Fear: M = 3.50, SD = .63; Sad: M = 2.40, SD = .24; Happy: M = 7.30, SD = .45) 
significantly differed from that of neutral images (M = 5.03, SD = 26) and from each other, p 
< .001 for all pairwise comparisons. Standardised arousal ratings from the IAPS norming 
study for emotional images (Fear: M = 6.35, SD = .63; Sad: M = 5.05, SD = .41; Happy: M = 
5.07, SD = ..39) significantly differed from that of neutral images (M = 3.05, SD = .54). At p-
threshold of .05, pairwise comparisons were significant for Fear-Sad and Fear-Happy 
comparisons, but not the Happy-Sad comparison. 
 
Figure 4.1. Illustration of a trial-level sequence. A congruent trial is shown here (probe 
replaces the emotional stimulus). 
 
2 IAPS identification codes for images used in emotional-neutral trials: Fear – 1120, 1930, 5971, 2770, 6250, 
6370; Sad – 9184, 9340, 9561, 2141, 2205, 2900; Happy – 1463, 1710, 7492, 8461, 2340, 2347; Neutral – 5471, 
7036, 7041, 7185, 7500, 7705, 7550, 7050, 7080, 7187, 2440, 2575, 2745.1, 2383, 2393, 2396. Two neutral 
images were sourced from free online stock photo databases and are available upon request. All pictures used 








Data Preparation and Analyses 
Fear, Sad, and Happy bias scores were derived by subtracting mean reaction times 
(RTs) for correct responses on congruent trials (probe replaces emotional stimulus) from 
mean RTs for correct responses on incongruent trials (probe replaces neutral stimulus). 
Within the dot probe paradigm, diminished attention for positive information is thought to 
manifest in an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, or overall faster responses to 
probes replacing neutral stimuli (Winer & Salem, 2016). In contrast, an attentional bias 
towards positive stimuli (overall faster responses to positive compared to neutral stimuli) is 
considered the normative response pattern to naturally rewarding stimuli (i.e. indicative of 
intact attentional processing of positive stimuli; Winer & Salem, 2016). To form the two 
groups of individuals characterised by attentional biases towards and away from positive 
stimuli (i.e. Positive bias group, the moderating variable of interest), participants were 






respectively3. Fear and Sad bias scores were used as continuous indices of ABT. A three-step 
hierarchical regression was conducted with diagnostic history entered in the first step, Fear 
bias score, Sad bias score, and Positive bias group in the second step, and the interaction 
terms between the two ABT indices and Positive bias group in the third step4. Sad and Fear 
bias scores were mean-centred prior to being entered in the analysis or used to compute 
interaction terms. Significant interaction effects were followed up with simple slope analyses 
in the two Positive bias groups.   
   
Results 
Ten participants achieved less than 75% accuracy on the dot probe task and were 
removed from further analyses, in keeping with first-line exclusion criterion used in previous 
studies (Britton et al., 2015; White et al., 2016). Accuracy rates on the dot probe task among 
the remaining 260 participants were high (M = 97.6%, SD = 2.64). 118 participants were 
characterised by an attentional bias towards positive stimuli (Happy bias score > 0; M = 
26.33, SD = 31.47) while 142 participants were characterised by an attentional bias away 
from positive stimuli (Happy bias score < 0; M = -27.81, SD = 35.60).  
Outliers for the hierarchical regression analysis to predict DASS-21 Anxiety were 
classified at a threshold of Cook’s distance values of 4/n, separately in the two Positive bias 
groups as recommended for predictive analyses with categorical moderators (Tay, Parrigon, 
Huang, & LeBreton, 2016; Wang & Ware, 2013). This criterion identified 28 participants as 
 
3 Although continuous data for Happy bias score was presently available, a decision was made to treat the 
moderating variable as categorical (i.e. qualitatively different Positive bias groups; towards and away) to 
facilitate ease of interpretation and integration with extant literature (Bradley et al., 1999; Ioannou, Mogg, & 
Bradley, 2004; Bradley et al., 1998; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004). 
4 This model was also tested with an extreme groups approach to Positive bias group (i.e. with persons with 
Happy bias scores between -5 and +5 removed from analyses). Results did not differ from that observed with 






extreme influencers of model parameters. Removal of these outliers affected results of the 
planned regression analysis; specifically, the statistical significance of the Sad bias score x 
Positive bias group interaction term in Step 3 was altered from non-significant to significant 
at p-threshold of .05. Excluded participants had higher DASS-21 Anxiety (MDifference = 5.94) 
and Fear bias scores (MDifference = 19.02) than the final sample, t(258) = -8.11, p = .000 and 
t(258) = -2.38, p = .018 respectively.5 Results based on data with outliers removed (final 
sample N = 232) are subsequently reported. Mean RT for the emotional-neutral trials which 
were used to calculate bias indices (RTincongruent – RTcongruent) are presented in Table 4.1. For 
each trial type, reaction times on trials where probes were presented on the left and where 
probes were presented on the right were consolidated separately. Cronbach’s alpha for 
reaction times on left- and right-replacing probes was > .7 across trial types (see Table 4.1), 
suggesting that probe location did not confound congruency effects. Descriptives for study 
variables are presented in Table 2. 
 Multicollinearity did not present an issue for the targeted hierarchical regression 
analysis (see Table 4.2). Of note, only the Sad bias score but not the Fear bias score was 
independently correlated with DASS-21 Anxiety6. The inverse nature of the association 
between Sad bias score and DASS-21 Anxiety (r = -.135, p = .04) suggests that increasing 
attentional avoidance of sadness-related scenes (i.e. faster reaction times to probes replacing 
competing neutral scenes) was associated with higher levels of anxiety (see Applehans & 
 
5 The following variables were also tested and did not yield significant group differences between retained and 
excluded participants: Age, Gender, Diagnostic history, Positive bias group, and Sad bias score. However, on 
the PANAS, excluded participants (compared to retained participants) did indicate higher current-state ratings 
on all anxiety-related items: Scared, t(258) = 6.09, MDifference = 1.11; Nervous, t(258) = 4.62, MDifference = 1.07; 
Jittery, t(258) = 2.62, MDifference = .53, and Afraid, t(258) = 4.35, MDifference = .81, p < .001 for all tests. 
6 Given known relationships between attentional biases for sadness-related information and depressive 
syndromes, the correlation between the Sad bias score and DASS-21 Depression scores available on hand was 
also examined. The null finding (r = -.04, p = .51) supports the specificity of the Sad bias score association with 
anxiety, and corroborates the broader literature on the distinct time course of attentional biases in anxiety and 






Luecken, 2006; Putman, 2011 for similar findings). Upon initial consideration, these findings 
appear to contradict the understanding that anxiety is associated with facilitated orienting of 
attention towards threat-related stimuli (Cisler et al., 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016). 
However, according to one model of ABT in anxiety (Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis; 
Mogg et al., 2004), anxious individuals may first orient quickly to a threat stimulus during 
initial exposure but after detection, avoid it. When eye movements of anxious individuals are 
tracked during dot probe task performance, findings have indicated a pattern of gaze aversion 
following initial gaze fixation on the threat stimulus when supraliminal presentation times (> 
200 ms) are used (Rinck & Becker, 2006; Wieser., Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 
2009). These findings support the possibility that facilitated attentional orientation towards 
threat stimuli may be implicit within attentional avoidance of threat stimuli as observed on 
behavioural indices using the dot probe task (Barry et al., 2015; Booth, 2014; Williams et al., 
1988). Accordingly, the presently observed inverse association between Sad bias score and 
DASS-21 Anxiety does not necessarily contradict the understanding that anxiety is associated 
with facilitated orienting of attention towards threat-related stimuli, although more definitive 
conclusions cannot be drawn without the availability of eye-tracking measures in the current 
study7.  This point is relevant to keep in mind for subsequent discourse on outcomes (nature 
of β coefficients) of the planned hierarchical regression analysis (results in Table 4.3). After 
controlling for the presence of a clinically diagnosed anxiety disorder (diagnostic history), 
Sad bias score significantly predicted DASS-21 Anxiety in the second step of the hierarchical 
regression analysis (β = -.147, p = .020) but Fear bias score (β = -.022, p = .73) and Positive 
bias group (β = .003, p = .97) did not. When the interaction terms for Fear bias score x 
 
7 Readers should be aware that the current interpretation of absolute correlation coefficients (rather than 
direction of the relationship) represents a post-hoc solution for understanding the presently observed association 
between indices of ABT and anxiety, and that not all researchers agree that the direction of association between 
indices of ABT and anxiety can be discounted (e.g. Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014; Morales, Pérez-Edgar, & 






Positive bias group and Sad bias score x Positive bias group were included in the model in 
Step 3, Sad bias score remained a significant predictor of DASS-21 Anxiety, β = -.523, p = 
.006. Additionally, the Sad bias score x Positive bias group interaction was significant, β = 
.399, p = .035.  
To follow up this interaction effect, Sad bias score was regressed on DASS-21 
Anxiety separately in the two Positive bias subgroups, retaining diagnostic history as a 
control variable. As illustrated by different steepness of slopes in Figure 4.2, Sad bias score 
predicted DASS-21 Anxiety in those characterised by an attentional bias away from positive 
stimuli [β = -.259, t(129) = -3.03, p = .003], but not those characterised by an attentional bias 
towards positive stimuli [β = .058, t(103) = 0.582, p = .562]. 
Table 4.1. Mean RTs [SD] and Reliability Estimates for Emotional-Neutral Trials Used to 
Calculate Bias Indices 
Incongruent Mean [SD] Cronbach’s Alpha 
Sad-Neutral 413.99 [74.28] .724 
Fear-Neutral 417.78 [75.38] .816 
Happy-Neutral 414.28 [69.98] .824 
Congruent   
Sad-Neutral 416.70 [72.31] .826 
Fear-Neutral 418.62 [68.54] .838 
Happy-Neutral  418.51 [69.55] .751 
 
Table 4.2. Means and Correlations (r) of Study Variables 



























Happy bias score 
















*p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Table 4.3. Moderated Regression Analysis Predicting DASS-21 Anxiety  
Variable β R2 ΔR2 F 
Step 1  .099 - 25.25** 
Diagnostic history .315**    
Step 2  .121 .022 7.85** 






Fear bias score -.022    
Sad bias score -.147*    
Positive bias group .003    
Step 3  .139 .017 6.05** 
Diagnostic history .311**    
Fear bias score -.049    
Sad bias score -.523**    
Positive bias group .008    
Fear bias score x Positive bias group .018    
Sad bias score x Positive bias group .399*    
β = Standardised coefficients 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
 
Figure 4.2. Simple slope analyses for interactive effects between Sad bias score and Positive 
bias group on DASS-21 Anxiety. Sad bias score significantly predicted DASS-21 Anxiety 
only for the Bias Away group. The inverse nature of this association should not be 









 Within the context of an extended dot probe task involving both negative-neutral and 
positive-neutral trials, the current study examined whether attentional biases towards and 
away from positive stimuli would moderate the association between ABT and anxiety. 
Several observations secondary to the main investigation are worth noting upfront. First, the 
number of outliers identified in the main analysis of interest was unusually high (N = 28) 
despite the use of standard diagnostic criteria. Participants identified as outliers (and removed 
from analyses) were characterised by higher levels of self-reported anxiety and bias scores 
for fear-related scenes relative to the final sample. As supported by elevated ratings on 
anxiety-related items on the PANAS (see Footnote 5), this profile may point to a subgroup of 
individuals experiencing acute anxiety (Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994; Ortega, Jiménez 
Solanilla, & Acosta, 2015), to whom current findings may not generalise. Second, between 






score yielded significant associations with anxiety. In the remainder of the discussion, ABT 
denotes patterns of attentional deployment to sadness-related scenes. Fear-related scenes, 
including those presently employed, typically features situations which arguably convey 
information about actual, unambiguous sources of danger (e.g. person wielding a gun). 
Heightened attentional responding to such information may represent an adaptive process 
which occurs independently of anxiety. Conversely, sadness-related scenes (including those 
presently employed) typically feature situations where harm has ostensibly already occurred 
(e.g. grieving persons, injured animals). Heightened attentional responding to such 
information may favour the encoding of threat which may not be immediately or personally 
relevant, setting the individual up to experience the world as an inherently unsafe place (i.e. a 
key feature of anxiety; Hazlett-Stevens, 2008). Thus, the present observation appears in line 
with theoretical reasoning that psychopathological expressions of ABT are rooted in 
exaggerated perceptions of ambiguous threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Bradley et al., 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). It has previously 
been highlighted that qualitative differences between classes of negatively-valenced material 
may be important to consider in research on the association between ABT and anxiety (Calvo 
& Avero, 2005; Calvo & Lang, 2004), a sentiment echoed by current findings.  
 In relation to the main investigation, it was observed that the association between 
ABT and anxiety was not equivalent between persons characterised by attentional biases 
towards and away from positive stimuli. Inconsistencies in the ABT-anxiety link have been 
documented in previous research (Abend et al., 2018; Bradley et al., 1999; Fox et al., 2010; 
Koster et al., 2004; Miloff et al., 2015; Mogg et al., 1992; Staugaard, 2009; Wirth & 
Wentura, 2017; Zvielli et al., 2014), collectively giving reason to suggest that the 
psychopathological status of ABT may not be homogeneous across all individuals. Present 






which unmasks inter-individual differences in the association between ABT and anxiety. 
More specifically, ABT predicted anxiety for persons characterised by an attentional bias 
away from positive stimuli, but not those characterised by an attentional bias towards positive 
stimuli. Current findings can be understood in light of the undoing hypothesis (Fredrickson et 
al., 2000) within the broaden-and-build framework (Fredrickson, 2001), which gives rise to 
the notion that persons with a broader scope of visual attention are better equipped at 
regulating aversive emotional experiences. Specifically, current findings suggest that the 
benefits of a scope of visual attention inclusive of positive stimuli may operate as a protective 
factor against the potential anxiogenic consequences of heightened attentional responding to 
negative stimuli.   
 It is also possible that persons characterised by an attentional bias towards positive 
stimuli represent a subgroup of individuals for whom experiences of anxiety are less heavily 
driven by external events. Laboratory-based measures of ABT such as the dot probe task are 
thought to capture habitual patterns of attentional deployment towards classes of negative 
stimuli as they occur in the physical world. However, many aspects of anxiety tend to 
manifest in the absence of identifiable triggers in the immediate external environment (Stout 
et al., 2013). Indeed, although ABT did not operate the same way in persons characterised by 
attentional biases towards and away from positive stimuli, it was also presently observed that 
Positive bias group did not independently predict differences in self-reported anxiety. That is, 
the differential association between ABT and anxiety seems to have occurred against a 
backdrop of individuals experiencing similar levels of anxiety. Rather than contradict the 
information presented earlier, these observations serve to reinforce the notion that ABT is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for symptoms of anxiety to occur (Van Bockstaele et al., 
2014). Relatedly, concerns have been raised over whether the near-exclusive focus on ABT 






scope relative to the complex origins of the condition (Barry et al., 2015; Heeren & McNally, 
2016; Roy, Dennis, & Warner, 2015; Staugaard, 2009). While the end goal in research and 
practice should be to extend the range of clinically relevant variables which may be targeted 
in the treatment and prevention of anxiety, present findings nonetheless have several 
implications worth noting for the design of behavioural training programs which seek to 
alleviate anxiety through the reduction of ABT (i.e. ABMT).  
 First, to discourage speeded orientation towards threat, most ABMT programs employ 
dot probe tasks where attention is repeatedly cued away from negative stimuli. Specifically, 
probes consistently replace the competing stimulus paired alongside a negative stimulus 
across trials (Mogg et al., 2017). Such a procedure also simultaneously increases attention for 
the competing class of stimuli being used (Klosowska, Blaut, & Paulewicz, 2015). Treatment 
protocols using neutral competing stimuli (e.g. Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Britton 
et al., 2015; Carleton et al., 2015; de Voogd et al., 2016; Klosowska et al., 2015) and positive 
competing stimuli  (e.g. Boettcher, Hasselrot, Sund, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2014; Boettcher 
et al., 2013; Lisk, Pile, Haller, Kumari, & Lau, 2018; Yang et al., 2017)  have been employed 
to this end. Current findings suggest that increasing attention for positive information may 
not directly reduce anxiety but may help reduce the potential anxiogenic consequences of 
ABT, and thus support the use of the latter protocol in favour of the former. Second, where 
the presence of ABT and/or anxiety at baseline may not suffice to identify individuals more 
likely to benefit from ABMT, present results suggest that positive attentional biases may 
represent a useful tertiary variable by which suitable candidates may be discerned in 
treatment selection procedures. 
Findings of the present study should be interpreted in light of several limitations. 






higher levels of self-reported anxiety and bias scores for fear-related scenes. Although this 
profile corresponds to that of individuals experiencing acute, transient, anxiety (Mogg et al., 
1994; Ortega et al., 2015; see also Footnote 5), the same indices have also been shown to 
differentiate clinically anxious individuals in more severe stages of the disorder from 
counterparts in remission (Mogg et al., 1992). Although present analyses were controlled for 
presence of a clinically diagnosed affective disorder, this does not preclude the possibility 
that current findings may not generalise to the full clinical population of anxious individuals 
in various stages of the disorder. Treatment/clinical status should be considered as an 
additional control variable in future research. Secondly, data collection occurred remotely, so 
that participants completed the dot probe task within an environment of their own choosing. 
While such a procedure may be advantageous where ecological validity is the end goal, it 
may also limit the comparability of present findings with studies where dot probe data was 
collected within controlled laboratory settings. Thirdly, the cross-sectional nature of the 
present study limits causal inferences, and also meant that attentional biases were measured at 
a single time-point. Repeated assessments over several measurement sessions may provide a 
clearer picture of stable individual differences in patterns of attentional deployment to classes 
of emotional stimuli. Finally, while the current study relied on the traditional computational 
formula for dot probe bias scores (i.e. RTincongruent – RTcongruent), recent developments in 
research have highlighted reliability advantages of novel computational methods (e.g. 
Attention Bias Variability and Trial Level Bias Score; Kruijt, Field. & Fox, 2016; Zvielli, 
Bernstein, & Koster, 2015). Where negative associations were presently observed between 
indices of ABT and anxiety, the claim that the association reflects a relationship between 
heightened attentional orientation and anxiety had to be drawn based on assumptions about 
underlying processes which had elapsed (i.e. that faster responses to probes replacing neutral 






computational methods, bearing the advantage of segmenting between temporal expressions 








Chapter 5: The Role of Loneliness in the Association Between Attentional Bias for 
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Objective: There is literature to suggest that anxious individuals may be lonely. Attentional 
bias for threat (ABT), a mechanism implicated in the core symptoms of anxiety, has been 
linked to loneliness in a separate line of work. The primary aim of this study was to examine 
the role of loneliness in the association between ABT and anxiety. 
Method: An unselected sample of 260 individuals (196 Female; Mean Age = 22.43) 
completed measures of loneliness, ABT (a dot probe task), and anxiety. Two possible models 
of the role of loneliness in the ABT-anxiety link were tested using hierarchical regression 
analysis: (1) A moderation model (the ABT-anxiety link is moderated by loneliness), and (2) 
A proxy model (the ABT-anxiety link is better explained by loneliness). 
Results: In support of the latter model, ABT no longer predicted anxiety after the effects of 
loneliness had been accounted for. Additionally, ABT was associated with anxiety only when 
indexed using sadness-related scenes (but not fear-related scenes). 
Conclusions: Loneliness may be one important source of exaggerated threat appraisals which 
underpin the association between ABT and anxiety. Different classes of negative stimuli may 









Anxiety-related conditions represent one of the most commonly encountered forms of 
psychopathology in mental health practice (Douglas & James, 2013). While formal 
classification systems for mental disorders put forward distinct diagnostic categories for 
different clusters of anxiety-related symptoms, there also exist core features and hence shared 
mechanistic underpinnings across the range of formally recognized anxiety-spectrum 
disorders (Bystritsky et al., 2013; Lang & McTeague, 2009). Attentional bias for threat 
(ABT), or the tendency to orient more quickly to negative compared to neutral or more 
positive stimuli (Cisler et al., 2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016), is thought to favor the encoding 
of threatening information and represents one mechanism which has been centrally 
implicated in the core symptoms of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Bradley et al., 1998; MacLeod et al., 1986; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 
1988). Research has indicated that traditional psychological interventions (e.g., cognitive-
behavioral therapy) for anxiety-related issues produce only modest benefits (Carpenter et al., 
2018; Gould et al., 1997). These outcomes have in part been attributed to the implicit nature 
of ABT, so that the heightened encoding of threatening information occurs on a level of 
awareness below that required for talking therapies to be effective (Beard, 2011; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 2012). Yet, contrary to expectations, novel interventions for anxiety which directly 
target ABT through behavioral training methods have only been partially successful in 
improving therapeutic outcomes (Mogg & Bradley, 2018; Mogg et al., 2017; Mogoaşe et al., 
2014). Collectively, these circumstances point to complexities beyond ABT in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety, and the need for such complexities to be 
recognized in research (Heeren & McNally, 2016). Specifically, these circumstances 
highlight the need for research beyond investigations based on theoretical models of anxiety 






Studies on the cognitive and behavioral correlates of anxiety have highlighted several 
ways in which interpersonal relations may be affected among anxious individuals. For 
example, chronic worrying about a broad range of topics, a defining feature of anxiety 
(Hirsch et al., 2013), has been associated with extended decision-making times (Masi et al., 
2004), heightened needs for reassurance (Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012), and a tendency to 
interpret events in the worst possible light (Hayes et al., 2010). These behavioral dispositions 
can make being in the presence of an anxious individual unpleasant (Newman & Erickson, 
2010), and result in the attrition of social networks overtime. Indeed, anxious individuals 
report having fewer friends than their non-anxious counterparts (Rapee & Melville, 1997; 
Whisman et al., 2000). There is also evidence to suggest that subjective experiences of 
interpersonal relations may be altered in anxiety. For example, anxious individuals report a 
sense of being exploitable and helpless in the context of friendships (Eng & Heimberg, 2006), 
and report lower levels of intimacy in their close relationships compared to non-anxious 
counterparts (McLeod, 1994). 
Loneliness describes a state of being where one’s needs for social connectedness are 
not met (Perlman & Peplau, 1982). Given the evidence to suggest that both quantity and 
quality of social connections may be compromised in anxiety, it stands to reason that anxious 
individuals are also more likely to be lonely. To date however, no studies have examined 
anxiety with a specific focus on loneliness, although anxiety has more broadly been identified 
as one among the range of mental health conditions where symptom severity is positively 
associated with loneliness (Richardson et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018). This paucity in 
research is particularly surprising considering that lonely individuals also appear to be 
characterized by habitual patterns of attentional deployment similar to that observed among 
anxious individuals (Cacioppo et al., 2016, 2009; Shintel et al., 2006). For example, on a 






compared to positive words, and compared to their non-lonely counterparts (Shintel et al., 
2006). Further, during a simple viewing task, lonely individuals (compared to non-lonely 
individuals) were characterized by greater brain activity when presented with unpleasant 
images, and reduced brain activity in response to pleasant images (Cacioppo et al., 2009). 
These findings suggest that negative information may capture attention more saliently among 
lonely individuals, consistent with the definition of ABT as the tendency to orient more 
quickly to negative compared to neutral or more positive stimuli. It is thought that loneliness 
unwittingly increases one’s focus on self-preservation, which in turn entails an enhanced 
perception of threat in the external world. Among lonely individuals, this enhanced 
perception of threat is expressed in ABT (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & 
Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017). 
The study of loneliness in anxiety has been limited, despite 1) evidence suggesting 
that anxious individuals are more likely to be lonely and 2) ABT, an assumed core 
mechanism involved in anxiety, being linked to loneliness in a separate line of work. To date, 
ABT, loneliness, and anxiety have not been examined within the scope of the same study, 
which the current research sought to do. Specifically, the current study sought to test two 
conceptual models of the role of loneliness in the ABT-anxiety link. 
First, loneliness may moderate the association between ABT and anxiety. As 
described above, theoretical accounts of ABT observed among lonely individuals propose 
that ABT is expressed as a secondary effect of loneliness (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; 
Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017). Thus, ABT is also likely to be more 
extreme at higher levels of loneliness. By enhancing the magnitude of a qualitatively similar 
mechanism, it is possible that the presence of loneliness may enhance the effects of ABT on 
anxiety. Statistically, an association between ABT and anxiety might be more apparent at 






findings on the association between ABT and anxiety which have been observed in previous 
research (e.g., Abend et al., 2018; Fox et al., 2010; Koster et al., 2004; Miloff et al., 2015). 
Alternatively, loneliness may play an explanatory role in the association between 
ABT and anxiety. A proxy model (Kraemer et al., 2001) describes a third variable effect 
where the relationship between a predictor variable A (ABT) and an outcome variable Y 
(anxiety) is better explained by a third variable B (loneliness). Proxy models are statistically 
similar to mediation models, but differentiated on conceptual grounds. While statistical 
support for both models is inferred when the relationship between A and Y is reduced after 
accounting for the effects of B on Y, proxy models do not assume causal precedence between 
variables A and B (i.e. ABT need not causally precede loneliness). The notion that the 
association between ABT and anxiety may not entirely reflect the direct effects of ABT is 
first raised when ABT is considered from an evolutionary point of view. From this 
perspective, being quicker to orient toward threats in the environment should serve an 
adaptive function in the short-term, rather than result in anxiety over the long-term (Öhman, 
2005; Öhman et al., 2001, 2012). Many theories of the ABT-anxiety link recognize this, 
albeit tacitly, in proposing that anxiogenic effects of ABT are rooted in exaggerated 
appraisals of threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). Given that loneliness enhances 
subjective perceptions of threat (Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; 
Spithoven et al., 2017), and that anxiogenic effects of ABT may be rooted in exaggerated 
appraisals of threat, it is possible that loneliness may exacerbate a driving mechanism in and 
(at least in part) account for the relationship between ABT and anxiety. As existing literature 
could theoretically support either of the two models just described, both were examined 








Participants were recruited via the research participation scheme at the School of 
Psychology, University of Wollongong (New South Wales, Australia; N = 209), as well as 
several community forums on the online Platform Reddit which connect researchers and 
voluntary survey respondents (N = 68). Recruitment site (university vs. Reddit) did not alter 
the pattern of findings as presented in the Results section. All data collection took place 
remotely via the online platform Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org). A total of 277 participants 
(196 Female; Mean Age = 22.43, SD = 8.35) completed a behavioral measure of ABT (a dot 
probe task), and self-report measures of loneliness and anxiety (described below). 
Participants who did not achieve at least 75% accuracy on the dot probe task (N = 17) were 
removed from further analyses. The final sample constituted 260 participants (183 Female; 
Mean Age = 22.34, SD = 7.76). 
 
Measures 
 Attentional Bias for Threat (ABT) 
ABT was assessed using a dot probe paradigm. Within a standard dot probe task, each 
trial begins with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by the presentation of an emotional-
neutral stimulus pair on opposite sides of the screen (500 ms). A probe (i.e. a dot) then 
quickly replaces either the emotional or neutral stimulus. Emotional-neutral trials are fully 
counterbalanced with regards to the position of the emotional stimulus (left or right), and 
whether the probe replaced the emotional or neutral stimulus. Participants are tasked to 
indicate the location of the probe as quickly as possible via a keyboard press (“E” for left, “I” 
for right). An attentional bias for the given class of emotional stimuli is typically inferred 






(probes replace the emotional stimulus) and mean reaction times on congruent trials (probes 
replace the neutral stimulus). 
The current dot probe task was configured with standard parameters described above, 
but differs from earlier versions of the task in that it presents stimuli in the form of 
naturalistic scenes instead of words or isolated faces. Compared to words or isolated faces, 
naturalistic scenes may provide an advantage in ecological validity in the assessment of ABT 
(Heitmann et al., 2017; Sagliano et al., 2014; Zvielli et al., 2014). Commonly used scenes to 
represent threat in the assessment of ABT include scenes which portray loss (e.g., grieving 
persons) and danger (e.g., person holding an aimed gun). Although typically undifferentiated 
when implemented in behavioral measures of ABT, the two classes of stimuli relate more 
closely to the emotions of sadness and fear, and likely differ in the likelihood and immediacy 
of threat they convey (Kveraga et al., 2015), Given that many theories of the ABT-anxiety 
link propose that anxiogenic effects of ABT are rooted in exaggerated perceptions of 
ambiguous threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998; Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988), it is possible that attentional biases for sadness- 
and fear-related scenes may not be equally apparent at higher levels of anxiety. Thus, 
emotional-neutral trials presenting fear-neutral and sad-neutral stimulus pairs were treated as 
separate experimental conditions, and used to derive separate indices of ABT. The index 
which returned a stronger correlation with anxiety was used to denote ABT in analyses to 
address the main aims of the present study (described shortly). 
There were 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials in the current dot probe task, as 
well as 24 happy-neutral and 40 neutral-neutral filler trials which were not presently 
examined. Trials across the task appeared in complete randomised order for each participant.  
In anticipation that ABT in loneliness may be specific to negative stimuli conveying socially-






neutral and sad-neutral trials presenting scenes which featured human persons (12 trials for 
each condition).The 12 fear-neutral and 12 sad-neutral (social) trials were created using three 
unique image pairs repeated four times across the experiment. Fear- and sadness-related 
images (resized to approx. 307 x 230 px) were scenes drawn from the International Affective 
Pictures System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), and pre-validated for their 
emotional content in a pilot study (N =103; under review). IAPS identification codes for these 
images are as follows: Fear – 2770 (tribal member in an aggressive stance), 6250 (man 
wielding an aimed gun), 6370 (masked man captured on cctv footage); Sad –2141 (woman 
grieving over deceased man), 2205 (old man at bedside of dying wife), 2900 (boy in tears)1. 
Standardised valence ratings (Fear: M = 3.30, SD = .92; Sad: M = 2.28, SD = .29) and arousal 
ratings (Fear: M = 6.03, SD = .79; Sad: M = 4.87, SD = .30) from the IAPS norming study 
did not differ between the two classes of negative stimuli, t(4) = 2.35, p = .12 and t(4) = 1.82, 
p = .19 respectively.    
Loneliness 
The UCLA Loneliness Scale (Version 3) (Russell, 1996) was used to measure 
loneliness. The instrument is composed of 20 items (e.g., “How often do you feel left out?”), 
where responses vary on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (always). Nine of the 20 items 
are positively worded and reverse-scored (e.g., “How often do you feel that there are people 
you can turn to?”). Possible scores range from 20–80, with higher scores reflecting higher 
loneliness. Cronbach’s alpha was .93 in the current sample. 
Anxiety 
 
1 These images were paired with neutral images matched for social content. Four of these images were drawn 
from the IAPS and have the following identifier codes: 7550, 2440, 2575, 2745.1. Two neutral images were 
sourced from free online stock photo databases and are available upon request. All pictures used were assigned a 






The Anxiety subscale of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; (S. 
Lovibond & P. Lovibond, 1995a) was used to measure self-reported anxiety. This subscale 
was developed to capture the range of core symptoms of anxiety (S. Lovibond & P. 
Lovibond, 1995b). Participants completed the full questionnaire so as not to alter the order of 
presented items. Responses on the DASS-21 have been shown to be temporally stable and 
suitable for capturing trait-like syndromes (Gomez et al., 2014; Jafari et al., 2017; Lu et al., 
2018). On a scale of 0 (did not apply to me) to 3 (applied to me much or most of the time), 
participants responded to items such as “I was worried about situations in which I might 
panic and make a fool of myself”. Scores on the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale can range from 0 
to 21. Cronbach’s alpha for the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale was .87 in the current sample.  
DASS-21 Anxiety scores were positively skewed in the current sample (when 
participants were classified according to specified DASS-21 Anxiety severity ranges, 
proportions were: 63% Normal, 12% Mild, 7.3% Moderate, 5% Severe, and 12.7% 
Extremely Severe). However, exploratory analyses using log-transformed scores produced 
the same pattern of findings as that using untransformed scores. Results using the latter are 
subsequently presented for ease of interpretation.  
Previous research has highlighted that mechanisms of psychopathology may differ 
between clinically and non-clinically anxious individuals (Yiend et al., 2015; Unterrainer et 
al., 2018). As an intended control variable to ensure observed findings were generalizable 
across the severity continuum of anxiety, participants also reported on whether they had been 
clinically diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (N = 69). Although data for depression severity 
was available (DASS-21 Depression subscale), we chose not to control for depression 
severity for several reasons. First, anxious symptoms most commonly precede depression 
(e.g., Fava et al., 2000; Starr & Davila, 2012), while the current study had interests in anxiety 






loneliness, including depression as a covariate might result in an overadjusted statistical 
model and underestimation of relevant associations of interest (i.e. the effects of loneliness; 
Hom et al., 2017). 
 
Data Analyses 
Within a dot probe paradigm, attentional bias for a given class of emotional stimuli is 
typically indexed by subtracting mean reaction times on congruent trials (probe replaces 
emotional stimulus) from mean reaction times on incongruent trials (probe replaces neutral 
stimulus) where correct responses are made. This was done separately for fear-neutral and 
sad-neutral trials to yield two bias scores (Fear and Sad; i.e. two indices of ABT). 
The two possible models of the interrelationship between ABT, loneliness, and 
anxiety were simultaneously tested in a single hierarchical regression analysis predicting 
DASS-21 Anxiety. Preliminary correlations were performed between study variables to 
determine the bias score (Fear or Sad) to be used to denote ABT (i.e. the bias score which 
yielded a higher correlation with DASS-21 Anxiety). Diagnostic history was entered in the 
first step as a control variable, ABT in the second step, Loneliness in the third step, and the 
interaction term between ABT and Loneliness in the fourth step2. If the association between 
ABT and anxiety is moderated by loneliness, the interaction term in Step 4 should return 
statistically significant. If the association between ABT and anxiety is at least in part 
explained by loneliness (i.e. a proxy model), statistical support would be seen in the reduced 
effects of ABT moving from step 2 to 3, after accounting for the effects of Loneliness on 
DASS-21 Anxiety [see Behar et al. (2010), Bujarski et al. (2017), and Spinhoven et al. (2016) 
for similar approaches]. 
 
2 Mean-centred Sad bias and Loneliness scores were entered in the analysis and used to calculate the interaction 
term. For hierarchical regression analyses with 4 predictors, the minimum sample size is 39 based on anticipated 







Table 5.1 presents the means and correlations between study variables. Mean 
accuracy rates on the dot probe task were high (M = 97.27%, SD = 2.78%). For fear-neutral 
trials, mean RTs (SDs) used to calculate bias scores are as follows: incongruent – 428.54 
(88.43), congruent – 423.67 (83.66). For sad-neutral trials, mean RTs (SDs) used to calculate 
bias scores are as follows:  incongruent – 417.70 (80.62), congruent – 417.37 (79.35).  
Loneliness correlated positively with DASS-21 Anxiety, a finding in keeping with 
predictions that would be made based on existing literature on how interpersonal relations 
might be affected among anxious individuals (Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Ellis, 2016; Eng & 
Heimberg, 2006; Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2013; G. Masi et al., 2004; McLeod, 1994; 
Newman & Erickson, 2010). As seen in Table 5.1, between the two potential indices of ABT, 
only the Sad bias score yielded a significant correlation with DASS-21 Anxiety (analyses 
excluding bias scores +/- 3 SD from the mean removed produced the same pattern of 
findings). Thus, the Sad bias score3 was used to denote ABT in the subsequent hierarchical 
regression analysis to predict DASS-21 Anxiety.  
Table 5.2 presents outcomes of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting DASS-
21 Anxiety. Results did not support a moderating role of loneliness in the association 
 
3 Of note, the relationships between the Sad bias score and both DASS-21 Anxiety and UCLA Loneliness were 
inverse in nature. Upon initial consideration, these findings appear to contradict the understanding that anxiety 
and loneliness are associated with facilitated orienting of attention towards threat-related stimuli (Cisler et al., 
2009; Mogg & Bradley, 2016). However, according to one model developed to describe ABT in anxiety 
(Vigilance-Avoidance Hypothesis; Mogg et al., 2004), anxious individuals may first orient quickly to a threat 
stimulus during initial exposure but after detection, avoid it. When eye movements of anxious individuals are 
tracked during dot probe task performance, findings have indicated a pattern of gaze aversion following initial 
gaze fixation on the threat stimulus when supraliminal presentation times (> 200 ms) are used (Rinck & Becker, 
2006; Wieser., Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009). These findings support the possibility that 
facilitated attentional orientation towards threat stimuli may be implicit within attentional avoidance of threat 
stimuli as observed on behavioural indices using the dot probe task (Barry et al., 2015; Booth, 2014; Williams et 
al., 1988).. Thus, current results do not necessarily contradict the understanding that anxiety and loneliness are 






between ABT and anxiety, in that the interaction term between ABT and Loneliness (Step 4) 
was not significant, β = -.050, p = .38.  However, in support of a proxy account of the 
relationship between ABT, loneliness, and anxiety, the initial predictive significance of ABT 
in Step 2 (β = -.139, p = .02) was no longer observed when Loneliness was entered in the 
model in Step 3 (β = -.089, p = .12 for ABT; β = .360, p = .00 for Loneliness).  
 






3. Sad bias 
score 
4. Fear bias 
score 
5. Loneliness  
5 .399** .172** -.129* -.108 - 
4 -.046 -.046 .045 - - 
3 -.127* .056 - - - 
2 .217** - - - - 
Mean 
[SD] 
3.38 [4.01] No history (0):  
N = 191 
Positive history 
(1): N = 69 
0.32 [65.29] 4.87 [83.48] 43.46 [10.39] 








Table 5.2. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting DASS-21 Anxiety 
Variable β R2 ΔR2 F 
Step 1  .047 - 12.70** 
Diagnostic history .217 **    
Step 2  .066 .019* 9.11** 
Diagnostic history .224 **    
ABT (Sad bias score) -.139*    
Step 3  .189 .123** 19.95** 
Diagnostic history .160*    
ABT (Sad bias score) -.089 
 
   
Loneliness  .360**    
Step 4  .192 .002 15.14** 
Diagnostic history .158*    
ABT (Sad bias score) -.082 
 
   
Loneliness  .362**    
ABT (Sad bias score) x  Loneliness  -.050     
β = Standardised coefficients 







Extant literature on the quantity and quality of social connections in anxiety has given 
reason to suggest that loneliness may be more likely to occur among anxious individuals 
(Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Eng & Heimberg, 2006; Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2013; 
Masi et al., 2004; McLeod, 1994; Newman & Erickson, 2010). ABT, an assumed core 
mechanism involved in anxiety, has been linked to loneliness in a separate line of work 
(Cacioppo et al., 2016, 2009; Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; 
Shintel et al., 2006; Spithoven et al., 2017). As part of a movement in research 
acknowledging complexities beyond ABT in the development and maintenance of anxiety, 
the current study examined two possible models of the ABT-anxiety link inclusive of a third 
variable, namely loneliness. The first model examined whether loneliness would 
moderate/strengthen the association between ABT and anxiety. The second (proxy) model 
examined whether loneliness might (at least in part) account for the association between ABT 
and anxiety. Present findings favor the latter conceptualization of the role of loneliness in the 
ABT-anxiety link. That is, the strength of the association between ABT and anxiety did not 
vary as a function of loneliness. However, loneliness did make a unique contribution to 
predicting anxiety, and ABT no longer uniquely predicted anxiety after the effects of 
loneliness were accounted for. 
The rationale for investigating the proxy model was that, from an evolutionary 
viewpoint, faster orientation to threats in the environment should serve an adaptive function 
in the short-term rather than result in anxiety over the long term (Öhman, 2005; Öhman et al., 
2001, 2012). The finding that ABT was no longer associated with anxiety in the presence of a 
third variable per se suggests that ABT may not inherently produce anxiogenic effects, and is 
in keeping with this notion. Additional support for the normative aspects of ABT comes from 






associated with anxiety only where defined by patterns of attentional deployment for sadness-
related scenes, but not fear-related scenes. Fear-related scenes, including those presently 
employed, typically feature situations which arguably convey information about actual, 
unambiguous sources of danger (e.g., person wielding an aimed gun). Heightened attentional 
responding to such information may represent an adaptive process which occurs 
independently of anxiety. Conversely, sadness-related scenes typically feature situations 
where harm has ostensibly passed (e.g., grieving persons). Heightened attentional responding 
to such information may favor the encoding of threat which may not be immediately or 
personally relevant, setting the individual up to experience the world as an inherently unsafe 
place [i.e. a key feature of anxiety; Hazlett-Stevens (2008)]. While further research is 
necessary to verify these speculations, present observations serve to echo previous sentiments 
on the importance of drawing qualitative distinctions in negatively-valenced material used to 
assess ABT in anxiety (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Calvo & Lang, 2004). 
In tacit acknowledgment that ABT is fundamentally adaptive, many theories of the 
ABT-anxiety link propose that anxiogenic effects of ABT are rooted in exaggerated 
appraisals of threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley et al., 1998; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). Relatedly, ABT documented among 
lonely individuals is thought to be a function of enhanced threat perception in loneliness 
(Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2018; Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017). It was 
presently observed that ABT no longer uniquely predicted anxiety in the presence of 
loneliness, supporting a proxy model of the interrelationship between loneliness, ABT and 
anxiety in which the association between ABT and anxiety is better explained by loneliness. 
These results (along with the earlier described finding on the selective association between 
indices of ABT and anxiety) are consistent with the notion that the anxiogenic effects of ABT 






loneliness may be one important source of exaggerated threat appraisals which underpin the 
association between ABT and anxiety. These findings serve to reiterate the need for more 
complex models of anxiety beyond ABT (Heeren & McNally, 2016), and add a voice to the 
growing movement away from investigating ABT as an isolated process in anxiety-related 
research. 
The present findings hold implications for clinical practice. The limited efficacy of 
both traditional (i.e. cognitive-behavioral therapy) and novel interventions for anxiety (i.e. 
behavioral training to reduce ABT) highlight the need to extend the range of therapeutic 
methods which can be implemented to effectively manage anxiety. Present [and previous: 
(Richardson et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018)] findings suggest that loneliness may contribute 
to anxiety, so that anxious individuals may also stand to benefit from interventions which 
seek to reduce loneliness (and thus enhanced perceptions of threat). It should be noted, 
however, that although present findings favor the clinical utility of reducing loneliness over 
ABT where anxiety is concerned, several caveats have been highlighted pertaining to 
interventions for loneliness. Efforts to reduce loneliness often involve the training of social 
skills and provision of opportunities to develop social relationships (Cacioppo et al., 2015; 
Masi et al., 2011; Ypsilanti, 2018). Such interventions may help expand the social network of 
an individual, but do not necessarily alleviate subjective feelings of social isolation 
(Cacioppo et al., 2015; Masi et al., 2011; Ypsilanti, 2018). Although reductive effects on 
anxiety may be modest (Mogg & Bradley, 2018; Mogg et al., 2017; Mogoaşe et al., 2014), 
studies and clinical trials which have sought to modify ABT via behavioral training methods 
have indicated that ABT is at least amendable to change [see (Mogg et al. (2017) and 
Mogoaşe et al. (2014) for reviews]. Where challenges to reducing loneliness prevail, reducing 
ABT may still retain its clinical utility as the comparative next-best option in interventions to 






Current findings should be interpreted in light of several constraints. First, to account 
for the specificity of ABT in loneliness (Cacioppo et al., 2016), ABT was indexed based on 
social stimuli (i.e. scenes which featured human persons). Although ABT based solely on 
social stimuli (e.g., faces) has been documented among anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007), heightened attentional orienting in anxiety appears to extend to nonsocial pictorial 
stimuli which convey threat (e.g., scenes portraying snakes, natural disasters, injured animals) 
(Sagliano et al., 2014; Zvielli et al., 2014). While present findings suggest loneliness may 
play an explanatory role in the association between ABT and anxiety, it is unclear if the 
explanatory value of loneliness holds for the association between attentional bias for 
nonsocial threat and anxiety4. Second, the direction of influence from loneliness to anxiety 
was assumed based on self-report measures at a single timepoint in the present cross-
sectional study. However, as described in the Introduction, anxiety-related related behaviours 
can indirectly influence loneliness, so that a bidirectional relationship between the two 
variables is possible. Previous studies have shown that loneliness can be experimentally 
manipulated under laboratory settings through the use of social exclusion paradigms [e.g., 
Hames et al. (2018) and Stillman et al. (2009)], and should be considered in future research. 
Third, the presently observed correlation between Sad bias score (used to index ABT) and 
self-reported anxiety was small (r = − .127). Although previous studies have found 
associations between indices of ABT and anxiety of similar magnitude (Abend et al., 2018; 
Campbell & Kertz, 2019; Ho et al., 2017), it remains possible that this may have influenced 
the current main findings (i.e. ABT no longer predicted anxiety in the presence of loneliness). 
Last, while the convenience sampling method used in the present study yielded a participant 
pool with adequate variability in self-reported anxiety, mean anxiety levels were low (Mean 
 
4 In supplementary analyses using available data from non-social trials, presently reported findings on the 






DASS-21 Anxiety = 3.38, SD = 4.01). Although current findings on the role of loneliness in 
the ABT-anxiety link were observed after accounting for diagnostic history (i.e. 
presence/absence of a clinically diagnosed anxiety disorder), further research is necessary to 








 In the manuscript just presented, a reasoned decision was made not to control for 
depression severity in analyses predicting anxiety based on loneliness and ABT (denoted 
using bias indices for sadness-related scenes). While not stated in the manuscript, the 
availability of DASS-21 Depression subscale scores on hand was utilised for a separate 
purpose. Specifically, the correlation between Sad bias score and scores on the DASS-21 
Depression subscale was also examined, given known relationships between attentional 
biases for sadness-related information and depressive syndromes. This correlation was not 
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 Although framed as a methodological consideration of the present thesis thus far, the 
decision to consider fear- and sadness-related scenes as separate classes of stimuli in the 
assessment of ABT has produced findings which raise important questions about the nature 
of the anxiety-related attentional bias. Specifically, a recurring finding across the two 
previous empirical studies (Chapters 4 and 5) was such that ABT was associated with anxiety 
only when indexed by responses to sad images- and not fear-related scenes. The study 
presented (as a manuscript) in the next section sought to investigate the cognitive profile 
associated with anxiety, and potential mediating effects of neurocognitive functioning on the 
association between ABT and anxiety, as part of the overarching aims of the present thesis. 
Rather than a methodological consideration adjunctive to the primary research questions, the 
potential selectivity of the anxiety-related attentional bias was explicitly examined as part of 
the study’s main aims, within the context of a relevant theoretical framework. As implied in 
the chapter title, the framework places sadness- and fear-related stimuli on a continuum of 
threat from mild to high. 
 While described in full in the manuscript presented below, a preliminary description 
of additional statistical techniques which were applied in the processing of dot probe data is 
presently given for better context. Carrying forward analyses used in the previous empirical 
chapters of this thesis, indices of attentional bias for fear- and sadness-related scenes were 
examined separately for their correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety. However, the previously 
observed selective association between indices of ABT and self-reported anxiety was not 
seen. Preferential associations aside, relationships between traditionally-computed indices of 
ABT and self-reported anxiety could not be established on the whole. These initial outcomes 
prompted a probe into the literature on how indices of ABT based on reaction times might be 






recent (successful) efforts when drift diffusion modelling techniques were applied to dot 
probe data (Price et al., 2019), allowing for indices of ABT to be computed based on reaction 
times with irrelevant components of task performance removed. Drift diffusion modelling 
techniques were also applied in the present study to provide supplementary indices of 
attentional bias.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that towards the end goal of the present thesis to identify 
theoretically-relevant moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link, the study 
encompassed in the present chapter had limited success compared to those in the two 
previous chapters. Specifically, correlations could not be established between cognitive 
measures (both indices of ABT and neurocognitive functioning) and anxiety in data collected 
via the laboratory testing session allocated specifically for the current study, so that mediation 
analyses could not be pursued. Possible theoretical and methodological accounts are explored 
in the Discussion of the manuscript presented below, while broader implications are 









 The current study extended investigations on anxiety-related cognitive processes. 
There were two testing phases: an online study, and a laboratory session. Emotional 
attentional bias was assessed on both counts using an extended dot probe task. A 
neurocognitive test battery was administered in the laboratory session with the end goal of 
examining whether neurocognitive impairments would mediate the association between 
attentional bias and anxiety. Results showed attentional bias was associated with anxiety only 
when indexed based on sadness- (mild threat) but not fear-related (high threat) scenes. 
However, this selective association was apparent only in online data. As further 
contraindication against pursuing mediation analyses, laboratory-based neurocognitive 
performance did not correlate with anxiety. Implications for the measurement of anxiety-









 There are two broadly identifiable areas of work within existing research on cognitive 
processes associated with anxiety: “hot” cognitive processes (emotional informational 
processing) and “cold” cognitive processes (non-emotional information processing, or basic 
neurocognitive functioning). The leading subject in the former, dominant body of work is 
represented in the attentional bias for threat phenomenon, or the tendency to orient more 
quickly to negative compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2016). This habitual pattern of attentional deployment is not seen as mere 
epiphenomena of anxiety, but has been conceptualised to play a causal role in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van, 2007; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). While plausible, the notion appears under-detailed when 
considered from an evolutionary perspective. From an evolutionary standpoint, being quicker 
to detect negative stimuli in the environment prepares the organism to respond swiftly to 
potential danger, and serves to facilitate survival in the short term (Ohman, 2005; Ohman, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Öhman, Soares, Juth, Lindström, & Esteves, 2012). As such, a purely 
psychopathological view may not suffice to account for the adaptive aspects of attentional 
bias for threat.  
 One account of attentional processes in anxiety to have acknowledged the adaptive 
aspects of attentional bias for threat within its theoretical postulates is the cognitive-
motivational framework (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2018). Within this 
framework, the anxiety-related attentional bias (and anxiety more generally) is rooted in 
exaggerated appraisals of stimulus threat value. Thus, while attentional bias for highly 






represents a normative function), attentional bias for mildly threatening stimuli may be 
evident only among individuals with higher levels of anxiety. In a series of experiments led 
by the same theorists (Mogg et al., 2000), it was demonstrated that anxious individuals 
indeed only outperformed their non-anxious counterparts on a behavioural measure of 
attentional bias in response to mildly threatening scenes (e.g. soldier holding a gun), but not 
highly threatening scenes (mutilated bodies, murder victims). Although these findings have 
important implications for the fundamental nature of the anxiety-related attentional bias, 
replication studies have been few1. The first aim of the current study was to extend 
investigations on the specificity of the anxiety-related attentional bias to mildly threatening 
(but not highly threatening) stimuli, using an alternative approach to manipulate the threat 
value of stimuli employed to capture attention. In Mogg et al.’s (2000) study, mildly and 
highly threatening stimuli were represented using negative scenes varying primarily in 
arousal, and thus the emotional distress they elicit. As a possible means to the same end (and 
the approach adopted in the current study), scenes could be selected by the discrete negative 
emotion they elicit. Specifically, sadness- and fear-related scenes, in conveying signals of 
elapsed and potential danger respectively (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Kveraga et al., 2015), could 
be thematically used to represent threat on a continuum of mild to high in a way which does 
not raise ethical concerns associated with the presentation of highly arousing or emotionally 
distressing stimuli.   
 The second aim of this study pertains to addressing a gap within anxiety-related 
research where “cold” cognitive processes have received limited attention relative to “hot” 
cognitive processes (see Leonard & Abramovitch, 2019 for similar sentiments). “Cold” 
 
1 To the authors’ knowledge, there is only one other study to have pursued similar 
investigations (Li, Wang, Poliakoff, & Luo, 2007). This study found that attentional bias for 
highly threatening stimuli was not modulated by anxiety, in keeping with findings from the 






cognitive processes, or basic neurocognitive functioning, have been shown to vary with 
symptom severity in many mental health conditions (Harvey, Koren, Reichenberg, & Bowie, 
2006; Kleim et al., 2013; McGurk et al., 2000; Zuckerman et al., 2018). Establishing the key 
neurocognitive impairments associated with specific disorders thus represents a clinically 
relevant goal in research. In addition to being limited by a relatively small number of studies, 
forming conclusions on the neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety is further 
hampered by challenges in integrating findings across different studies. As highlighted in 
contemporary literature, studies on cognitive functioning in anxiety tend to examine only a 
select few cognitive domains (Hallion, Tolin, Assaf, Goethe, & Diefenbach, 2017; Leonard & 
Abramovitch, 2019; Muller, Torquato, Manfro, & Trentini, 2015), and this selected range 
varies from one study to the next. Where cognitive domains of interest overlap between 
anxiety-related studies, cross-study comparisons are complicated by the use of different tests 
(Leonard & Abramovitch, 2019).  
 Beyond descriptive purposes, the theoretical importance of understanding the 
neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety is enhanced by the suggestion that a purely 
psychopathological view on attentional bias for threat may be incomplete. Relatedly, several 
mechanistic accounts of the association between attentional processes and anxiety propose 
that biased attention for threat operates indirectly, via impairments in basic cognitive 
functions, to perpetuate anxiety. Such impairments have been articulated using varied terms 
across different models, including resource allocation mechanisms (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Williams et al., 1988), goal-engagement systems (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998), inhibitory skills (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998), and attentional control (Eysenck et 
al., 2007). Thus, the second aim of this study comprises of two related parts: (a) First, to add 
to the limited literature on the neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety, using a 






step towards addressing challenges in the integration of previous findings; and, (b) If 
neurocognitive impairments are established, whether these impairments would mediate the 
association between attentional bias and self-reported anxiety measured in the same 
laboratory testing session.  
Although detailed in the Methods section below, several methodological aspects of 
the current study are worth introducing here. First, there were two testing phases in the 
current study: an online study, and a laboratory testing session. In both these phases, 
measures of attentional bias and anxiety were administered, with the laboratory testing 
session further involving the administration of the CogState test battery. While data from the 
laboratory testing session specifically informed the second aim, data from both testing phases 
were used to address the first aim of the current study (i.e. specificity of the anxiety-related 
attentional bias to mildly threatening stimuli/sadness-related scenes) for comprehensiveness. 
Second, traditionally-computed indices of attentional bias were supplemented with indices 
derived from a computational modelling technique known as drift-diffusion modelling. These 
indices are described in full below, within the context of their supporting behavioural 
paradigm. 
Methods 
Participants and Procedures  
 Data collection for the current study occurred in two phases. The first testing phase 
occurred online (i.e. data was collected remotely). In this testing phase, participants 
completed measures of anxiety, attentional bias, and several other psychological variables as 
part of a larger project to understand psychological factors involved in the link between 
biased attention for threat and anxiety. Cognitive functioning (i.e. the current research) sits 






Participants who completed the online study (N = 647) were invited to attend a 
laboratory testing session at the institution where the current research occurred (University 
of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia). The same measures of anxiety and attentional 
bias, along with measures of neurocognitive functioning (i.e. the CogState test battery) were 
administered in this session. Participants were offered either university course credit points 
(where applicable) or a $20 shopping gift card for their time. 100 individuals (66 Female, 
Mean Age = 24.80, SD = 9.38) who completed the online study signed up to participate in 
the laboratory testing session. As recruitment emails specified an in-person testing session at 
the University of Wollongong, individuals who signed up were predominantly enrolled 
undergraduate students (N = 87). The remaining 13 sign-ups were members of the local 
Wollongong community.  14 participants, of which 11 were undergraduate students, reported 
the current use of antidepressants. To account for potential effects of educational differences 
and pharmaceutical influences on cognitive functioning, both entry site (university vs. 
community) and medication status (currently using vs. not using antidepressants) were coded 
for control purposes in analyses involving CogState tests. 
Measures 
Anxiety 
The Anxiety subscale from the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; 
(S. Lovibond & P. Lovibond, 1995a) was used to measure self-reported anxiety. Reliability 
and validity of the DASS-21 Anxiety subscale has previously been established in both 
clinical (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997; Clara, Cox & Enns, 2001; Antony, 
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998) and nonclinical samples (Antony et al., 1998; 
Crawford & Henry, 2003; Sinclair et al., 2011). Although only the Anxiety subscale was of 
interest in the current study, participants completed the full DASS-21 questionnaire so as not 






to which a series of statements applied to them over the past week. The Anxiety subscale 
includes statements such as “I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself”. Scores are summed across seven items and range from 0 to 21. Participants 
completed the DASS-21 in both the online study and laboratory testing session. The DASS-
21 has been shown to be temporally stable and suitable for capturing individual differences in 
baseline anxiety (Gomez, Summers, Summers, Wolf, & Summers, 2014; Jafari, Nozari, 
Ahrari, & Bagheri, 2017; P. Lovibond, 1998; Lu et al., 2018). 
DASS-21 Anxiety scores were positively skewed for both testing phases (when 
participants were classified according to specified DASS-21 Anxiety severity ranges, 
proportions were: Online study – 53% Normal, 22% Mild, 8% Moderate, 5% Severe, and 
12% Exremely Severe; Laboratory testing session – 46% Normal, 24% Mild, 10% Moderate, 
7% Severe, and 13% Extremely Severe. However, exploratory analyses using log-
transformed scores produced the same patterns of findings as that using untransformed 
scores. Results using the latter are subsequently presented for ease of interpretation.   
Attentional Bias for Fear- and Sadness-Related Scenes  
A dot probe task was used to assess attentional biases for fear- and sadness-related 
scenes. This task was programmed and administered within a web-based browser using 
Psytoolkit (www.psytoolkit.org). Each trial began with a fixation cross (500 ms) followed by 
the presentation of a pictorial stimulus pair on opposite sides of the screen (500 ms). A probe 
(i.e. a dot) then quickly replaced one of the stimuli. Participants were tasked to indicate the 
location of the probe as quickly as possible via a keyboard press (‘E’ for left, and ‘I’ for 
right). Trials with incorrect responses were excluded from analyses, and trials where 
responses were not received within 2000 ms were automatically considered incorrect and 
excluded from further analyses (see (Britton et al., 2015; Zhang, Dong, & Zhou, 2018) for 






There were four types of trials, appearing in a randomised order for each participant: 
24 fear-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, 24 happy-neutral and 40 neutral-neutral filler trials. The 
current study examined the negative-neutral (i.e. fear-neutral and sad-neutral) trials. Whether 
the negative stimulus appeared on the left or right of the screen, and whether the probe 
replaced the negative or neutral stimulus was counterbalanced across trials. The 24 trials for 
each negative-neutral condition were created using six unique image pairs repeated four times 
across the experiment. Images used (resized to approx. 307 x 230 px) were predominantly 
scenes drawn from the International Affective Pictures System; (IAPS; (Bradley & Lang, 
2007) and pre-validated for their emotional content in a pilot study (N = 103, in press)2.  
Negative and neutral images were paired so that both scenes in a given negative-neutral 
stimulus pair either consistently featured human persons or did not. Standardized valence 
ratings (Fear: M = 3.30, SD =.92; Sad: M = 2.28, SD = .29) and arousal ratings 
(Fear: M = 6.03, SD = .79; Sad: M = 4.87, SD = .30) from the IAPS norming study did not 
differ between the two classes of negative stimuli, t(4) = 2.35, p = .12 and t(4) = 1.82, p = .19 
respectively. 
Indices of attentional bias for fear- and sadness-related scenes were computed by 
traditional means, i.e. by subtracting mean reaction times on incongruent trials (probe 
replaces neutral stimulus) from mean reaction times on congruent trials (probe replaces 
emotional stimulus). More extreme bias scores (i.e. differences scores) denote more extreme 
attentional biases for the given class of emotional stimuli.  
Additionally, these traditional bias scores were complemented with bias scores 
computed based on extra-decisional reaction times. Extra-decisional reaction times are 
 
2 IAPS identification codes for images used in negative-neutral trials: Fear – 1120, 1930, 
5971, 2770, 6250, 6370; Sad – 9184, 9340, 9561, 2141, 2205, 2900; Neutral – 7185, 7500, 
7705, 7550, 7050, 7080, 7187, 2440, 2575, 2745.1. Two neutral images were sourced from 
free online stock photo databases and are available upon request. All pictures used were 






derived from drift-diffusion modelling of trial-level reaction time data. (see Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008 for theory and origin, and Voss, A. & Voss, J., 2007 for processing software 
used). Drift-diffusion modelling techniques have their origins in computational cognitive 
psychology, or the field of research which applies computational methods to observational 
data with the goal of quantifying mental processes underlying human information processing 
more precisely (Palmeri, Love, & Turner, 2016). On reaction-time-based measures involving 
simple two-choice perceptual decisions (such as the dot probe task), drift-diffusion modelling 
techniques allow for trial-level data to be broken down into their component cognitive 
processes (parameters) for analysis: Namely, decision-related components (e.g. amount and 
rate of information accumulation before a decision/motor response is executed) and the extra-
decisional component. At trial-level, the extra-decisional component (or extra-decisional 
time) partials out the time taken to encode the evidence from a stimulus that will drive the 
decision process (Ratcliff & MacKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016). In the case of the dot 
probe task where speed of attentional orientation is of interest, modelling trial-level extra-
decisional time in isolation may provide aggregate reaction times which can be used to derive 
more refined indices of attentional bias (Price, Brown, & Siegle, 2019).   
Cognitive Functioning 
The CogState computerised test battery (www.cogstate.com) was used to index 
neurocognitive functioning across several domains. The full test battery comprises 13 tests 
(full test descriptions are available for public access on the CogState website) assessing 
neurocognitive functioning across eight unique domains: International Shopping List Test 
(verbal learning), Groton Maze Chase Test (processing speed), Groton Maze Learning Test 
(executive function), Detection Test (processing speed), Identification Test (attention), One 
Card Learning Test (visual memory), One-Back Test (working memory), Two-Back Test 






Learning Test (visual memory), Socio-Emotional Cognition Test (emotional recognition), 
Groton Maze Learning Test – Delayed Recall (visual memory), International Shopping List 
Test – Delayed Recall (verbal memory). Tests are stated in the order of administration 
recommended by CogState guidelines. Test re-retest reliability estimates for CogState tests 
range between .84 and .91 (Collie, Maruff, Darby, & McStephen, 2003; Falleti, Maruff, 
Collie, & Darby, 2006), where practice effects have been demonstrated to be negligible 
(Falleti et al., 2006).  
Results 
 
Correlations Between Indices of Attentional Bias and Anxiety 
Table 6.1 gives accuracy rates and mean reaction times used to calculate bias scores 
and extra-decisional bias scores based on dot probe task performance, as well as mean 
DASS-21 Anxiety scores, for both testing phases in the current study3.  
Correlations between bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety were performed separately 
for the online study and laboratory testing session. Mean Fear and Sad bias scores are given 
in Table 6.2, along with their correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety scores obtained at each 
testing phase. There was a selective association between bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety, 
such that only Sad bias score but not Fear bias score was significantly correlated with DASS-
21 Anxiety. However, as shown in Table 6.2, this selective association was apparent only 
 
3 There was an overall upward shift in means for both DASS-21 Anxiety scores and reaction 
times on the dot probe task (shorter response latencies) moving from the online to laboratory 
testing session. Influxes in baseline anxiety (Purves et al., 2019) and decreases in response 
latencies (Hilbig, 2016; Semmelmann & Weigelt, 2017) moving from online to laboratory 
test settings have been previously documented, and are likely to reflect normative shifts from 






when bias scores were computed using extra-decisional reaction times, when measures of 
attentional bias and anxiety were obtained via remote data collection methods (i.e. online)4.  
Correlations Between Neurocognitive Functioning and Anxiety 
 Mean performance outcomes on CogState tests and their correlations with DASS-21 
are also given in Table 6.2. As seen, none of the test scores correlated with DASS-21 
Anxiety. The inclusion of entry site (university vs. community) and medication status 
(currently using vs. not using antidepressants) as control variables did not alter this pattern of 
findings.  
In the present case, targeted mediator variables (performance outcomes on CogState 
tests) and independent variables (in-lab bias scores) were not associated with the dependent 
variable (in-lab DASS-21 Anxiety scores). Since basic assumptions for mediation analyses 
were not met (Baron & Kenny, 1986; James & Brett, 1984; Judd & Kenny, 1981), further 
tests were not conducted. For comprehensiveness, correlations between possible mediator and 
independent variables (i.e. CogState outcomes and in-lab bias scores) are given in the 
Appendix J.  
 
Table 6.1. Mean reaction times used to calculate bias scores and extra-decisional bias scores 
based on dot probe task performance, and mean DASS-21 Anxiety scores for both testing 
phases (N = 100).  
  Online Study Laboratory Testing 
Session 
 
4 Given known relationships between attentional biases for sadness-related information and 
depressive syndromes (and the availability of DASS-21 Depression subscale scores on hand), 
the correlation between the extra-decisional Sad bias score and DASS-21 Depression was 
also examined within the online dataset. This association was not significant, r = .026, p = 






Acccuracy (%)  97.86 [3.06] 98.06 [2.56] 
Reaction Time Trial Type Mean in ms [SD] Mean in ms [SD] 
Traditional Sad – Congruent 430.21 [83.11] 397.11 [63.95] 
Sad – Incongruent  426.32 [67.92] 396.59 [65.32] 
Fear – Congruent 435.58 [78.07] 394.82 [63.84] 
Fear – Incongruent 432.03 [73.06] 396.82 [69.70] 
Extra-
decisional  
Sad – Congruent 363.34 [57.41] 337.13 [50.37] 
Sad – Incongruent  373.38 [68.60] 336.82 [54.71] 
Fear – Congruent 367.75 [65.92] 343.03 [53.06] 
Fear – Incongruent 366.36 [61.96] 339.54 [53.08] 
 DASS-21 Anxiety   3.90 [4.05] 4.62 [4.22] 
 
 
Table 6.2. Mean Fear and Sad bias scores, performance outcomes on CogState tests, and their 
correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety. Outliers for bias scores and CogState test scores were 
identified as data points +/- 3 SD from the mean, where N below denotes the number of 
observations after outliers were removed. Initial N = 100 unless otherwise stated.  






















Traditional – Fear 93 -1.37 
[28.85] 
.127 [.224] 92 -0.59 
[31.70] 
-.054 [.607] 
Traditional – Sad  92 -2.19 
[28.72] 
.044 [.647] 90 0.81 
[26.23] 
-.005 [.961] 
ED – Fear 97 -2.31 
[36.22] 
.116 [.260] 94 1.17 
[34.19] 
-.100 [.335] 
ED - Sad 97 5.01 
[33.14] 









- - - 97 59.14 
[42.52] 
-.067 [.516] 
Detection Test [lmn] - - - 93 2.58 
[.089] 
.077 [.462] 
Groton Maze Chase 
Test [mps]  




Learning Test [err] 




Learning Test – 
Delayed Recall [err]  














Shopping List Test 
[cor] 




Shopping List Test – 
Delayed Recall [cor] 
- - - 91 9.95 
[1.73] 
-.089 [.400] 
One Card Learning 
Test [acc] 
- - - 100 .967 
[.13] 
.018 [.859] 




Cognition Test [acc] 
- - - 78a 1.13 
[.12] 
-.098 [.394] 
Two-Back Test [acc] - - - 73a 1.14 
[.10] 
.015 [.897] 
Set-Shifting Test [err] - - - 71a 28.43 
[15.11] 
-.207 [.083] 
*p < .05. 
aInitial N for these variables was 79 due to errors in data saving. 
lmn = Speed of performance, log10 milliseconds; acc = Accuracy of performance, arsine 
proportion; err = Error count; cor = Number of correct responses; mps = Moves per second. 
Discussion 
 The present study sought to address two aims. The first aim was to examine whether 
previous findings on the specificity of the anxiety-related attentional bias to mildly 
threatening stimuli (Mogg et al., 2000) would be replicated, when sadness- and fear-related 






thematically represent mild and high threat respectively. The second aim was two-fold: (a) to 
examine the neurocognitive profile associated with anxiety, and (b) if neurocognitive 
impairments are established, whether they would mediate the association between attentional 
bias and self-reported anxiety measured in the same laboratory testing session.  
 Pertaining to the first aim, a selective association between indices of attentional bias 
and self-reported anxiety was presently observed, such that attentional bias was associated 
with anxiety only when indexed based on sadness- but not fear-related scenes. These findings 
support and extend on previously established empirical evidence (Mogg et al., 2000) for 
predictions made based on the cognitive-motivational framework (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 2018): Namely, that the anxiety-related attentional bias is specific to mildly 
threatening stimuli, while attentional bias for highly threatening stimuli may represent a 
normative function that is not modulated by anxiety. However, this selective association was 
apparent only when indices of attentional bias were computed using extra-decisional reaction 
times derived from drift-diffusion modelling, when measure of attentional bias and anxiety 
were obtained via web-based data collection methods (i.e. in the online study, but not the 
laboratory testing session). Besides adding to previously established support for the utility of 
applying drift-diffusion modelling techniques to dot probe data in anxiety-related research 
(Price et al., 2019), the current pattern of findings have other methodological implications for 
the measurement of the anxiety-related attentional bias, which has been documented with 
notable inconsistency across studies (see Van Bockstaele et al., 2014 for a review).  
First, negative stimuli of differing threat value may not be equally sensitive to anxiety 
when implemented in behavioural measures of attentional bias, and should be systematically 
controlled for in the study of attentional bias in anxiety. To this end, current findings point to 
sadness- and fear-related stimuli as a plausible thematic approach to represent threat on a 






of highly arousing or emotionally distressing stimuli.  Second, although incidental to the 
main aim, the association between attentional bias and anxiety was presently observed only 
within web- but not lab-collected data for the same participants. Where findings from web-
based experiments and their laboratory counterparts do not corroborate, possible explanations 
include technical and situational variation (Hilbig, 2016; Semmelmann & Weigelt, 2017). 
The latter seems more likely in the present case, since the same browser-based dot probe task 
was administered in both the online study and laboratory testing session. It has previously 
been suggested that undertaking experiments in unfamiliar environments (and with unfamiliar 
equipment) adds a cognitive load to the task at hand (Kim, Gabriel, & Gygax, 2019). 
Relatedly, studies have shown that differences between anxious and non-anxious individuals 
in the processing of emotional information taper off with increasing task demands (Vytal, 
Cornwell, Arkin, & Grillion, 2012; Vytal, Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin & Grillion, 2013). 
There are several potential accounts (not mutually exclusive) for these findings, including 
that increased cognitive load may inhibit anxiety-related mechanisms from operating (Vytal 
et al., 2012), or reduce emotional influences on attention and cognition more generally 
(Pessoa, 2010). It is possible that the different patterns of association between dot probe task 
performance and anxiety as presently observed between web- and lab-collected data may in 
part be explained by different cognitive loads in the two settings (lower vs. higher 
respectively). In addition to systematic control over the threat value of stimuli, current 
findings suggest that thoughtful consideration should be given to the experimental setting in 
endeavours to capture attentional bias associated with anxiety. 
Pertaining to the second aim, performance across all CogState tests did not correlate 
with anxiety, indicating that neurocognitive functioning did not vary with anxiety on the 
whole. The finding that neurocognitive impairments are not more extreme at the higher end 






et al., 2011; Jarros et al., 2011; Leonard & Abramovitch, 2019; Troller-Renfree, Barker, Pine, 
& Fox, 2015)] which sit within a larger body of inconsistent findings on neurocognitive 
functioning in anxiety. One possible account for such null findings, is that cognitive 
impairments in anxiety are more readily apparent on less conventionally-used neurocognitive 
tests. According to a corollary in one prominent account of cognitive functioning in the ABT-
anxiety link (Attentional Control Theory; Eysenck et al., 2007), anxiety promotes enhanced 
cognitive effort to ensure performance effectiveness is maintained on a given task, often at 
the cost of processing speed. Thus, anxiety-related impairments are more likely to be 
observed on cognitively-demanding tasks where processing speed is assessed (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009). While the CogState test battery has its merits in comprehensiveness and 
standardisation, composite tests are predominantly accuracy-based, where tests which 
evaluate processing speed only entail minimal cognitive load. Chiaravalloti et al. (2003) draw 
a distinction between neurocognitive tasks which assess simple and complex processing 
speed: While the former requires only a simple motor response to a single presented stimulus, 
the latter requires the simultaneous and continuous manipulation of information in mind. It is 
possible that tasks which tap complex processing speed might be better able to differentiate 
anxious from non-anxious individuals (see (Zainal & Newman, 2018) for a similar 
proposition), and should be considered in the prospective search for neurocognitive domains 
associated with anxiety. 
Alternatively, but not mutually exclusively, the experimental setting may also 
partially explain the lack of correlations between CogState tests and anxiety as presently 
observed. Pertaining to the current study’s second aim, mediation analyses were not pursued 
partly on the grounds that correlations could not be established between targeted independent 
variables and the dependent variable. That is, bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety measured 






were observed (albeit selectively) between the two measures when obtained within the online 
setting. It is possible that the association between cognitive performance and anxiety may 
also vary according to context (Robinson, Vytal, Cornwell, & Grillon, 2013). The current 
study lacks an online counterpart to speak to this speculative hypothesis, which may be worth 
incorporating in the design of future studies.    
Other limitations of the present study include its sampling methods, which favoured 
the recruitment of university students among whom the association between cognitive 
functioning and anxiety might be unique. Although the inclusion of entry site (university vs. 
community) did not alter the current pattern of findings, this might in part be explained by the 
modest sample size. This sample size was compromised for some CogState tests due to 
technology failures. A more demographically diverse and larger sample would help offset 
doubts in the generalizability of study findings in future research. Additionally, although 
anxiety was presently treated as a unitary construct, separate measures of trait and state 
anxiety would have been helpful to partition situationally-driven effects (a notion of 
particularly relevance to the current study) and should be considered in future investigations. 
The discrepant direction of association between indices of ABT observed in the 
current study and studies in previous chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) also warrants mention.  
While inverse associations were observed in previous chapters, ABT was positively 
associated with anxiety (for web-collected data) in the current study. It is possible that this 
may be explained by differences in the nature of reaction times used to compute indices of 
ABT. In the current study, indices of ABT were computed based on extra-decisional reaction 
times derived from drift-diffusion modelling (thought to capture attentional processes with 
irrelevant features of task performance removed), while traditional reaction times were used 
in previous studies. However, findings from the next chapter cast doubt on this, with an 






reaction times and anxiety. The reliance on assumptions about underlying visual processes 
which have elapsed for the interpretation of observed associations between ABT and anxiety 
represents a running limitation of this thesis, and is discussed in the General Discussion 







Chapter 7: Is the Anxiety-Related Attentional Bias Preferential to Sadness- Over Fear-







7.1. Contextual Statement 
Towards the main aims of the present thesis, a number of factors were examined for 
their potential role in the association between ABT and anxiety across three empirical studies 
spanning Chapters 4 to 6. Associated findings are summarised and evaluated in the next 
chapter (Chapter 8: General Discussion). The current chapter presents a follow-up 
exploratory investigation on the nature of the anxiety-related attentional bias, in light of 
associative patterns incidentally observed between indices of ABT and self-reported anxiety 
when fear- and sadness-related scenes were considered as separate classes of target images in 
a dot probe task. Specifically, findings across the three main empirical studies presented thus 
far (collective N = 620) appear to point to a preferential association between an ABT index 
based on sadness-related scenes and self-reported anxiety, relative to an ABT index based on 
fear-related scenes. 
Although this preferential association was demonstrated with relative consistency 
(barring boundary conditions in Study 3, Chapter 6), this finding was reproduced using the 
same dot probe task, and thus the same set of fear- and sadness-related scenes. Many scholars 
(e.g. Laws, 2016; Schmidt, 2009) draw a distinction between direct replications (reproduction 
of a previous finding using the exact same procedure) and conceptual replications 
(reproduction of a previous finding even after modifying a critical element of the procedure), 
and emphasize the latter in order to determine the true implications of the original finding. In 
the present case, it would be important to support the claim that the anxiety-related 
attentional bias is preferential to sadness- over fear-related stimuli by demonstrating the 
robustness of the phenomenon across different target images of the same class (i.e. that the 
finding was not specific to the particular set of fear- and sadness-related scenes employed 










234 participants (154 Female; Mean Age = 25.91, SD = 10.37) were recruited via two 
sources: the research participation scheme at the School of Psychology, University of 
Wollongong (N = 121) and invitations placed on the online platform Reddit on relevant 
forums designed to connect researchers and voluntary research participants (N = 113). These 
participants were individuals who had not previously been involved in any research 
pertaining to the present thesis. Data collection took place remotely via Psytoolkit 
(www.psytookit.org). Recruitment site (university vs. Reddit) did not alter the pattern of 
findings as presented in the Results section, nor did diagnostic history (N = 56 reported a 
positive history of an anxiety disorder).  
 
Measures and Procedures  
 The present study was conducted as an effort to conceptually replicate the finding that 
the anxiety-related attentional bias is preferential to sadness- over fear-related stimuli, using a 
dot probe task presenting a different set of target stimuli (i.e. different fear- and sadness-
related scenes). All aspects of previously used measures were kept constant, including the 
outcome measure of anxiety (DASS-21 Anxiety subscale), and configurations of the initial 
dot probe task (specifics presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.3). Changes between the initial 
and current dot probe task were only with regards to target images in stimulus pairs appearing 
in the 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials (6 unique stimulus pairs repeated 4 times for 
each condition). These replacement images were selected based on the categorical norming 
study on IAPS images by Libkuman et al. (2007). All selected images had an intensity rating 






social scenes were selected in equal parts, and matched to existing neutral counterparts of the 
same social content. Target images in the initial six sad-neutral stimulus pairs were replaced 
with scenes of the following IAPS codes: 9000, 9181, 9415, 9421, 9910, 9911. Target images 
in the initial six fear-neutral stimulus pairs were replaced with scenes of the following IAPS 
codes: 1052, 2751, 5972, 6230, 6300, 9620.  
Participants completed the three main measures in the following order: 1) the DASS-
21; 2) the modified dot probe task; and, 3) as part of the manipulation check procedures for 
the current study, participants also rated each of the six sadness- and fear-related scenes (12 
images in total) on Fear and Sad intensity rating scales ranging from 1 to 10 following 
completion of the dot probe task.   
Results 
The following participants were excluded from analyses: participants who did not 
meet the minimum age requirement for adulthood (i.e. 18 years; N = 4), participants who did 
not perform the dot probe task correctly (< 75% accuracy; N = 3), and participants who did 
not respond thoughtfully on the intensity ratings task, as suggested in default responses of “1” 
across all items (N = 7). The final participant pool consisted of 220 individuals (147 Female; 
Mean Age = 25.76, SD = 10.21; Mean DASS-21 Anxiety Score = 5.44; SD = 4.18). Mean 
accuracy rates on the dot probe were high, M = 97.82% (SD = 2.82%). Table 7.1 gives fear 
and sad intensity ratings for target images averaged across these 220 individuals. Fear target 
images were rated more highly on Fear (M = 5.27, SD = 2.51) than Sad (M = 2.87, SD = 
1.67), t(219) = 18.59, p < .001, while Sad target images were rated more highly on Sad (M = 
5.99, SD = 2.46) than Fear (M = 3.24, SD = 1.88), t(219) = 21.05, p < .001.   
Fear and Sad bias scores were computed by subtracting mean reaction times on 
congruent trials from mean reaction times on incongruent trials for fear-neutral and sad-






modelling techniques were also presently applied (using Fast-DM; A. Voss & J. Voss, 2007), 
so that traditionally-computed bias scores were supplemented with bias scores computed 
based on extra-decisional reaction times. Mean reaction times on trials and mean bias scores 
they were used to compute these can be found in Table 7.2. These bias scores were examined 
for their correlations with DASS-21 Anxiety. Results showed that traditionally-computed 
bias scores were not associated with DASS-21 Anxiety, for both Fear (r = .040, p = .554) and 
Sad bias score (r = .007, p = .912). Correlations (absolute magnitudes) with DASS-21 
Anxiety were improved with the use of bias scores computed based on extra-decisional 
reaction times  (r = .120, p = .076 for Fear bias score; r = -.117, p = .085 for Sad bias score), 
but did not unmask any selectivity in the association between indices of attentional bias and 
self-reported anxiety. 
 
Additional Analyses   
Given the availability of intensity ratings for target stimuli on hand, additional 
analyses were conducted to ascertain that poorly differentiated correlations between bias 
scores and anxiety were not better explained by innappropriate stimulus selection. 
Specifically, maximising the function of intensity ratings which were collected for target 
images in the current dot probe task, correlational analyses between bias scores and DASS-21 
Anxiety were repeated with two subsets of the original dataset created to maximise 
qualitative differences between Fear and Sad target images. Table 7.1 is extended to also 
include mean fear and sad intensity ratings for target images in these subsets.  
For the first subset, intensity ratings were used to identify target images which were 
least well-distinguished on their assigned negative emotion based on mean ratings across 220 
participants. For Fear target images, the two images with the lowest difference score when 






and IAPS no. 9620 (non-social), MDifference = 0.40, and 1.03 respectively. For Sad target 
images, the two images with the lowest difference score when fear intensity ratings were 
subtracted from sad intensity ratings were IAPS no. 9910 (social) and IAPS no. 9911 (non-
social), MDifference = 1.59 and 1.85 respectively. For complete descriptives on intensity ratings 
across all target images, please see Appendix K. The 8 fear-neutral and 8 sad-neutral trials 
presenting the mentioned target images were removed1. Thus, instead of computing bias 
scores using 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials across 220 participants, bias scores were 
computed using 16 fear-neutral and 16 sad-neutral trials across 220 participants.  
For the second subset, intensity data was used to identify participants who did not 
perceive the current set of negative scenes as discretely as they were normed. To be included 
in this subset, participants had to rate Fear and Sad target images dissimilarly on fear and 
sadness intensity scales with a difference score of at least 1. This criterion excluded 83 
participants2. Thus, bias scores were computed using 24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-neutral trials 
across 137 (instead of 220) participants.  
Besides mean reaction times on trials and bias scores computed across the full dataset, 
Table 7.2 also gives the equivalent for the two data subsets, along with correlations between 
bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety. While the pattern of associations between bias scores and 
DASS-21 Anxiety observed in the full dataset was not altered in the first data subset3, 
findings differed in the second data subset. Specifically, the extra-decisional Sad bias score 
 
1 The option to exclude images (and the trials they appear in) on the basis of a specified cut off difference score 
was available. However, participants were presented with two response scales (Fear and Sad intensity) for each 
image they were tasked to rate. This comparative mode of presentation made it a challenge to objectively 
quantify the distance between units of intensity, and to assert whether they are equal. For example, one 
participant may have used ratings of 8 and 4 for Fear and Sad intensity to indicate that a picture was more fear- 
than sad-eliciting, while another participant may have used ratings of 2 and 1 to indicate the same pattern of 
information processing. A decision was made to use ranked difference scores as a means of overcoming 
anticipated inter-individual differences in internal scaling. 
2 Excluded participants did not differ from included participants on demographics (age, gender, diagnostic 
history) or study variables (all variants of bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety).  
3 This may in part have been due to the number of trials being too small for robust parameter estimation in drift-






showed a small but significant association with DASS-21 Anxiety (r = -.1854, p = .036) when 
analyses were restricted to participants who perceived Fear and Sad target images as distinct 
to a greater extent.  
  
Table 7.1. Mean fear and sad intensity ratings for target images averaged across the full 
dataset and two data subsets (created to maximise qualitative differences between Fear and 
Sad target images). 








Full Dataset  
(24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-
neutral trials, 220 participants) 
Fear 5.27 [2.51] 2.87 [1.67] 
Sad 3.24 [1.88] 5.99 [2.46] 
Data Subset 1 
(16 fear-neutral and 16 sad-
neutral trials, 220 participants)  
Fear (4 
images) 
5.60 [2.67] 2.33 [1.67] 
Sad (4 
images) 
2.76 [1.84] 6.03 [2.50] 
Data Subset 2  
(24 fear-neutral and 24 sad-
neutral trials, 137 participants)   
Fear 6.23 [2.16] 2.98 [1.58] 
Sad 3.12 [1.57] 6.62 [2.19] 
 
4 As per the main empirical studies presented across Chapters 4 to 6, the absolute magnitude of the correlation is 
presently interpreted (i.e. the direction of association is not considered meaningful). This is based on the 
reasoning that heightened orientation to emotional stimuli on the dot probe task using a 500ms stimulus 
exposure time can manifest in either increasing bias scores (faster reaction times to probes replacing emotional 
stimuli) or decreasing bias scores (faster reaction times to probes replacing neutral stimuli due to facilitated 
disengagement following initial attentional capture) (Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; Booth, 2014). 
Nonetheless, the reliance on assumptions about underlying visual processes which have elapsed for the 
interpretation of observed associations between ABT and anxiety represents a running limitation of this thesis, 







Table 7.2. Mean reaction times on trials used to calculate traditional and extra-decisional bias 
scores and correlations between bias scores and DASS-21 Anxiety, across the full dataset and 
two data subsets.  
 Reactio
n Time 


















































Fear – Congruent 348.06 
[63.35] 






































































Sad – Congruent 409.79 
[67.89] 














































*p < .05 
 
Discussion 
 Across the three empirical studies in the previous chapters of the present thesis 
(Chapters 4 – 6), fear- and sadness-related scenes were considered as separate classes of 
target images in the assessment of ABT within a dot probe paradigm. Collective findings 
point to a preferential association between an ABT index based on sadness-related scenes and 
self-reported anxiety, relative to an ABT index based on fear-related scenes. The present 
study explored whether the same associative pattern would be observed in the context of a 
dot probe task presenting a different set of target images which have been normed for the 
emotions of sadness and fear.  
  The previously observed associative pattern between indices of attentional bias and 
self-reported anxiety was not replicated in initial analyses. However, replicative findings 
were brought to the fore  when several boundary conditions were imposed (discussed 






in secondary analyses of this study (and in previous chapters of this thesis) may in part be 
explained by differences in threat value between fear and sad classes of stimuli, and are in 
keeping with predictions from Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive-motivational 
framework: Namely, that the anxiety-related attentional bias is specific to mildly threatening 
stimuli (i.e. sadness-related scenes conveying elapsed danger),  while attentional bias for 
highly threatening stimuli (i.e. fear-related scenes conveying potential harm) may represent a 
normative function which is relatively unmodulated by anxiety5. 
 As mentioned, the preferential association between the ABT index based on sadness-
related scenes and self-reported anxiety (relative to ABT indexed by fear-related scenes) was 
brought to the fore only when several boundary conditions were imposed. First, as per Study 
3 (Chapter 6), the finding that the anxiety-related attentional bias was selective to sadness- 
but not fear-related stimuli was observed only when correlational analyses were performed 
with bias scores computed using extra-decisional reaction times derived from drift-diffusion 
modelling techniques. Second, in the present study, this associative pattern was additionally 
conditional on analyses being restricted to participants who perceived the current set of 
negative stimuli more closely aligned with the discrete emotions for which they were normed. 
Besides adding support for applying drift-diffusion modelling techniques to dot probe data in 
research on the ABT-anxiety link, current findings also highlight the importance of subjective 
responses to experimental stimuli, and the role that perceptual idiosyncrasies might play in 
combination with stimulus features to influence associations between measures of (visual) 
emotional attention and anxious pathology.  
 There are several aspects of the current findings which suggest the present conceptual 
replication should be interpreted conservatively, pending further research. First, after 
 
5 The potential selectivity of the anxiety-related attentional bias was examined as part of the main aims in Study 
3 (Chapter 6) within the context of Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) cognitive-motivational framework. A more 






restricting analyses to selected participants (i.e. Data Subset 2), correlation coefficients for 
bias scores and self-reported anxiety did not differ greatly in absolute magnitude between 
Fear bias score (r = |.142|) and Sad bias score (r = |.185|). Although only the latter coefficient 
achieved statistical significance, the closely-matched magnitudes challenge conclusions on 
the selectivity of the anxiety-related attentional bias. Second, the selection criterion for Data 
Subset 2 (participants had to rate Fear and Sad target images dissimilarly on fear and sadness 
intensity scales with a difference score of at least 1) excluded a substantial portion of the 
sample (N = 83; 37.7%). This compromised the sample size from which conclusions were 
drawn. Along with the second boundary condition described in the paragraph above, the 
observed high exclusion rate contraindicates relying solely on external norms for the content 
of visual stimuli (specifically, naturalistic scenes) in research involving measures of 
emotional attention. Failure to record sample-specific norms for the emotional content of 
target stimuli (i.e. homogeneity of stimulus perception was assumed when ABT was 
assessed) may thus represent a potential running limitation across the empirical studies of the 
present thesis, and will be further discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 8: General 
Discussion).  
As a way of prefacing the next chapter, it is worth noting that the present chapter 
deviates from the central focus of the present thesis in its exploration of procedural 
moderators of the ABT-anxiety link. In light of incidental findings observed across empirical 
studies in Chapters 4 to 6, the present study further explored the experimental conditions 
under which correlations between indices of ABT and anxiety might be more consistently 
established. It is perhaps unsurprising that a few challenges were encountered to this end. As 
described in the Introduction (Chapter 1), inconsistent findings on the association between 
ABT and anxiety are likely to (at least in part) reflect actual phenomena, which in turn 






ABT-anxiety link. The explanatory power of methodological accounts for inconsistent 






Chapter 8: General Discussion 
 
8.1. Summary of Key Findings and Their Clinical Implications  
The present thesis sought to study the ABT-anxiety link in the context of a research 
program extending from that of the information-processing approach. Specifically, one where 
the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by considering ABT as an 
indirect or component predictor of anxiety, where stable individual differences are considered 
for their role in the ABT-anxiety link. The end goal was to identify theoretically-relevant 
moderators and mediators of the ABT-anxiety link which may ultimately be clinically useful, 
or more precisely serve to refine the design of attentional bias modification programs. Three 
empirical studies were conducted to investigate a number of factors (with conceptual ties to 
RDoC domains) which may moderate or mediate the relationship between ABT and anxiety. 
A follow-up study was also conducted in light of the pattern of association incidentally 
observed between indices of attentional bias and anxiety, owing to methodological 
considerations taken on board in the assessment of ABT within the present thesis. Figure 8.1 









Figure 8.1. Graphical representation of the pattern of findings from investigations of the 
present thesis. Arrows with dashed lines denote non-significant relationships. Note that 
mediation models were intended but not tested in Chapter 6 (Study 3) as correlations could 
not be established between targeted independent and dependent variables (in-lab bias scores 
and DASS-21 Anixety ratings). 
 
 The first study (Chapter 4) examined whether attentional biases towards and away 
from positive stimuli would moderate the association between attentional bias for threat and 






association between attentional bias for threat and anxiety differed between participants 
characterized by attentional biases towards and away from positive stimuli. Specifically, 
attentional bias for threat was associated with anxiety only among persons characterised by 
an attentional bias away from positive stimuli, who in turn may represent a subgroup of 
individuals characterised by higher ruminative tendencies. While not stated as part of the 
study’s aims in the manuscript presented in Chapter 4, findings from this study also 
demonstrate that the separate constructs of ABT and positive attentional bias can be 
simultaneously assessed by including a wider range of target stimuli in a single experiment 
set up to capture patterns of attentional processing (the dot probe paradigm in this case). 
Given that baseline measures of ABT are typically obtained as part of the pre-treatment 
protocol in attentional bias modification programs (e.g. Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 
2009; Chau, Tse, So, & Chan, 2019; Linke et al., 2019), incorporating positively valenced 
target stimuli in baseline measures of ABT may offer a way of differentiating candidates 
more or less likely to benefit from training sessions, without imposing major burdens of 
effort or time on either the researcher/treatment provider or participant.  
 The second study (Chapter 5) examined two models of the role of loneliness in the 
association between attentional bias for threat and anxiety: (1) A moderation model (the 
ABT-anxiety link is moderated by loneliness), and (2) A proxy model (the ABT-anxiety link 
is better explained by loneliness). Findings supported the latter model, and interpreted in light 
of relevant theory (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck & Clark, 1997; Bradley, Mogg, Falla & 
Hamilton, 1998; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1988; J. T. Cacioppo & S. Cacioppo, 2018; J. T. Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven, 
Bijttebier, & Goossens, 2017), suggest that loneliness may be one driving source of 
exaggerated threat appraisals which underpin the association between ABT and anxiety. 






findings should not be taken as support for targeting loneliness in favour of ABT among 
anxious individuals given caveats associated with interventions for loneliness. Specifically, 
existing interventions for loneliness tend to serve to provide opportunities for an individual to 
extend their social network, which may not necessarily generalize to reductions in subjective 
feelings of social isolation (S. Cacioppo, Grippo, London, Goossens, & J. T. Cacioppo, 2015; 
Masi, Chen, Hawkley, & J. T. Cacioppo, 2011; Ypsilanti, 2018). Interestingly, while not 
developed to target loneliness per se, studies have shown that mindfulness training programs 
produce pre- to post-treatment decreases in self-reported loneliness or increases in social 
connectedness (Cohen & Miller, 2009; Seppala, Hutcherson, Ngyuen, Doty, & Gross, 2014; 
Aspy & Proeve, 2017). It has been suggested that mindfulness down-regulates the threat 
system (Hickey, Nelson, & Meadows, 2017), a notion supported by research demonstrating 
that higher levels of mindfulness are associated with the tendency to evaluate possible 
sources of threat more benignly (Hoffman & Geisler, 2020; Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan, 
2009). While loneliness is thought to increase one’s focus on self-preservation and an 
enhanced perception of threat in the external world (J. T. Cacioppo & S. Cacioppo, 2018; J. 
T. Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009; Spithoven et al., 2017), it has also been noted that being in a 
state of constant vigilance for threat also, in a vicious cycle, increases the individual’s 
feelings of social isolation (Hawkley & J. T. Cacioppo, 2010). It is possible that pre- to post-
treatment decreases in self-reported loneliness observed in mindfulness training programs 
(Cohen & Miller, 2009; Seppala et al., 2014; Aspy & Proeve, 2017) may in part be explained 
by decreases in threat perception, thus interrupting the self-perpetuating loop just described. 
If the association between ABT and anxiety is modulated by exaggerated threat appraisals, 
which in turn is exacerbated by loneliness, providers of attentional bias modification 







 Alternatively, it is possible that pre- to post-treatment decreases in loneliness 
observed in mindfulness training programs may simply be explained by bonding processes or 
feelings of solidarity, given many mindfulness training programs (including those cited 
earlier; Cohen & Miller, 2009; Seppala et al., 2014; Aspy & Proeve, 2017) tend to be 
interpersonally-oriented in that they are conducted in the context of interactive group settings. 
This can be contrasted with the nature of computerised psychological interventions (including 
attentional bias modification programs), which are largely self-administered and involve 
minimal interaction between participants and therapist (Taylor & Luce, 2003; Davies, 
Morriss, & Glazebrook, 2014). Regardless of which of the above accounts is preferred for 
pre- to post-treatment decreases in loneliness observed in mindfulness training programs, 
when considered alongside presently observed associations between loneliness and anxiety 
(both independently and interactively with ABT), clinical implications are similar; namely, 
that it would be important to integrate a psychosocial component in attentional bias 
modification programs for anxiety.  
Pertaining to Study 3 (Chapter 6), it is important for subsequent discussion to first note 
that data collection was characterised by two phases: an online component preceding a 
laboratory testing session. ABT was assessed on both counts. A neurocognitive test battery 
(CogState; www.cogstate.com) was administered during the laboratory testing session, with 
the end goal of examining whether neurocognitive impairments would mediate the 
association between ABT and anxiety. ABT was associated with anxiety only in online data 
(i.e. correlations could not be established between ABT and anxiety measured during the 
laboratory testing session). Further contraindicating the pursuit of mediation analyses, indices 
of performance across all CogState tests did not correlate with self-reported anxiety within 
the laboratory testing session. As highlighted within the scoping review presented in Chapter 






whether neurocognitive impairments are associated with anxious pathology. In turn, these 
inconsistent findings raise the question of whether neurocognitive functioning is weighted 
less in anxious pathology, or whether neurocognitive impairments associated with anxiety are 
localised in domains outside the range of assessment in previous studies. Current findings 
appear to support the former notion, in that neurocognitive functioning was not associated 
with anxious pathology even when assessed across a relatively wide range of domains (i.e. 
using the CogState, a standardised, comprehensive neurocognitive test battery). While 
research on other forms of psychopathology have demonstrated that neurocognitive training 
(and neurocognitive improvements) can produce reductions in symptom severity (see Kim, 
Bahk, W.H. Lee, J.S. Lee, & Choi, 2018 for a review), current findings do not seem to 
support the clinical utility of neurocognitive training among anxious individuals (whether as 
an adjunctive to attentional bias modification programs, or as an alternative for individuals 
who may not be suitable candidates for attentional bias modification programs). This being 
said, it must be noted the possibility remains that cognitive impairments associated with 
anxiety are more readily apparent on less conventionally-used neurocognitive tests which 
were not part of the CogState battery (described in more detail in the Discussion section of 
the study presented in Chapter 6). Pending further research, implications from this study 
should be drawn tentatively.  
 Across all three empirical studies described above, attentional bias for sadness- and 
fear-related scenes were indexed using the same dot probe task, and considered separately 
where associations between ABT and self-reported anxiety were examined. A follow-up 
study (Chapter 7) was conducted to examine the associative pattern between indices of 
attentional bias and anxiety using a dot probe task presenting a different set of target stimuli 
(i.e. fear- and sadness-related scenes). Although the focus of the present thesis was not on the 






an ABT index based on sadness-related scenes was preferentially associated with self-
reported anxiety, relative to an ABT index based on fear-related scenes. It is possible that this 
finding may be explained by differences in threat value between sadness- and fear-related 
scenes (mild vs. high threat respectively), and that anxiety is characterised (and possibly 
perpetuated) by exaggerated alarm responses to mild threat (i.e. benign objects or events; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Beck, 1986). While it would appear logical to propose that 
attentional bias modification programs should restrict training procedures to reduce 
attentional allocation for mildly threatening stimuli, the clinical implications of these findings 
are unlikely to be straightforward. That is, operating on “better-safe-than-sorry” heuristics 
also serves a self-preserving function, in that detecting potential sources of danger which turn 
out to be benign is more adaptive than overlooking them and having to face the consequences 
in cases they bear actual harm (Gilbert, 1998; de Jong & Vroling, 2014). However, where 
subjective threat value of stimuli is important to consider in the assessment of ABT in 
anxiety, and by extension the reduction of ABT in anxiety, there is a (somewhat obscure) line 
of work within efforts to develop attentional bias modification programs which has taken to 
employing tailored, idiosyncratically-feared training stimuli (Thomas, Gonsalvez, & 
Johnstone, 2013; Amir, Beard, Burns & Bomyea, 2009). More precisely, within this variant 
of attentional bias modification programs, anxious individuals are trained over multiple 
sessions to divert their attention from a subset of stimuli they personally rated as most 
negative within a broader range of threat-related stimuli. Current findings suggest such 
training procedures should be given more recognition than presently allocated1, although 
further research is needed to determine if the cost of time and effort in tailoring each training 
 
1 Other findings from the current thesis which support the use of idiosyncratic stimuli in attentional bias 
modification programs are those from the follow-up study presented in Chapter 7, where sample-specific ratings 






task per participant produces therapeutic benefits exceeding that of training tasks built on a 
one-size-fits-all approach.   
 Several other procedural moderators of the ABT-anxiety link were also identified in 
the course of addressing the main aims of the present thesis. Specifically, where associations 
were observed between an ABT index based on sadness-related scenes and anxiety, in some 
cases these results were produced only within the constraints of additional boundary 
conditions, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. These observations have implications for future 
research more so than they bear clinical implications, and are so organised to be further 
discussed in Section 8.3 (Collective Implications and Directions for Future Research) 
following an explication of the limitations of the current thesis in 8.2 (Methodological 
Limitations and Other Caveats).  
An aspect of the overall findings to note is that correlations between indices of ABT 
and anxiety were small where they were significant (r representing the relationship between 
Sad bias score and DASS-21 Anxiety ranged from |.127| to |.205|, which in turn translates to 
an r-square or explained variance range between 1.6% to 4.2%). This represents both a caveat 
and possible theoretical contribution of the present thesis, as further discussed in the next two 
subsections that follow.  
 
8.2. Methodological Critique and Other Caveats 
8.2.1. Methodological critique  
8.2.1.1. Cross-sectional research design. A key assumption in the present thesis was 
such that the direction of influence led from ABT to anxiety, and that this pathway might 
potentially be modified or mediated by other study variables. However, single time-point 






thesis, and causal interpretations are constrained given the link between ABT and anxiety is 
likely bidirectional in the long run (van Bockstaele, Verschuere, Tibboel, De Houwer, 
Crombez, & Koster, 2014). Similarly, although the role of moderators and/or mediators in the 
ABT-anxiety link were proposed on the basis of theoretical plausibility, inferences on the 
nature and direction of these relationships cannot be conclusively drawn within the 
constraints of cross-sectional data. For example, in Study 2 (Chapter 5), the statistical 
relationship between ABT and anxiety was lost after loneliness was accounted for. While it 
was concluded that the association between ABT and anxiety may be better explained by 
loneliness, it remains possible that anxiety may play a precedent role over ABT in explaining 
loneliness.  
8.2.1.2. Outcome measures. One strength of the present thesis was that it was 
designed to also capture depressive symptomatology where anxiety was the main outcome 
variable of interest. Given the two clusters of symptoms frequently co-occur, research on 
predictive models of either syndrome should include a measure of the other to demonstrate 
the disorder-specificity of effects, which the present thesis was able to do across three (main) 
empirical studies. However, in a related line of thought, only one outcome measure was used 
in present endeavours to capture the core symptoms of anxiety (the DASS-21 Anxiety 
subscale). As mentioned within the Introduction chapter (Section 1.1.1), other measures have 
been developed for this purpose (e.g. Beck Anxiety Inventory; Beck & Steer, 1993). 
Demonstrating the robustness of current findings across different measures of transdiagnostic 
anxious pathology would have aided in determining their true implications.   
8.2.1.3. Range restriction. A convenience sampling method was applied when 
participants were recruited to address research questions in the three main empirical studies 
of the present thesis, in keeping with the RDoC-given guideline that “sampling should be 






interest” (Kozak & Cuthbert, 2016). Although this sampling method provided for reasonable 
numbers and adequate variability in self-reported anxiety within samples for each study, 
mean anxiety levels were low [DASS-21 Anxiety = 3.49 and 3.38 in Study 1 and 2; 3.90 
(online study) and 4.62 (laboratory testing session) in Study 3]2. Although controlling for 
diagnostic history did not alter results as reported across all three empirical studies, this range 
restriction makes it unclear whether presently observed findings would generalize to 
individuals experiencing (or prone to experiencing) anxious pathology more severely.  
 8.2.1.4. Measurement of ABT: Reliance on external norms for target stimuli. 
Across the main empirical studies of the present thesis, it was assumed that negative stimuli 
used to capture ABT in the dot probe task were perceived as they were normed in the 
judgement study presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2). Thus, manipulation checks were not 
subsequently performed or considered. However, when intensity ratings for target stimuli 
were obtained on a precautionary basis in the follow-up study presented in Chapter 7 
(conducted to examine associations between indices of ABT and anxiety in the context of a 
dot probe task presenting a different set of target images), several observations suggest this 
may have been an oversight. First, it was observed that there was a significant proportion of 
the sample who did not perceive externally-normed Fear and Sad target images dissimilarly 
(37.7%). Second, excluding these individuals from analyses unmasked associations (and 
patterns of associations) between indices of ABT and anxiety not otherwise observed with the 
sample considered as a whole. These findings highlight that subjective responses to 
emotional stimuli in a given sample may not necessarily concur with the emotions for which 
they were normed in an external study, and that these perceptual idiosyncrasies may be 
important to consider in the association between measures of (visual) emotional attention and 
 
2 The DASS-21 classifies scores on the Anxiety subscale in the following ranges of severity: Normal – 0 to 3, 






anxious pathology. Failing to record sample-specific norms for the emotional content of 
target stimuli thus represents a running limitation across the main empirical studies of the 
present thesis.  
  8.2.1.5. Measurement of ABT: Computation of bias indices.  Drift-diffusion 
modelling techniques were applied to dot probe data in the later empirical studies of the 
current thesis (Chapters 6 and 7), representing a methodological strength in allowing for bias 
scores to be computed using reaction times with irrelevant components of task performance 
removed (i.e. extra-decisional reaction times). In turn, bias scores computed using extra-
decisional reaction times served to unmask associative patterns between indices of ABT and 
anxiety not otherwise observed using traditionally-computed bias scores. It should be noted, 
however, that drift-diffusion modelling techniques were applied only to later and not all 
empirical studies of the current thesis, i.e. only where challenges in establishing correlations 
between traditionally-computed indices of ABT and anxiety were encountered. Further, this 
did not alleviate challenges associated with the traditional formula for bias score computation 
based on dot probe task performance (subtracting mean reaction times on congruent trials 
from mean reaction times on incongruent trials). Specifically, where negative associations 
were observed between derivative bias scores and self-reported anxiety (Chapters 4, 5, and 
7), the claim that the association reflects a relationship between heightened attentional 
orientation and anxiety had to be drawn based on assumptions about underlying processes 
which had elapsed (i.e. that faster responses to probes replacing neutral stimuli also entail that 
attention for threat-related stimuli was captured more quickly).  
8.2.3. Other caveats 
8.2.3.1. Omissions. At the time of writing, a sixth major functional domain 
(Sensorimotor Systems) has been proposed within the RDoC framework. However, given 






RDoC framework was adopted in the current thesis. Moreover, based on research priorities 
identified in the scoping review presented in Chapter 2, not all domains outside the Negative 
Valence Systems (i.e. the domain to which ABT has been linked) were presently considered 
in the selection of third variables to be examined in the ABT-anxiety link. The RDoC 
framework additionally indicates two additional elements acting on all functional domains: 
neurodevelopmental and environmental aspects (National Institute of Mental Health, 2020). 
These elements were also not considered in the present thesis.  
8.2.3.2. Small effect sizes. As mentioned earlier (end of Section 8.1), presently 
observed correlations between indices of ABT and anxiety (and thus the variance in anxiety 
explained by ABT) were small. Given the present thesis was centred around the ABT-anxiety 
link, these small effect sizes have a negative impact on the overall clinical value of the 
present thesis. However, presently observed small effect sizes may also serve to reinforce 
previous discussion on the weighted role of ABT in anxiety (and in part the rationale 
underpinning the current project): namely, that ABT is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
anxious pathology to occur (Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015; van Bockstaele et al., 2014). 
Alternate ways to conceive of presently observed small effect sizes are considered in the next 
section, before drawing a more definitive conclusion.  
  
8.3. Collective Implications and Directions for Future Research 
 Barring the methodological limitations and caveats detailed above, collective findings 
from the present thesis have several implications for future research. First, individual 
differences are not commonly considered a source of variance in the link between ABT and 
anxiety within research led by the dominant information-processing approach. However, 






association between ABT and anxiety, and highlight the utility of these factors towards the 
development of theoretical models and clinical interventions for anxiety centred around ABT. 
In future research on the ABT-anxiety link, findings from the present thesis support an 
extended research program in relation to that of the information-processing approach; 
specifically, one where the adaptive aspects of ABT are taken on board in study design by 
considering ABT as an indirect or component predictor of anxiety.  
 Second, while not the focus of the present thesis, several procedural moderators of the 
ABT-anxiety link were identified in the course of addressing the main aims of the present 
thesis, which in turn may have implications for the assessment of ABT in future anxiety-
related research. In this regard, the content of negative stimuli used to capture attention 
appears to be a primary moderator of the ABT-anxiety link. That is, findings from the present 
thesis indicate that ABT indexed on sadness-related scenes was preferentially associated with 
self-reported anxiety, relative to ABT indexed on fear-related scenes. As mentioned earlier, it 
is possible that this finding may be explained by differences in threat value between sadness- 
and fear-related scenes (mild vs. high threat respectively), and that anxiety is characterised 
(and possibly perpetuated) by exaggerated alarm responses to mild threat (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Beck, 1986). Future research on the ABT-anxiety link should seek to systematically 
control for the content (if not threat value) of negative stimuli used to capture attention in 
measures of ABT. Secondary procedural moderators of the ABT-anxiety link (i.e. procedural 
moderators conditional on the use of sadness-related stimuli to assess ABT) identified in the 
present thesis were (see Figure 8.1 for an illustration): (1) The use of extra-decisional 
reaction times derived from drift-diffusion modelling to compute bias scores (vs. traditional 
reaction times; Study 3, Chapter 6 and Follow-Up Study, Chapter 7), (2) Remote data 
collection methods (vs. in-lab testing; Study 3, Chapter 6), and (3) the restriction of analyses 






for which they were normed (vs. full sample data; Follow-Up Study, Chapter 7). Tentatively, 
these factors may also be important to consider in the assessment of ABT in anxiety (in 
addition to systematic control over the content/threat value of negative stimuli used to capture 
attention), although further confirmatory research is warranted in each aspect. 
The implications and directions for future research presented above should be 
evaluated, bearing in mind that presently observed correlations between indices of ABT and 
anxiety were small overall (r representing the relationship between Sad bias score and DASS-
21 Anxiety ranged from |.127| to |.205|, which in turn translates to an r-square or explained 
variance range between 1.6% to 4.2%). As earlier mentioned, despite ABT playing only a 
limited role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety, there are alternate ways to conceive 
of these small effect sizes. One possible account is that presently observed small effect sizes 
reflect the inherent limited sensitivity of “noisy” reaction-time-based measures to self-report 
measures of psychopathology (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018), the assumption of which 
may in turn explain persistent research enthusiasm for the ABT-anxiety link despite relatively 
weak associations. Indeed, small effect sizes similar to those reported in this thesis do not 
appear to be  uncommon in other anxiety-related studies using the dot probe task (e.g. Abend 
et al., 2018; Campbell & Kertz, 2019; Ho, Yeung, & Mak, 2017; Klein, de Voogd, Wiers, & 
Salemink, 2018; Miloff, Savva, & Carlbring, 2015) and other behavioural measures of ABT 
(e.g. de Voogd, Wiers, & Salemink, 2017; Brown et al., 2014; Verkuil, Brosschot, Putman, & 
Thayer, 2009). 
Yet, statistical techniques employed in the present thesis to overcome precision-
related issues associated with manual reaction-time-based measures only had limited success 
in improving correlations between indices of ABT and anxiety. Specifically, drift-diffusion 
modelling techniques employed to derive extra-decisional reaction times (and indices of 






correlations between ABT and anxiety beyond the low range (r = |.205| at ceiling). In other 
studies beyond the present thesis which have complemented behavioural measures of ABT 
(i.e. reaction-time-based measures) with eye-tracking (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, & Hyatt, 
2013; Veerapa et al., 2020), neuroimaging (Price et al., 2014; Harrewjin et al., 2020), or 
electroencephalography techniques (Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014), 
supplementary indices of ABT derived from these more advanced (and assumedly more 
precise) methodologies also tend to yield correlations with anxiety falling in the low (r < 
|.300|) and/or non-significant range. It may be timely at this point to revisit the 
Wittgensteinian quote laid out at outset of the Introduction (Chapter 1) in the present thesis: 
“… the problems and the method pass each other by.”  
 In the Introduction, the quote was utilized to illustrate that inconsistent findings on the 
association between ABT and anxiety cannot be explained fully by the lack of sensitivity of 
measures of ABT to anxiety. Rather, inconsistent findings on the association between ABT 
and anxiety reflect actual phenomena which make sense when the adaptive aspects of ABT 
are considered (Section 1.2.1.1), a notion indirectly supported by findings of the present 
thesis.  
An integration of current and previous findings on the ABT-anxiety link suggests that the 
implications of the quote extends to the associative magnitude between ABT and anxiety, 
such that small effect sizes cannot fully be explained by limitations of methodology. As 
research on ABT (and attentional bias modification programs) in relation to anxiety continues 
to expand, it may be important to note that the volume of work elapsed on ABT in research 
on the etiology and maintenance of anxiety should not be conflated with the centrality of 






taken on board in the design of studies on the ABT-anxiety link and of attentional bias 
modification programs, to which end the present thesis represents a starting point.  
 In conclusion, it is important to highlight that the above discussion does not entail that 
the Negative Valence Systems should be subsidiarised in the conceptualization of anxious 
pathology. That is, the RDoC framework was used to guide the present thesis, and ABT was 
treated as a proxy for the Negative Valence Systems for the purpose of having a backdrop to 
work against. There is a wealth of evidence, both anecdotal and empirical, to suggest that 
habitual patterns of responding to aversive situations or contexts (i.e. the primary function of 
the Negative Valence Systems as defined in the RDoC framework) are key in differentiating 
anxious individuals from their non-anxious counterparts. Although a simplified version of the 
RDoC framework was applied in the present thesis, the RDoC framework additionally parses 
each major functional domain into subsidiary functional systems termed “constructs”. 
Outcomes of the present thesis suggest that future research on the ABT-anxiety link within 
context of the RDoC framework may benefit from considering ABT as a sub-order construct 
of the Negative Valance Systems, rather than constituent of the Negative Valence Systems. 
Precisely, ABT may be best conceptualised as a component rather than central process 
involved in anxiety. 
8.4. Addendum 
 Through the empirical chapters (Chapter 4 to 6) that relied on the main dot probe task 
of the present thesis (described in Section 3.3), sadness- and fear-related scenes (i.e. scenes 
which convey signals of elapsed and potential danger) were assumed to thematically 
represent mild and high threat respectively. However, this experimental manipulation was 
never directly empirically validated, i.e. Sad and Fear scenes used the in dot probe task of this 
thesis were never rated for their threatening properties, but were assumed to vary from mild 







Given the assumption that Sad and Fear scenes vary on a continuum of mild to high 
threat runs across the empirical chapters of the present thesis (and is central to the 
interpretation of findings from the present thesis), a post-hoc study was initiated at point of 
revision (March 2021) to empirically test the assumption. A survey was set up to collect 
threat ratings for each of the six Fear and Sad scenes (12 in total) which appeared in the main 
dot probe task of the present thesis. Images were presented sequentially in alternate order of 
Fear and Sad, with the following prompt for each image: “On a scale of 1 to 10, how 
threatening do you find the content in this picture? A rating of 1 indicates you do not find it 
threatening at all. A rating of 10 indicates you find it extremely threatening”. A call for 
participants was placed on the sub-Reddit r/SampleSize.  
An unexpectedly high number of responses were received. After removing incomplete 
responses (N =24), there were 1319 participants who provided threat ratings for each of the 
twelve experimental stimuli. These 1319 participants had a mean age of 26.07 (SD = 9.81), 
were 50.5% (666) Male, and were distributed across the following countries: 52.4% (691) 
United States, 9.1% (120) United Kingdom, 7.9% (104) Canada, 3.7% (49) Germany, 3.0% 
(39) Australia (proportions for all other countries were < 2.5%).  
Data was collapsed across 1319 participants, and images were made the main unit of 
observation to allow for Fear and Sad images to be compared on threat ratings. Data for this 
study, in pre-collapsed and collapsed forms, can be accessed via two separate sheets labelled 
accordingly at https://osf.io/dbxpz. A t-test performed using SPSS indicated that threat 
ratings were approximately twice as high for Fear images (M = 6.60, SD = .88) than Sad 
images (M = 3.12, SD = .87), t(10) = 6.91, p < .001.  
Given this post-hoc study was aimed at gaining a better of understanding of how 






differences were not considered/controlled for. However, the strength in sample size (N = 
1319) serves to alleviate some concerns on whether threat ratings obtained were specific to a 
given psychological profile.  Barring potential limitations of generalisability, findings from 
this post-hoc study add empirical support for the assumption that Sad and Fear scenes vary on 
a continuum of mild to high threat, and add strength to empirical chapters of this thesis by 
supporting the validity of the employed experimental manipulation and interpretation of 
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Appendix A: Search terms entered in each database 
Scopus: 
( TITLE ( anxiety )  AND  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "risk factor*"  OR  "contributing factor*"  
OR  "predisposing factor*" )  AND NOT  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "social phobia" )  AND NOT  
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "social anxiety" )  AND NOT  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "phobia" )  AND 
NOT  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "panic disorder" )  AND NOT  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ocd  OR  
"obsessive compulsive disorder"  OR  "obsessive-compulsive disorder" )  AND NOT  
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ptsd  OR  "post-traumatic stress disorder"  OR  trauma )  AND NOT  
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( depression ) )  
 
PsycINFO: 
TI anxiety AND ( risk factors or contributing factors or predisposing factors ) NOT ( ocd or 
obsessive compulsive disorder ) NOT ( ptsd or post traumatic stress disorder or posttraumatic 
stress disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder or trauma ) NOT ( social anxiety or social 
phobia or social anxiety disorders ) NOT panic disorder NOT depression  
 
PubMed:  
“predisposing factor*” [All Fields] OR “contributing factor*” [All Fields] OR "correlat*” 
[All Fields] OR "predict*"[All Fields] OR "associat*"[All Fields] OR "risk factor*"[All 
Fields] AND "anxiety"[title] NOT "social anxiety"[All Fields] NOT "social phobia"[All 
Fields] NOT "phobia"[All Fields] NOT "panic disorder"[All Fields] NOT "OCD"[All Fields] 
NOT "obsessive-compulsive"[All Fields] NOT "PTSD"[All Fields] NOT "post-







Appendix B: List of excluded cases 
A total of 159 cases (across 84 studies) were excluded. In the table below, numbered reasons 
for exclusion denote the following: 1 = Sociodemographics (40 cases), 2 = Health-risk 
behaviours or lifestyle factors (19 cases), 3 = Family history of psychopathology (15 cases), 4 
= Negative life events or life stressors (18 cases), 5 = Other mental health disorders or 
chronic physical health conditions (26 cases), 6 = Parenting factors (27 cases), 7 = Physical 




















1 Breinholst et 
al., 2018 
Paternal Rejection 6 1 
2 Brice Lepiece 
et al., 2019 
Age  1 6 
3  Having a paid job 1  
4  Gender 1  
5  Urbanisation 1  
6  Household income 1  
7  Cannabis/Alcohol Use  2  
8 Broeren et 
al., 2014 
Stressful life events 4 1 
9 Brown et al., 
2012 
Anxiety diagnosis status of 
their co-twin 
3 1 
10 Brumariu & 
Kerns, 2012 
Lower ability to manage 
intense emotions 
8 1 








Lower ability for cognitive 






Lower distress tolerance 8  
14 Gagne et al., 
2017 
Familial psychiatric history  3 1 
 
 Variables tagged with the superscript “” are emotion-regulatory factors which could potentially be classified 
as NVS-related variables (i.e. responses to aversive stimuli). However, these factors were presently excluded in 
light of ongoing discussion on whether emotional regulation may constitute an RDoC domain of its own 









Thought-action fusion1 8 1 
16 Hudson & 
Dodd, 2012 
Maternal over-involvement 6 3 
17  Maternal negativity 6  
18  Maternal anxiety 3  
19 Hudson et al., 
2011 
Overinvolved and negative 
parenting  
6 2 
20  Parental anxiety 3  
21 Izadpanah et 
al., 2016 
Maladaptive cognitive-
emotion regulation  
8 1 
22 Kerns et al., 
2011 
Family negative life events  4 3 
23  Mother’s anxiety  3  
24  Maternal sensitivity  6  
25 Mount et al 
2010  
Maternal sensitivity  6 1 
26 Owens et al 
2014 
Age 1 1 





28 Steiner et al 
2017 
Frequency of religious 
attendance  
2 3 
29  Frequency of private 
religious activity 
2  
30  Intrinsic religiosity  2  
31 Stevens et al 
2015  
Parental control 6 4 
32  Parental intrusiveness  6  
33  Parental rejection  6  
34  Parental over-protection 6  
35 Taylor & Del 
Pilar, 1992 
Recreational drug use 2 1 
36 Warren et al 
1997 
Maternal anxiety  3 1 
37 Van Brakel et 
al 2006 
Parental control  6 2 
38 Viana et al., 
2013 
Lower perceived control 
over external events 
8 2 
39  Parental anxious rearing  6  









1 Although a cognitive process by definition, the RDoC Cognitive Systems do not at present include meta-










disorder (ADHD)  
5 3 
43  Parental anxiety 3  










et al 2018 
Maternal parenting style 6 1 





47 Brauer et al., 
2015 
Air pollution  7 1 
48 Calling et al., 
2017 
Education 1 7 
49  Urbanization  1  
50  Marital Status 1  
51  Age 1  
52  Smoking 2  
53  Leisure time physical 
activity  
2  
54  Body mass index  2  
55 De Graaf et 
al., 2002 
Gender 1 9 
56  Age 1  
57  Education 1  
58  Urbanicity  1  
59  Living with partner 1  
60  Paid employment 1  
61  Chronic somatic disorder  5  
62  Parental psychiatric history  3  
63  Childhood trauma  4  
64 Douglas et 
al., 2010 
Childhood trauma 4 1 





66 Esbjorn et al., 
2016 
Maternal metacognitions 6 1 
67 Gada et al., 
2014 
Asthma  5 1 
68 Garcia et al., 
2013 
Twin psychiatric history  3 1 
69 Ginsburg et 
al., 2018 
Family conflict 4 3 
70  Parental over-control 6  
71  Parental psychopathology 3  
72 Gomes et al., 
2019 
Vocal risk factors (self-








73 Gorka et al 
2014 
Childhood trauma 4 1 
74 Grant et al., 
2005 
Gender 1 7 
75  Ethnicity  1  
76  Low income  1  
77  Marital status 1  
78  Substance use disorders  5  
79  Personality disorders  5  
80  Other affective/mood 
disorders  
5  
81 Grover et al 
2005 
Childhood adverse events 4 1 
82 Guo et al., 
2018 
Family dysfunction 4 1 
83 Helenius et al 
2014 
Familial psychiatric history  3 4 
84  Gender 1  
85  Birth cohort 1  
86  Area of residence  1  
87 Hildingh & 
Baigi, 2010 
Hypertension 5 1 
88 Jensen et al., 
2010 
Work dissatisfaction 4 1 
89 Jin et al., 
2014 
Gender 1 8 
90  Education grade 1  
91  Urbanization 1  
92  Age 1  
93  Number of siblings  1  
94  Temper (mild, middle, 
quick) 
8  
95  Disposition (introversion, 
middle, extraversion)2 
8  
96  Diet 2  
97 Kendler et 
al., 1994 
Twin psychiatric history  3 1 
98 Kender et al., 
2000 
Parenting style  6 1 












2 Although Extraversion can be mapped within the RDoC framework, there is no mention of the measure used to 
quantify the “Disposition” construct within the cited reference so it is unclear if the same psychological 






101 Lee et al., 
2015 
Occupational stress 4 1 
102 Leung et al., 
2010 
Academic stressors 4 1 
103 Liang & 
Chikritzhs, 
2011 
Alcohol misuse/dependence  2 1 
104 Liu et al., 
1997 
Stressful life events   4 1 
105 Lofors et al., 
2006 
Gender 1 7 
106  Marital status  1  
107  Immigrant status  1  
108  Social networks  1  
109  Housing tenure  1  
110  Employment status  1  
111  Income  1  
112 Ma et al., 
2011 
Family dynamics  6 1 
113 Mackintosh 
et al., 2006  




Alcoholism 5 1 
115 Miloyan et 
al., 2018 
Adverse life events 4 1 
116 Moylan et al., 
2013 
Smoking  2 1 
117 Muris & 
Meesters, 
2004 
Somatization symptoms 8 1 
118 Nordahl et 
al., 2007 
Maternal psychopathology 3 1 
119 Overgaard et 
al., 2014 
ADHD symptoms  5 1 
120 Pascual et al., 
2003 





Stressful life events  4 1 
122 Raposo et al., 
2014 
Early adverse experiences  4 1 
123 Remes et al 
2017 
Area deprivation  1 1 
124 Sanna et al., 
2013 
Age 1 16 
125  Body mass index (BMI) 2  






127  Physical activity  2  
128  Smoking status  2  
129  Alcohol consumption  2  
130  Musculoskeletal disease 5  
131  Thyroid disorders  5  
132  Metabolic disorders  5  
133  Gastrointestinal disorders  5  
134  Recurrent headaches  5  
135  Syncope and seizures  5  
136  Cardiovascular/pulmonary 
disease 
5  
137  Liver disorders  5  
138  Cancer 5  
139  Psoriasis  5  
140 Sareen et al., 
2004 
Alcohol use  2 1 
141 Saucedo-
Uribe et al., 
2019 
Season of the year  7 1 
142 Schleider et 
al., 2014 
Parental control 6 1 
143 Shapiro et al., 
2014 
Obstructive sleep apnea 
symptoms 
5 1 
144 Simon et al., 
2009 
 Mother’s pre-natal physical 
health 
 6 1 
145  Physical complications 
during birth process 
5  
146 Sipos et al., 
2010 
Cerebrovascular disorder 5 1 
147 Smith et al., 
2008 
Dementia 5 1 
148 Soenke et al., 
2010 
Childhood abuse 4 1 
149 Spada et al., 
2012 
Parental overprotection  6 2 
150  Parental metacognitions 6  
151 Sparkes & 
Connett, 
1999 
Asthma severity 5 1 
152 Takemura et 
al., 1999 
Smoking 2 1 
153 Tambs et al., 
2012 




Cannabis use 2 1 
155 Vannucci et 
al., 2017 






156 Vasiliadis et 
al., 2010 
Fetal growth 5 1 
157 Williams & 
Woodruff-
Borden, 2015 
Parent emotion socialization 
practices 
6 1 
158 Wu et al., 
2019 
Balance in time perspective 8 1 
159 Yoon & 
Zinbarg, 
2007 








Appendix C: References for 154 articles assessed for eligible correlates 
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Appendix D: Additional details (further breakdown of variable classes) 
Negative Valence Systems 
 The variable class “abnormalities in relation to the visual processing of threatening 
stimuli” (16 cases) can be further broken down as follows: Abnormal neural activity during 
the visual processing of threatening stimuli (8 cases), attentional avoidance of threatening 
stimuli (2 cases), increased attention for threatening stimuli (2 cases), emotion recognition 
bias for threatening facesNS, poorer attentional inhibition of threatening information, , and 
greater encoding of untrustworthy faces (higher sustained posterior contralateral negativity 
EEG amplitude). The variable class “abnormalities in relation to interoceptive processing” (5 
cases) was composed of anxiety sensitivity (4 cases) and interoceptive sensitivity (1 case). 
The variable class “early temperamental factors” (4 cases) was composed of the following 
factors: Highly reactive (Infanthood), Negative emotionality/shyness, Negative 
emotionality/fearful distress, and negative emotionality/irritable distress. The variable class 
“avoidant-related variables” (4 cases) was composed of the following factors: Harm-
avoidance, experiential avoidance (self-report and behavioural measures), and harm 
avoidance.  
Arousal and Regulatory Systems 
 The variable class “irregularities in autonomic nervous system activity” (8 cases) was 
composed of the following variables: lower resting vagal control, diminished heart rate 
variability, lower respiratory sinus arrhythmia, systolic and diastolic blood pressureNS, 
prolonged atrial electromechanical delay, increased QT variability (2 cases), and higher 
baseline electrodermal activity. The variable class “impaired contextual regulation of 
defensive responses” (2 cases) was composed of the following variables: Greater increase in 
heart rate in the context of ambiguous threat (1 case), early express of excess fear in low 
threat situations (1 case).  
Multi-Domain 
 Within the variable class “abnormal baseline connectivity between amygdala and 
other brain regions” (8 cases), implicated brain regions are as follows: anterior cingulate 
cortex, inferior temporal gyrus/paracentral lobule, medial orbitofrontal cortex, posterior 
cingulate cortex/parahippocampal gyrus, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (2 cases with opposite patterns of findings – see Cases #94 and #161). In 
one case, lower strength of an axonal pathway between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex 



















































Appendix F: Potential social-neutral images 
Below presents the ten potential stock photos for the social Neutral category, and their rates 
of agreement on each of the four emotional labels (Neutral, Fear, Happy, Sad) across 21 
participants in the follow-up judgement task.  Images are sorted from highest to lowest based 
on rates of agreement on Neutral. 
Stock 
Photo 





















































































































































































































































































Appendix J: Correlations between possible mediator and independent variables 
The table below gives correlations between possible mediator variables (performance 
outcomes on CogState tests) and independent variables (in-lab bias scores), given in the 
format r [p-value]. 




CogState tests [Outcome Variable]  Fear Sad Fear Sad 


































Groton Maze Learning Test – 

























International Shopping List Test – 








































Appendix K: Fear and sad intensity ratings for target images (full sample data) 
The table below gives mean fear and sad intensity ratings for target images across the full 
sample (220 participants). Trials presenting images marked with an asterisk were removed in 
analyses using Data Subset 1.  
Assigned 
Emotion 









Fear 1052 5.19 [3.25] 1.51 [1.18] 3.68 [.206] 
Fear 6300 5.80 [3.16] 2.26 [2.20] 3.54 [.205] 
Fear 6230 6.18 [3.08] 2.74 [2.36] 3.44 [.198] 
Fear 5972 5.13 [3.05] 2.81 [2.28] 2.32 [.200] 
Fear 9620* 4.99 [3.05] 3.96 [2.58] 1.03 [.205] 
Fear 2751* 4.35 [2.94] 3.96 [2.66] 0.40 [.192] 
Sad 9181 2.80 [2.39] 7.35 [2.80] 4.55 [.202] 
Sad 9415 2.27 [2.16] 5.93 [2.99] 3.66 [.188] 
Sad 9421 2.97 [2.42] 5.84 [3.05] 2.87 [.193] 
Sad 9000 3.04 [2.48] 5.01 [3.07] 1.97 [.203] 
Sad 9910* 4.38 [2.89] 6.23 [2.87] 1.85 [.197] 
Sad 9911* 4.00 [2.90] 5.59 [3.06] 1.59 [.208] 
 
